Published Date: 2021-03-09
Postmortem Analysis | |
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Timeline | 1. The software failure incident involving the hack of security cameras from Verkada, impacting various locations such as hospitals, schools, factories, and jails, occurred in March 2021 as reported in [Article 112303], [Article 112282], and [Article 112311]. |
System | 1. Verkada security camera system [Article 112282, Article 112303] 2. Super Admin account within the Verkada system [Article 112282, Article 112311] |
Responsible Organization | 1. Hackers from the group APT-69420 Arson Cats, primarily led by Swiss hacker Tillie Kottmann, were responsible for causing the software failure incident by breaching the systems of the security-camera startup Verkada [112303, 112282]. 2. The hacker collective that gained access to Verkada's systems, including the Super Admin account, and exposed footage from hundreds of cameras in Tesla factories and warehouses worldwide was also responsible for the software failure incident [112311]. |
Impacted Organization | 1. Hospitals, schools, factories, jails, and corporate offices [112303, 112282] 2. San Francisco web infrastructure and security company Cloudflare [112303, 112282] 3. San Francisco tech company Okta [112303] 4. Madison County Jail in Huntsville, Alabama [112303] 5. Tesla [112303, 112282] 6. Virgin Hyperloop [112282] 7. Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut [112303, 112282] 8. Florida hospital [112282] 9. Police station in Stoughton, Massachusetts [112282] |
Software Causes | 1. The software failure incident was caused by hackers gaining access to a Verkada "super" administrator account using valid credentials found online, allowing them to peer into live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras [112303]. 2. The hackers breached Verkada's systems by using a "super admin" account to gain access to all cameras connected to the Verkada system, with the account details allegedly posted online [112311]. 3. The attack on Verkada involved hackers gaining access to up to 150,000 security cameras installed in various locations such as schools, hospitals, and businesses, indicating a widespread breach of the software system [112282]. |
Non-software Causes | 1. Lack of proper access control measures leading to unauthorized access to the security camera systems [112303, 112282, 112311] 2. Use of valid credentials found online to gain access to the systems [112303] 3. Inadequate security practices in handling internal administrator accounts [112303] 4. Sharing of sensitive data and footage within the company [112303] 5. Failure to promptly respond to security breaches and disable compromised accounts [112282] 6. Reliance on third-party companies for security measures [112311] |
Impacts | 1. The hackers were able to gain access to live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras, including sensitive locations such as hospitals, schools, and corporate offices, leading to a breach of privacy and security [112303, 112282]. 2. The compromised cameras were watching entrances and main thoroughfares of offices, potentially exposing the movements and activities of individuals within those spaces [112303]. 3. The hack exposed footage from hundreds of cameras in Tesla factories and warehouses worldwide, raising concerns about the security of sensitive areas within the company [112311]. 4. The breach included access to cameras in jails, schools, hospitals, and police departments, highlighting the widespread impact of the incident on various sectors [112311]. 5. The hack also involved logs from security doors, revealing information about who had accessed them, potentially compromising security protocols [112311]. |
Preventions | 1. Implementing stricter access control measures such as multi-factor authentication to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data [112303, 112282, 112311]. 2. Regularly auditing and monitoring user accounts and permissions to detect any unusual or unauthorized activities [112303, 112282, 112311]. 3. Conducting thorough security assessments and penetration testing to identify and address vulnerabilities in the system before they can be exploited by hackers [112303, 112282, 112311]. 4. Educating employees and users on cybersecurity best practices to prevent falling victim to social engineering attacks or inadvertently leaking sensitive information [112303, 112282, 112311]. 5. Ensuring that third-party vendors and partners adhere to strict security protocols and standards to prevent supply chain attacks [112311]. |
Fixes | 1. Implementing stricter access control measures and regularly reviewing and updating user credentials to prevent unauthorized access [112303, 112282, 112311]. 2. Conducting thorough security audits and vulnerability assessments to identify and address potential weaknesses in the system [112303, 112282, 112311]. 3. Enhancing security protocols and encryption methods to safeguard sensitive data stored on cloud servers [112303, 112282, 112311]. 4. Educating employees and users on cybersecurity best practices to prevent social engineering attacks and unauthorized access [112303, 112282, 112311]. 5. Increasing oversight and monitoring of third-party vendors and service providers to ensure they adhere to strict security standards [112311]. 6. Promptly responding to security incidents and breaches by disabling compromised accounts and notifying law enforcement [112303, 112282]. 7. Implementing multi-factor authentication and other advanced security measures to add layers of protection to the system [112303, 112282]. 8. Establishing a dedicated support line for customers to report security concerns and receive assistance in case of breaches [112282]. | References | 1. Verkada [112303, 112282, 112311] 2. Hackers (APT-69420 Arson Cats) [112303] 3. Bloomberg News [112303, 112282, 112311] 4. Swiss hacker Tillie Kottmann [112303, 112282] 5. Cloudflare [112303, 112282] 6. Okta [112303] 7. Twitter [112303] 8. Madison County Jail [112303] 9. Tesla [112303, 112282, 112311] 10. Sandy Hook Elementary School [112303, 112282] 11. Elisa Costante, vice president of research at Forescout [112303] |
Category | Option | Rationale |
