| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The incident involving the exploitation of the IT monitoring tool Centreon by hackers linked to Sandworm in France is reminiscent of a previous incident involving the GRU hacking French targets. In 2016, GRU hackers posing as Islamic extremists destroyed the network of France's TV5 television network [111074]. This suggests a pattern of aggressive hacking targeting French organizations by the same threat actors.
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article does not mention any specific instances of the same software failure incident happening at multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where hackers exploited an IT monitoring tool called Centreon, which had been running on servers of various French organizations. The hackers managed to breach these organizations by compromising servers running Centreon, which had been sold by the firm of the same name based in Paris. The French information security agency ANSSI found two different pieces of malware on these servers, indicating a breach that went undetected for as long as three years [111074].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the same article where it was mentioned that the victims of the hacking campaign were using an open-source version of Centreon's software that the company hadn't supported for more than five years. Additionally, these victims had deployed the software insecurely, including allowing connections from outside the organization's network. This operational misuse of the software contributed to the success of the hacking campaign [111074]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the hacking campaign exploiting the IT monitoring tool Centreon in France was primarily within the system. The hackers compromised servers running Centreon's software, exploiting vulnerabilities within the system to carry out the intrusion campaign [111074]. The French information security agency ANSSI found malware on the compromised servers, indicating that the breach originated from within the system itself [111074]. Additionally, the statement from Centreon mentioned that the victims were using an open-source version of Centreon's software that had not been supported for more than five years, suggesting internal system weaknesses contributed to the incident [111074].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident was also influenced by factors outside the system. The hackers with links to Sandworm, a group within Russia's GRU military intelligence agency, were responsible for the intrusion campaign, indicating external threat actors were involved in the attack [111074]. The hackers exploited internet-facing servers running Centreon's software inside the victims' networks, which could be considered an external factor affecting the system [111074]. The article also mentions similarities with another warning about Sandworm targeting internet-facing machines running the Exim email client, indicating external threats targeting vulnerable systems [111074]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case appears to be related to non-human actions, specifically the exploitation of an IT monitoring tool called Centreon by hackers with links to Sandworm, a group within Russia's GRU military intelligence agency [111074]. The hackers stealthily hacked targets in France by compromising servers running Centreon software, using malware like PAS and Exaramel. The intrusion campaign went undetected for as long as three years, indicating that the failure was due to factors introduced without human participation.
(b) The failure was not directly attributed to human actions in terms of introducing the contributing factors. However, it is worth noting that the victims were using an open-source version of Centreon's software that the company hadn't supported for more than five years and were deployed insecurely, allowing connections from outside the organization's network [111074]. This insecure deployment could be considered a human action that indirectly contributed to the software failure incident. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The articles do not mention any hardware-related failure incidents. [Article 111074]
(b) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to a breach that occurred by exploiting an IT monitoring tool called Centreon. The hackers compromised servers running Centreon software and planted malware on them, including a backdoor called PAS and another known as Exaramel. The breach was not due to a hardware failure but rather due to vulnerabilities in the software that allowed unauthorized access and compromise. [Article 111074] |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. The incident involved hackers linked to Sandworm, a group within Russia's GRU military intelligence agency, stealthily hacking targets in France by exploiting an IT monitoring tool called Centreon. The hackers compromised servers running Centreon with malware, including a backdoor called PAS and another known as Exaramel, which Sandworm has used in previous intrusions [Article 111074]. The article also mentions that Sandworm is known for destructive operations, and the end goal of most Sandworm operations is to cause a noticeable disruptive effect [Article 111074].
(b) The incident was not non-malicious as it involved intentional hacking activities by a group with a history of destructive cyberattacks. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
The software failure incident involving the hacking of French organizations through the exploitation of the IT monitoring tool Centreon by hackers linked to Sandworm (Russian military hackers) does not seem to be a result of poor decisions. The incident appears to be a deliberate and stealthy intrusion campaign carried out over several years with the use of sophisticated malware and techniques. The hackers compromised servers running Centreon and targeted specific organizations, including IT firms and web hosting companies, indicating a strategic and intentional effort to breach these entities [Article 111074]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as the French security agency ANSSI warned that hackers with links to Sandworm, a group within Russia's GRU military intelligence agency, had breached several French organizations by exploiting an IT monitoring tool called Centreon. The agency described the victims as "mostly" IT firms and particularly web hosting companies. The intrusion campaign dated back to late 2017 and continued until 2020, indicating a prolonged period of undetected compromise [Article 111074].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident related to the hacking campaign involving the exploitation of the IT monitoring tool Centreon by hackers linked to Sandworm was temporary in nature. The French information security agency ANSSI reported that the intrusion campaign began in late 2017 and continued until 2020, lasting for approximately three years [Article 111074]. This indicates that the software failure incident was not permanent but rather temporary, as it was ongoing for a specific duration before being detected and addressed. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the hackers stealthily hacked targets in France by exploiting an IT monitoring tool called Centreon and compromised servers running Centreon's software [111074].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The hackers successfully breached several French organizations by exploiting vulnerabilities in the IT monitoring tool Centreon [111074].
(c) timing: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early. The hackers were able to exploit the vulnerabilities in Centreon and carry out the intrusion campaign over a period of three years without being detected [111074].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The hackers compromised servers running Centreon's software and planted malware on them, indicating a successful intrusion rather than incorrect functioning of the software itself [111074].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The hackers' actions were deliberate and coordinated, leading to a successful breach of several French organizations using the Centreon IT monitoring tool [111074].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a targeted and stealthy cyber intrusion where the attackers exploited vulnerabilities in the Centreon software to gain unauthorized access to the systems of various organizations. The incident involved the use of specific malware tools and techniques linked to the Sandworm hacking group, indicating a sophisticated and coordinated attack [111074]. |