Incident: Apple iOS Security Vulnerability Allows Complete iPhone Access

Published Date: 2020-12-02

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident of the Apple security vulnerability happened in November 2020 [108991].
System 1. Apple's iOS software 2. Apple's proprietary mesh network AWDL 3. iPhone 11 Pro 4. Wi-Fi adapters 5. Raspberry Pi
Responsible Organization 1. Potential hackers were responsible for causing the software failure incident by exploiting the security vulnerability in Apple's iOS devices [108991].
Impacted Organization 1. iPhone users were impacted by the software failure incident [108991].
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a security vulnerability in Apple's iOS that allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to a person's iPhone without the victim needing to click on any suspicious links or download malware [108991].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of built-in encryption in Apple's proprietary mesh network AWDL, allowing for exploitation over Wi-Fi signals [108991]. 2. Buffer overflow programming error in C++ code that allowed untrusted data to pass through over Wi-Fi signals [108991].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to a person's iPhone without the victim needing to click on any suspicious links or download malware, potentially compromising sensitive information and activities [108991]. 2. The vulnerability exposed by the incident could enable hackers to steal photos from iPhones, reboot multiple iPhones simultaneously, and gain a treasure trove of information on unsuspecting targets [108991]. 3. About 13% of all iPhone users were still vulnerable to the security flaw even after it was fixed, highlighting the potential risk and impact on a significant portion of iPhone users [108991].
Preventions 1. Regular security audits and penetration testing could have potentially identified the vulnerability before it was exploited [108991]. 2. Implementing encryption in the proprietary mesh network AWDL could have prevented the exploit that allowed unauthorized access to iOS devices [108991]. 3. Enhancing the code review process to catch programming errors like buffer overflows could have mitigated the risk of such vulnerabilities being present in the software [108991]. 4. Continuous monitoring and updating of software to patch known vulnerabilities could have prevented the exploitation of the flaw [108991].
Fixes 1. The software failure incident, which was a security vulnerability in Apple's iOS allowing potential hackers to gain complete access to iPhones, was fixed in May through a patch introduced by Apple [108991]. 2. Apple introduced its notification exposure tools on iOS devices as part of the same patch that fixed the security flaw, providing additional protection against similar vulnerabilities [108991].
References 1. Ian Beer, a security researcher with Google's Project Zero [108991] 2. Apple's statement regarding the security flaw [108991]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to a security vulnerability in Apple's iOS devices has happened before within the same organization. In 2019, Ian Beer's team discovered another iOS vulnerability that allowed hacked websites to send malware to visitors, which was used by the Chinese government to track and spy on Uighur Muslims [108991]. (b) The software failure incident related to a security vulnerability in Apple's iOS devices has also happened at other organizations or with their products and services. This incident highlighted the potential risks associated with vulnerabilities that do not require victims to click on anything and give full access to attackers. Such vulnerabilities are considered significant threats to companies like Apple, emphasizing the importance of robust security measures across the industry [108991].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be attributed to the security vulnerability in Apple's iOS that allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to a person's iPhone without the victim needing to click on any suspicious links or download malware. This vulnerability was a result of a flaw in Apple's proprietary mesh network AWDL, which allowed for untrusted data to pass through over Wi-Fi signals due to a "fairly trivial buffer overflow programming error in C++ code" [108991]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be seen in how the iOS exploit demonstrated by Ian Beer only required the victim to be within Wi-Fi range for the attack to work. This means that the operation or use of the iPhone within Wi-Fi range could potentially lead to the device being compromised without the user's knowledge or interaction [108991].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident, which was a security vulnerability in Apple's iOS, was due to contributing factors that originated from within the system itself. The vulnerability was related to a flaw in Apple's proprietary mesh network AWDL, which allowed for the exploit to take place over Wi-Fi signals. The flaw was described as a "fairly trivial buffer overflow programming error in C++ code" that enabled untrusted data to pass through [108991]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident was not due to contributing factors that originated from outside the system. The vulnerability did not require any external manipulation or interaction from the user; it only needed the victim to be within Wi-Fi range for the exploit to work [108991].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a security vulnerability in Apple's iOS that allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to iPhones without the victims needing to click on any suspicious links or download malware. The vulnerability exploited a weakness in Apple's proprietary mesh network AWDL, which did not have built-in encryption, allowing for the exploit to occur over Wi-Fi signals [108991]. (b) However, it's important to note that while the initial vulnerability was due to non-human actions, the discovery and exploitation of this vulnerability were carried out by a security researcher, Ian Beer, who spent about six months looking into the security flaw and was able to exploit a single memory corruption to take over devices. This highlights the role of human actions in identifying and exploiting software vulnerabilities [108991].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident reported in the article was primarily due to hardware-related vulnerabilities. The security researcher, Ian Beer, discovered a security vulnerability in Apple's iOS devices that exploited weaknesses in Apple's proprietary mesh network AWDL, which is a hardware-related feature allowing iOS devices to connect to each other. Beer was able to exploit a memory corruption in the network, which did not have built-in encryption, to take over devices like the iPhone 11 Pro [108991]. (b) The software failure incident also had software-related aspects as the vulnerability stemmed from a "fairly trivial buffer overflow programming error in C++ code" that allowed untrusted data to pass through over Wi-Fi signals. This indicates a software flaw in the code implementation that led to the security vulnerability [108991].