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Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: - Verkada experienced a software failure incident where hackers were able to breach their systems and gain access to security camera feeds from various locations, including Tesla factories and warehouses [112303, 112282, 112311]. - The incident involved the hackers accessing a "super" administrator account using valid credentials found online, allowing them to view live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras [112303]. - Verkada stated that they disabled all internal administrator accounts to prevent unauthorized access and are investigating the scope of the breach [112303, 112282]. - The hackers behind the breach claimed to have accessed cameras in various sensitive locations, such as hospitals, schools, jails, and corporate offices [112303, 112282, 112311]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: - Cloudflare, another company affected by the Verkada breach, reported that compromised Verkada cameras were watching entrances and main thoroughfares to some of its offices that have been closed due to the pandemic [112303]. - Okta, another company, mentioned that five cameras placed at office entrances were compromised, although there was no evidence that anyone viewed the live streams [112303]. - The breach also impacted other organizations like Tesla, Virgin Hyperloop, and various locations such as hospitals, schools, police departments, and jails [112282, 112311]. |
Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the articles. The incident occurred due to contributing factors introduced by system development and procedures to operate or maintain the system. The hackers were able to breach the Verkada security cameras by gaining access to a "super" administrator account using valid credentials found online [112303]. This indicates a design flaw in the system's access control and authentication mechanisms, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive camera feeds. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also evident in the articles. The incident occurred due to contributing factors introduced by the operation or misuse of the system. The hackers were able to peer into live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras, including those in sensitive locations like hospitals, schools, and offices, for two days before being detected [112303]. This indicates a failure in the operational monitoring and security measures of the system, allowing unauthorized access to critical surveillance footage. |
Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | (a) within_system: - The software failure incident involving Verkada's security cameras being hacked was primarily due to contributing factors that originated from within the system. The hackers were able to gain access to a "super" administrator account within Verkada using valid credentials found online [112303]. - The hackers claimed to have breached Verkada's systems by gaining access to a "super admin" account, which allowed them to access video feeds from a large number of cameras connected to the Verkada system [112282]. - The vulnerability in Verkada's systems that led to the breach was reportedly due to the existence of a "Super Admin" account that provided access to all cameras connected to the Verkada system [112311]. |
Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The software failure incident involving the breach of Verkada's security cameras was primarily due to hackers gaining access to a "super" administrator account using valid credentials found online, allowing them to peer into live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras [112303]. - The hackers were able to access the Verkada system by finding a "Super Admin" account that provided access to all cameras connected to the Verkada system. The account details were allegedly posted online, indicating a vulnerability in the system that was exploited [112311]. - The hack of up to 150,000 security cameras installed in various locations was reported to have been due to hackers breaching Verkada's systems, gaining access to camera feeds from schools, hospitals, businesses, and even Verkada's own offices. The attack was described as unsophisticated and involved the use of a "super admin" account [112282]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The breach of Verkada's security cameras was facilitated by hackers who gained access to a "super" administrator account using valid credentials found online, indicating a human factor in the incident [112303]. - The hacker collective responsible for the breach of Verkada's systems claimed that their actions were driven by curiosity, fighting for freedom of information, anti-capitalism, and a desire for fun, highlighting the human motivations behind the hack [112282]. - The vulnerability in Verkada's systems that led to the exposure of footage from hundreds of cameras in Tesla factories and warehouses was reportedly exploited by a hacker collective seeking to demonstrate the pervasiveness of video surveillance and the ease with which it can be accessed surreptitiously, indicating human actions as contributing factors to the incident [112311]. |
Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The software failure incident involving Verkada's security cameras being hacked by hackers allowed them to access live feeds from various locations, including hospitals, schools, factories, jails, and corporate offices [Article 112303]. - The hackers were able to gain access to a Verkada "super" administrator account using valid credentials found online, which enabled them to peer into live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras, including sensitive locations like hospitals and schools [Article 112303]. - The Verkada footage captured and shared by hackers included locations like a Tesla facility in China and the Madison County Jail in Huntsville, Alabama [Article 112303]. - The hack of up to 150,000 security cameras installed in schools, hospitals, and businesses, including Tesla sites, was being investigated by the firm that makes them, Verkada [Article 112282]. - The vulnerability in Verkada's system that exposed footage from hundreds of cameras in Tesla factories and warehouses worldwide was reportedly found by a hacker collective, indicating a hardware-related failure in the security camera system [Article 112311]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The hackers were able to breach Verkada's systems and gain access to the security cameras by using a "super admin" account, indicating a software-related failure in the security camera system [Article 112282]. - The hack was described as unsophisticated, involving the use of a "super admin" account to gain access to Verkada, and the hackers lost access to the video feeds and archives after being contacted by Verkada [Article 112282]. - The way the hacker group gained access to Verkada's systems was not cutting-edge or super sophisticated, indicating a software-related vulnerability in the security camera system [Article 112311]. |
