| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to a vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus is an example of a software failure incident happening again within the same organization. This incident involved a critical 12-year-old bug in Windows Defender that was overlooked until recently, highlighting the challenge of identifying and addressing long-standing vulnerabilities within a company's own software products [Article 111076].
(b) The article mentions historic bugs cropping up occasionally in various software products, such as a 20-year-old Mac modem flaw and a 10-year-old zombie bug in Avaya desk phones. This indicates that software failure incidents, including long-standing vulnerabilities, can occur at multiple organizations and with different products over time [Article 111076]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 111076 can be attributed to the design phase. The critical 12-year-old bug in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus was a result of a flaw in the driver used by the antivirus program to delete invasive files created by malware. The flaw allowed attackers to manipulate the system by inserting strategic system links, leading to the overwrite of the wrong file or even the execution of malicious code. This design flaw in the driver's functionality was exploited by attackers due to the lack of specific verification of the new file, highlighting a vulnerability introduced during the system development phase [111076].
(b) There is no specific information in the articles pointing to the software failure incident being caused by factors related to the operation phase or misuse of the system. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the critical 12-year-old bug in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus was within the system. The vulnerability was present in a driver used by Windows Defender to delete invasive files created by malware. The flaw allowed an attacker to manipulate the system by inserting strategic system links that could direct the driver to overwrite the wrong file or run malicious code [Article 111076]. The vulnerability was discovered by researchers at SentinelOne, who reported it to Microsoft, leading to the release of a patch to address the issue.
(b) The software failure incident was also influenced by factors outside the system. The vulnerability could only be exploited when an attacker already had access—remote or physical—to a target device. This means that the exploit required an initial breach of security to take advantage of the vulnerability. The incident highlights the importance of considering external threats and access points when assessing software vulnerabilities [Article 111076]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 111076 occurred due to a non-human action, specifically a critical 12-year-old bug in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus that was discovered by researchers at the security firm SentinelOne. The flaw was in a driver used by Windows Defender to delete invasive files created by malware. The system didn't verify the new file replacing the malicious one, allowing an attacker to manipulate the driver to overwrite the wrong file or run malicious code [111076].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 111076 was also influenced by human actions, as the vulnerability in the Windows Defender antivirus was overlooked by both attackers and defenders for 12 years until it was discovered by researchers at SentinelOne. The bug was reported to Microsoft, which then released a patch to address the issue. The vulnerability could only be exploited when an attacker already had access to the target device, either remotely or physically, highlighting the importance of human actions in addressing and mitigating software vulnerabilities [111076]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the article is related to a vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus software, specifically in a driver used by the antivirus program. The vulnerability allowed attackers to manipulate the driver to overwrite the wrong file or run malicious code, potentially leading to privilege escalation and compromise of the machine [111076].
(b) The software failure incident is attributed to a critical 12-year-old bug in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus software. The bug was found in a driver used by Windows Defender to delete invasive files created by malware. The flaw in the software allowed attackers to insert strategic system links that could direct the driver to overwrite the wrong file or run malicious code, leading to potential compromise of the device [111076]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus was a critical 12-year-old bug that could be exploited by attackers to delete crucial software or data, direct the driver to run malicious code, and escalate privileges to compromise the machine. The flaw allowed attackers to manipulate the system by inserting strategic system links that could overwrite the wrong file or run malicious code, potentially taking over the device. The incident was discovered by security researchers at SentinelOne, who reported it to Microsoft, leading to the release of a patch to address the vulnerability [Article 111076]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the 12-year-old bug in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus can be attributed to poor decisions. The vulnerability was overlooked by both attackers and defenders until recently, indicating a lack of proper attention to security measures [111076]. Additionally, the vulnerability allowed for privilege escalation, enabling software running under low privileges to elevate to administrative privileges and compromise the machine, highlighting a critical flaw in the design and implementation of the software [111076]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 111076 was not due to development incompetence. The vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus was a critical 12-year-old bug that was discovered by researchers at the security firm SentinelOne. The flaw was related to a driver used by Windows Defender to delete invasive files created by malware. The driver did not specifically verify new files, allowing attackers to manipulate the system and potentially run malicious code. The bug was reported to Microsoft by SentinelOne, and Microsoft released a patch to address the vulnerability [111076].
(b) The software failure incident in Article 111076 was accidental in nature. The vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus was seemingly overlooked by attackers and defenders for 12 years until it was recently discovered by researchers at SentinelOne. The flaw was related to a driver used by Windows Defender, which did not verify new files, allowing attackers to potentially run malicious code. The accidental nature of this failure was highlighted by the fact that the vulnerable driver was not stored on a computer's hard drive full-time but was loaded dynamically and deleted when not needed, contributing to the long period during which the vulnerability remained undetected [111076]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was temporary. The vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus, which had been present for 12 years, was recently discovered by researchers at SentinelOne and reported to Microsoft in mid-November. Microsoft then released a patch on February 9 to address the critical bug. The vulnerability could only be exploited when an attacker already had access to the target device, either remotely or physically. The incident was not permanent as it was mitigated by the patch released by Microsoft [Article 111076]. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article is not related to a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Defender antivirus allowed for potential privilege escalation and compromise of the machine [Article 111076].
(b) omission: The software failure incident is not due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The vulnerability in Windows Defender was related to a critical 12-year-old bug that allowed attackers to manipulate the system to delete crucial software or data, or even run their own code to take over the device [Article 111076].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not due to the system performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early. The vulnerability in Windows Defender was a long-standing issue that remained hidden for years until it was discovered by researchers at SentinelOne [Article 111076].
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The vulnerability in Windows Defender allowed for potential privilege escalation and compromise of the machine by attackers exploiting the flaw [Article 111076].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident is not related to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The vulnerability in Windows Defender was a specific bug in a driver that could be exploited by attackers to manipulate the system and potentially compromise the device [Article 111076].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a critical security vulnerability that allowed for privilege escalation and compromise of the machine. The flaw in Windows Defender's driver could be exploited by attackers to delete crucial software or data, or run malicious code on the device [Article 111076]. |