| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the election in Michigan and Georgia involved issues with election-management software made by Dominion Voting Systems in Antrim County, Michigan [110271]. This incident led to errors in the unofficial vote counts due to human error in configuring ballot scanners and reporting systems with slightly different versions of the ballot. However, it was clarified that the errors were isolated cases and did not signal wider issues with vote counts elsewhere. The incident was quickly rectified by local officials.
(b) The software failure incident in Georgia also involved issues with software used by poll workers to check in voters in two counties and delayed the reporting of results in another county. The issues in Gwinnett County were tied to Dominion Voting Systems, while the issues in the other two counties, Spalding and Morgan, were related to systems made by a company called KnowInk. This shows that software issues occurred with products from different companies in different counties, indicating that similar incidents happened at multiple organizations [110271]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in Michigan's Antrim and Oakland counties was attributed to human error in configuring ballot scanners and reporting systems with slightly different versions of the ballot, leading to results not aligning with the correct candidate when loaded into the system. This issue was identified as a design-related failure introduced during the system development or configuration phase [110271].
(b) The software issues in Georgia affected how poll workers checked in voters in two counties and delayed the reporting of results in another county. These issues were related to the operation of the system, specifically with the interaction between KnowInk Poll Pads and ballot-marking devices, rather than a fault in the Dominion software as initially suggested. This operational failure impacted the check-in process at the polls [110271]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the news articles was primarily within the system. The issues in Michigan's Antrim and Oakland counties were caused by human error in configuring ballot scanners and reporting systems, leading to incorrect vote counts [110271]. Additionally, in Georgia, software issues only affected how poll workers checked in voters in two counties and delayed the reporting of results in another, but did not affect the actual vote counts [110271]. The errors were identified and rectified by election officials within the system before the final certification process [110271]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in Michigan's Antrim and Oakland counties was caused by human error, not software glitches. In Antrim County, the issue arose because an election worker had configured ballot scanners and reporting systems with slightly different versions of the ballot, leading to results not aligning with the correct candidate when loaded into the system. Similarly, in Oakland County, a local race result was changed after election officials spotted an error in the unofficial counts, where votes from the city of Rochester Hills were mistakenly counted twice [110271].
(b) The human actions that led to the software failure incidents included errors made by election workers in configuring the ballot scanners and reporting systems in Antrim County, as well as the mistake of counting votes from Rochester Hills twice in Oakland County. These human errors were identified and rectified by election officials in both counties [110271]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in Michigan and Georgia was not primarily due to hardware issues but rather human error and misconfigurations in the software systems. For example, in Antrim County, Michigan, the issue arose from an election worker configuring ballot scanners and reporting systems with slightly different versions of the ballot, leading to results not aligning with the correct candidate [110271]. Similarly, in Oakland County, Michigan, a local race result was changed due to election officials spotting an error in the unofficial counts where votes from a specific city were mistakenly counted twice [110271].
(b) The software failure incidents in Michigan and Georgia were primarily attributed to software issues such as misconfigurations and glitches. In Antrim County, Michigan, the initial discrepancy in vote counts was due to misconfigurations in the ballot scanners and reporting systems [110271]. Additionally, in Georgia, software issues only affected how poll workers checked in voters in two counties and delayed the reporting of results in another, but did not impact the actual vote counts [110271]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles was non-malicious. The issues in Michigan's Antrim and Oakland counties were caused by human error, not software glitches [110271]. The errors were attributed to election workers configuring ballot scanners and reporting systems with slightly different versions of the ballot, leading to mismatches in results when loaded into the system. Additionally, in Georgia, software issues only affected how poll workers checked in voters in two counties and delayed the reporting of results in another, but did not impact the actual vote counts [110271]. The Michigan Department of State emphasized that the mistakes were honest errors that were quickly rectified, and the system of checks in place worked to identify and correct them [110271]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be seen in the incident where election workers in Antrim County, Michigan, configured ballot scanners and reporting systems with slightly different versions of the ballot, leading to results not aligning with the correct candidate when loaded into the system [110271]. This poor decision resulted in an initial incorrect count showing President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. beating Mr. Trump by roughly 3,000 votes, which was later corrected to show Mr. Trump beating Mr. Biden by roughly 2,500 votes.
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental decisions is evident in the incident in Oakland County, Michigan, where election workers mistakenly counted votes from the city of Rochester Hills twice, leading to an error in the unofficial counts [110271]. This mistake initially indicated that an incumbent Republican county commissioner had lost his seat, but the corrected tallies showed he actually kept it. The error was quickly rectified once identified. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in Michigan's Antrim and Oakland counties was caused by human error, not software glitches. An election worker had configured ballot scanners and reporting systems with slightly different versions of the ballot, leading to results not lining up with the right candidate when loaded into the system [110271].
(b) The incident in Oakland County, Michigan, where the result of a local race was changed, was due to election workers mistakenly counting votes from the city of Rochester Hills twice. This error was quickly rectified once spotted by officials [110271]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as temporary. The issues reported in Michigan and Georgia were attributed to human error in configuring ballot scanners and reporting systems, as well as problems with how poll workers checked in voters. These issues were identified and rectified, indicating that the failures were temporary and not permanent [110271]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, timing, other |
(a) crash: The articles do not mention any instances of a system crash as a result of the software failure incident. [110271]
(b) omission: The software failure incident in Michigan's Antrim and Oakland counties resulted in errors in the unofficial vote counts due to omission of performing its intended functions correctly. For example, in Antrim County, the error occurred because an election worker had configured ballot scanners and reporting systems with slightly different versions of the ballot, leading to results not lining up with the right candidate. In Oakland County, votes from the city of Rochester Hills were mistakenly counted twice, affecting the outcome of a local race. These omissions were quickly rectified once identified. [110271]
(c) timing: The software issues in Georgia affected the timing of the reporting of results in one county due to problems with how poll workers checked in voters. However, these timing issues did not impact the actual vote counts. [110271]
(d) value: The software failure incident did not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly in terms of producing inaccurate results. The errors in the vote counts were due to human error and configuration mistakes rather than the software producing incorrect values. [110271]
(e) byzantine: The articles do not mention any instances of the software behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions, which would align with a byzantine failure. [110271]
(f) other: The software failure incident involved errors caused by human error, configuration mistakes, and issues with how poll workers checked in voters, which do not fit specifically into the categories of crash, omission, timing, value, or byzantine failures. The main issue was related to misconfigurations and mistakes in the handling of the election process rather than the software itself behaving in an unexpected manner. [110271] |