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious | (a) The software failure incident in this case was malicious. Hackers were able to breach the systems of a security-camera startup, Verkada, gaining access to a "super" administrator account using valid credentials found online. They were able to peer into live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras, including those in sensitive locations such as hospitals, schools, and corporate offices [112303, 112282, 112311]. The hackers, part of a group called APT-69420 Arson Cats, described themselves as primarily queer hackers backed by the desire for fun, being gay, and a better world. They accessed cameras in various locations, including a Tesla facility in China, a jail in Alabama, and the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut, where a deadly school shooting occurred in 2012 [112303, 112282]. The breach was not sophisticated and involved using valid credentials to access a significant amount of data stored on a cloud server. The hackers claimed credit for the hack, stating their reasons included curiosity, fighting for freedom of information, anti-capitalism, anarchism, and the enjoyment of the activity [112303, 112282, 112311]. |
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions | (a) poor_decisions: The software failure incident involving the breach of Verkada's security cameras was primarily due to poor decisions made by the company. The hackers were able to gain access to a "super" administrator account using valid credentials found online, indicating a lack of proper credential management and security protocols [112303]. Additionally, the hackers accessed a "Super Admin" account that gave them access to all cameras connected to the Verkada system, and these account details had allegedly been posted online, highlighting a significant oversight in account security [112311]. (b) accidental_decisions: The software failure incident does not seem to be primarily attributed to accidental decisions or unintended mistakes. Instead, the breach was a result of deliberate actions taken by hackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the system and gain unauthorized access to sensitive camera feeds [112303, 112282, 112311]. |
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence, accidental | (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the articles. The breach of up to 150,000 security cameras, including those in schools, hospitals, and businesses, was attributed to hackers gaining access to a Verkada "super" administrator account using valid credentials found online [112303, 112282]. This indicates a lack of proper security measures in place to protect sensitive data and systems, highlighting a failure due to contributing factors introduced by the development organization. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also present in the articles. The hackers claimed that the attack on Verkada's systems was unsophisticated and involved using a "super admin" account to gain access to the cameras [112282]. This suggests that the breach was not a result of a highly sophisticated attack but rather an accidental vulnerability in the system that allowed unauthorized access. |
Duration | permanent, temporary | (a) The software failure incident in the articles appears to be temporary. The hackers were able to gain access to the security cameras and live feeds for a limited duration before being discovered and losing access. For example, in Article 112282, it is mentioned that after Bloomberg contacted Verkada about the breach, the hackers lost access to the video feeds and archives. Additionally, the company disabled all internal administrator accounts to prevent further unauthorized access [112282]. (b) The software failure incident could also be considered permanent in the sense that the breach exposed a significant amount of data and footage from various locations. The impact of the breach could have long-lasting consequences, especially in terms of privacy and security concerns. The breach allowed hackers to access feeds from schools, hospitals, businesses, and even Tesla factories and warehouses. The breach also involved gaining control of cameras in jails, schools, hospitals, and police departments, as well as logs from security doors [112311]. |
Behaviour | crash, omission, timing, value, other | (a) crash: The software failure incident in the articles can be categorized as a crash as the hackers were able to gain access to a "super" administrator account of Verkada, allowing them to peer into live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras for two days [112303]. The incident led to a loss of control over the security cameras, indicating a crash in the system's functionality. (b) omission: The software failure incident can also be classified as an omission as the hackers were able to access sensitive locations such as hospitals, schools, and corporate offices by breaching the Verkada system, indicating that the system omitted to perform its intended function of securing the camera feeds [112303]. (c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident can be considered in the context of the system performing its intended functions incorrectly by allowing unauthorized access to the camera feeds. This unauthorized access occurred for two days before the breach was discovered and addressed, indicating a timing issue in the system's response to the security breach [112303]. (d) value: The software failure incident can be related to a failure in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly as the hackers gained access to a significant amount of data stored on a cloud server by using valid credentials, highlighting a failure in the system's security measures [112303]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident primarily involved unauthorized access to camera feeds and data, rather than exhibiting inconsistent behavior or interactions [112303]. (f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized as a failure due to a security breach leading to unauthorized access to sensitive camera feeds and data, resulting in a breach of privacy and security protocols [112282, 112311]. This behavior falls under the broader category of a security incident where the system fails to protect sensitive information from unauthorized access. |
