Recurring |
multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The article does not provide specific information about a similar incident happening again within the same organization or with its products and services. Therefore, it is unknown if a similar incident has occurred again at one organization.
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article mentions that Orcha, a firm that reviews healthcare apps for several NHS trusts, found that 80% of the healthcare apps they reviewed did not meet their standards. This indicates that the issue of healthcare apps not meeting standards is prevalent across multiple organizations or developers who have created these apps [110883]. |
Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The article mentions examples of software failures related to the design phase, where apps were found to have poor information, lack of security updates, and insufficient awareness of regulatory requirements [110883].
(b) The article also highlights software failures related to the operation phase, where an app to help smokers quit had not received security updates in over two years, indicating a failure in maintaining and operating the system properly [110883]. |
Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the article is primarily due to factors originating from within the system. The failure of healthcare apps to meet NHS standards is attributed to issues such as poor information, lack of security updates, insufficient awareness of regulatory requirements, and offering services without necessary expertise or professional input [110883]. These are all internal factors related to the development and maintenance of the apps themselves, indicating a within-system failure. |
Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The article mentions a software failure incident related to non-human actions, specifically in the context of healthcare apps not meeting NHS standards. The failures include poor information, lack of security updates, and insufficient awareness of regulatory requirements in the reviewed apps [110883]. These issues point to failures introduced without direct human participation, such as lack of proper maintenance or oversight.
(b) The article also highlights a software failure incident related to human actions. It mentions that developers may unintentionally fail to meet regulatory requirements due to a lack of understanding, leading to apps not meeting necessary standards [110883]. Additionally, the article discusses the importance of thorough research and design in app development, indicating that human actions, such as inadequate research or design, can contribute to software failures [110883]. |
Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident occurring due to contributing factors originating in hardware [110883].
(b) The software failure incidents mentioned in the article are primarily due to contributing factors originating in software. Examples include a diabetes management app offering complex medical support without expert backup, a physiotherapy app providing exercise plans without professional input, and a quit-smoking app lacking security updates [110883]. |
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) In the article, it is mentioned that a diabetes management app was offering complex medical support without any back-up from experts, a physiotherapy app was offering exercise plans without visible input from professionals, and an app to help smokers quit had not received security updates in more than two years [110883]. These instances indicate non-malicious software failures where the contributing factors were not introduced with the intent to harm the system but rather due to poor development practices or lack of expertise.
(b) The article does not provide any specific information about a software failure incident related to malicious intent introduced by humans to harm the system. |
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
- The article highlights that many healthcare apps reviewed by Orcha fail to meet standards due to poor information, lack of security updates, and insufficient awareness of regulatory requirements [110883].
- Developers may unintentionally fail to meet regulations because they may not realize what is required, leading to software failures [110883].
- Liz Ashall-Payne, the chief executive of Orcha, mentions that innovators can get a bad reputation due to unintentional failures, even if they have good intentions [110883].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
- The article mentions that developers may unintentionally fail to meet regulations because they may not realize what is required, leading to software failures [110883].
- Liz Ashall-Payne, the chief executive of Orcha, discusses how developers with good intentions may not know which regulations their products need to comply with, resulting in accidental failures [110883]. |
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) In the article, it is mentioned that a diabetes management app offered complex medical support without any back-up from experts, a physiotherapy app offered exercise plans without visible input from professionals, and an app to help smokers quit had not received security updates in more than two years. These examples highlight failures due to development incompetence, where apps were lacking professional expertise and updates necessary for their intended functions [110883].
(b) The article also discusses how developers may unintentionally fail to meet regulatory requirements, such as the need for a CE quality mark for medical devices or registration with national regulators. This lack of awareness or oversight can lead to accidental failures in compliance with regulations, even if the developers had good intentions but were not fully informed about the necessary standards [110883]. |
Duration |
unknown |
The articles do not provide specific information about a software failure incident being permanent or temporary. |
Behaviour |
crash, omission, value |
(a) crash: The article mentions examples of poor healthcare apps, such as a diabetes management app offering complex medical support without any back-up from experts, a physiotherapy app offering exercise plans without visible input from professionals, and an app to help smokers quit that had not received security updates in over two years. These examples suggest a potential for crashes where the system may lose state and fail to perform its intended functions [110883].
(b) omission: The article highlights that 80% of healthcare apps reviewed by Orcha did not meet its standards, with failings including poor information, lack of security updates, and insufficient awareness of regulatory requirements. This indicates instances where the apps omitted to perform their intended functions at certain instances [110883].
(c) timing: The article does not specifically mention any instances of timing failures related to the software failure incident [110883].
(d) value: The examples provided in the article, such as a diabetes management app offering complex medical support without expert back-up and a physiotherapy app offering exercise plans without professional input, suggest potential value failures where the system may perform its intended functions incorrectly [110883].
(e) byzantine: The article does not mention any instances of byzantine failures related to the software failure incident [110883].
(f) other: The article does not provide information on any other specific behaviors of the software failure incident beyond crashes, omissions, and value failures [110883]. |