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The security vulnerability in Apple's iOS allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to a person's iPhone without the victim needing to click on any suspicious links or download malware. The vulnerability was exploited through a Wi-Fi-based attack, demonstrating how an attacker could steal photos, monitor activities in real-time, and even reboot multiple iPhones simultaneously without the victims' interaction [108991]. The security researcher, Ian Beer, highlighted the significant power an attacker could wield with such capabilities, emphasizing the potential harm that could be inflicted on unsuspecting targets. Additionally, the article mentions a previous iOS vulnerability that was exploited by the Chinese government to track and spy on Uighur Muslims, further underscoring the malicious intent behind such software vulnerabilities [108991]. (b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that it was not caused by accidental or unintentional factors. The vulnerability stemmed from a programming error in Apple's proprietary mesh network AWDL, which lacked built-in encryption, allowing for a memory corruption exploit over Wi-Fi signals. The security researcher, Ian Beer, spent about six months investigating the vulnerability and identified a "fairly trivial buffer overflow programming error in C++ code" that enabled the exploit [108991]. While the flaw was not intentionally introduced to harm the system, it nonetheless posed a significant security risk to iPhone users, highlighting the importance of thorough security testing and patching processes in software development.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the Apple security vulnerability can be attributed to poor decisions made in the software development process. The vulnerability that allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to iPhones without the need for victims to click on any suspicious links or download malware was a result of a "fairly trivial buffer overflow programming error in C++ code" within Apple's proprietary mesh network AWDL [108991]. This programming error, which lacked built-in encryption, enabled the exploitation of a single memory corruption to take over devices, including newer models like the iPhone 11 Pro. Additionally, the fact that the vulnerability was not discovered and patched until security researcher Ian Beer spent about six months investigating it suggests a lapse in Apple's security measures and decision-making processes [108991]. (b) On the other hand, the software failure incident can also be seen as a result of accidental decisions or unintended consequences. The vulnerability was not intentionally introduced by Apple but rather stemmed from a programming error that allowed untrusted data to pass through over Wi-Fi signals, ultimately leading to the security flaw [108991]. Despite Apple's usual investments in security and the rarity of vulnerabilities in their systems, this incident highlights how even unintentional mistakes in software development can have significant consequences, as demonstrated by the potential for complete access to iPhones without user interaction.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the Apple security vulnerability discovered by Ian Beer. Beer found a security flaw in Apple's proprietary mesh network AWDL, which allowed him to exploit a single memory corruption to take over devices as new as the iPhone 11 Pro. The vulnerability stemmed from a "fairly trivial buffer overflow programming error in C++ code" that enabled untrusted data to pass through over Wi-Fi signals [108991]. (b) The accidental nature of the software failure incident is highlighted by the fact that Ian Beer discovered the security vulnerability during his research efforts. There is no indication in the article that the vulnerability was intentionally introduced or that it was a deliberate act. Instead, it appears to have been an unintended consequence of the lack of encryption in Apple's AWDL network, which allowed Beer to exploit the flaw accidentally while investigating the system [108991].
Duration temporary (a) The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. The security vulnerability that could have allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to a person's iPhone was fixed in May through a patch introduced by Apple [Article 108991]. This indicates that the failure was not permanent and was addressed by the company.
Behaviour omission, value (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article did not involve a crash where the system loses state and stops performing its intended functions. Instead, it focused on a security vulnerability that allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to a person's iPhone without the victim needing to click on any suspicious links or download malware [108991]. (b) omission: The vulnerability in the Apple software allowed for the omission of the need for victims to interact with any malicious content. Hackers could exploit the flaw without the victim needing to click on anything, thus omitting the usual requirement for user interaction in many cyber attacks [108991]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident was not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early. Instead, the vulnerability allowed for immediate access to the victim's iPhone without any delay [108991]. (d) value: The software failure incident did involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The security vulnerability allowed hackers to gain unauthorized access to iPhones and extract sensitive information without the victim's knowledge or consent, showcasing a failure in the system's security mechanisms [108991]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The vulnerability described in the article allowed for a consistent and successful exploitation by potential hackers, rather than erratic or inconsistent behavior [108991]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident could be categorized as a security vulnerability that bypassed the typical user interaction requirements for a successful cyber attack. This behavior falls under the category of a critical flaw in the system's security defenses, leading to unauthorized access and potential data breaches [108991].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, theoretical_consequence (a) unknown (b) unknown (c) unknown (d) The software failure incident related to the Apple security vulnerability could have allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to a person's iPhone, including viewing photos and monitoring activities in real time, without the victim needing to click on any suspicious links or download malware. This could have resulted in a significant breach of personal data and privacy [108991]. (e) unknown (f) unknown (g) The security flaw was fixed in May, and the majority of users were already on current versions of iOS and thus protected against the issue. Additionally, the exploit required relatively close proximity as it needed to be within Wi-Fi range to work, reducing the likelihood of widespread consequences [108991]. (h) The potential consequences discussed included the ability for an attacker to gain a treasure trove of information on an unsuspecting target, the exploitation of a single memory corruption to take over devices, and the possibility for a motivated attacker with just one vulnerability to remotely compromise top-of-the-range iPhones [108991]. (i) unknown
Domain information (a) The software failure incident reported in the article is related to the information industry. The vulnerability in Apple's iOS system allowed potential hackers to gain complete access to a person's iPhone, enabling them to view photos and monitor activities without the victim needing to click on any suspicious links or download malware [Article 108991]. This incident highlights the importance of security in protecting information and data privacy in the digital age.

Sources

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