Layer | Option | Rationale |
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Perception | network_communication | (a) sensor: The software failure incident was not directly related to sensor errors. (b) actuator: The incident did not involve failures due to actuator errors. (c) processing_unit: The failure was not attributed to issues with the processing unit. (d) network_communication: The software failure incident was related to network communication errors as hackers were able to breach the systems of a security-camera startup, Verkada, and gain access to live camera feeds from various locations such as hospitals, schools, factories, and jails [112303, 112282, 112311]. (e) embedded_software: The failure was not specifically linked to errors in embedded software. |
Communication | unknown | The software failure incident reported in the news articles does not specifically mention whether the failure was related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system that failed. The articles focus more on the breach of security cameras and unauthorized access to camera feeds, rather than detailing the specific technical aspects related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system. |
Application | TRUE | The software failure incident reported in the provided articles was related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The failure was due to contributing factors introduced by bugs, operating system errors, unhandled exceptions, and incorrect usage. The incident involved hackers gaining unauthorized access to security cameras provided by Verkada, a security company. The hackers were able to breach Verkada's systems by using a "super" administrator account with valid credentials found online [112303, 112282, 112311]. This unauthorized access allowed the hackers to view live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras, including those in sensitive locations such as hospitals, schools, factories, and jails. Additionally, the hackers were able to access cameras in various locations, including Tesla factories and warehouses worldwide, as well as in jails, schools, hospitals, and police departments. The breach was not sophisticated and involved exploiting a Super Admin account that provided access to all cameras connected to the Verkada system [112282, 112311]. Therefore, the software failure incident reported in the articles was indeed related to the application layer of the cyber physical system, as it involved unauthorized access and exploitation of system vulnerabilities introduced by bugs and incorrect usage. |
Category | Option | Rationale |
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Consequence | property, non-human, other | (a) The consequence of death due to the software failure was not mentioned in the provided articles [112303, 112282, 112311]. (b) The consequence of physical harm due to the software failure was not mentioned in the provided articles [112303, 112282, 112311]. (c) The consequence of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure was not mentioned in the provided articles [112303, 112282, 112311]. (d) The consequence of people's material goods, money, or data being impacted due to the software failure was evident in the articles. The breach of security cameras by hackers led to unauthorized access to sensitive locations such as hospitals, schools, factories, jails, and corporate offices, potentially compromising the privacy and security of individuals and organizations [112303, 112282, 112311]. (e) The consequence of people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure was not mentioned in the provided articles [112303, 112282, 112311]. (f) The consequence of non-human entities being impacted due to the software failure was evident in the articles. The hacked security cameras captured footage from various locations, including a Tesla facility in China and the Madison County Jail in Huntsville, Alabama. The unauthorized access to these cameras raised concerns about privacy and security [112303, 112282, 112311]. (g) The consequence of no real observed consequences of the software failure was not applicable as there were observed consequences of the security breach in the articles [112303, 112282, 112311]. (h) The consequence of potential consequences discussed but not occurring due to the software failure was not mentioned in the provided articles [112303, 112282, 112311]. (i) The other consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the options (a to h) include the breach leading to concerns about privacy violations, unauthorized surveillance, and potential misuse of the accessed data by the hackers [112303, 112282, 112311]. |
Domain | information, health | (a) The failed system was intended to support the production and distribution of information. The incident involved a security-camera startup called Verkada, which provides cloud-based surveillance services for workplace security. The breach allowed hackers to access live feeds from potentially tens of thousands of cameras in various locations, including hospitals, schools, factories, jails, corporate offices, and even a Tesla facility in China [Article 112303, Article 112282, Article 112311]. (b) The failed system was not directly related to the transportation industry. (c) The failed system was not directly related to the extraction of natural resources. (d) The failed system was not directly related to the sales industry. (e) The failed system was not directly related to the construction industry. (f) The failed system was not directly related to the manufacturing industry. (g) The failed system was not directly related to the utilities industry. (h) The failed system was not directly related to the finance industry. (i) The failed system was not directly related to the knowledge industry. (j) The failed system was intended to support the health industry as it allowed access to sensitive locations such as hospitals and clinics through compromised cameras [Article 112303, Article 112282]. (k) The failed system was not directly related to the entertainment industry. (l) The failed system was not directly related to the government industry. (m) The failed system was not directly related to any other industry mentioned in the options. |
Article ID: 112303
Article ID: 112282
Article ID: 112311