| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The article mentions that in Richmond, Virginia, health officials were considering trying the VAMS software again despite the initial issues with it. Ruth Morrison, the policy director for the Richmond and Henrico County health district, mentioned that they were "even thinking about trying VAMS again" as they were cobbling solutions together at the local level [111842].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article highlights that many state officials have switched software providers due to issues with the appointment scheduling systems, but they have seen little or no improvement. States like California, Massachusetts, and North Carolina have faced various tech mishaps and challenges with their vaccine appointment systems, indicating a recurring problem across multiple organizations [111842]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where it mentions that developers condensed work that would normally take years into weeks, leading to glitches in the software rollout [111842]. This indicates that the rushed development process introduced contributing factors that led to software failures.
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article where it describes how health providers' lack of knowledge about how to use the system or the constantly shifting needs of states contributed to criticisms of the software [111842]. This highlights that operational issues and misuse of the system by users played a role in the software failure incident. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system:
- The software failure incident was within the system as it was caused by flaws and issues within the appointment scheduling software tools like VAMS and PrepMod used by state health departments [111842].
- Developers of the software systems mentioned that the criticisms largely stemmed from health providers' lack of knowledge about how to use the systems or from the constantly shifting needs of states, indicating internal challenges within the software [111842].
- Issues such as reusable appointment links, glitches, crashing websites, and lack of unique registration links that expire after a single use were all internal problems within the software systems causing failures in the vaccine appointment scheduling process [111842].
(b) outside_system:
- The software failure incident was also influenced by factors outside the system, such as the evolving nature of the pandemic and the constantly shifting needs of states, which made it challenging for the software systems to keep up with the demands and changes [111842].
- The varied approaches to determining eligibility in different localities and the lack of a one-size-fits-all approach added complexity to the software rollout, indicating external factors impacting the software's effectiveness [111842].
- The reliance on imperfect tools from outside companies underscored the need to invest in technology for public health departments, suggesting external factors affecting the software's performance [111842]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The article mentions that the software systems faced challenges due to condensed work that would normally take years being completed in weeks, leading to glitches [111842].
- Various approaches to determining eligibility in different localities using the software made it difficult to develop a one-size-fits-all approach, contributing to the software rollout complications [111842].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- Human actions contributed to the issues with the software systems, as some health providers lacked knowledge about how to use the systems effectively, leading to criticisms of the software [111842].
- Problems such as reusable appointment links being shared on social media platforms were caused by human actions, leading to overbookings and confusion at vaccination events [111842]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The article mentions that the software issues faced by the Virginia health officials were partly due to flaws in the appointment software tools used, such as VAMS and PrepMod, which were recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [111842].
- It is highlighted that the reliance on outside companies' imperfect tools underscored the need to invest in technology for public health departments, many of which still use paper and fax machines to keep records, indicating a potential hardware infrastructure gap contributing to the software failures [111842].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The article discusses various software-related issues contributing to the failures, such as the confusing nature of the software for older adults, problems with appointment links being reusable and shared on social media, crashing websites, glitches in scheduling systems, and the inability of some systems to communicate with each other [111842].
- Specific software tools like VAMS, PrepMod, Salesforce, and Microsoft's vaccine software are mentioned to have faced criticisms and challenges, including issues with appointment slot reservations, unique registration links, and evolving needs of states during the pandemic, indicating software-related shortcomings [111842]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The articles do not provide any information indicating a malicious software failure incident where the failure was due to contributing factors introduced by humans with the intent to harm the system.
(b) The software failure incidents discussed in the articles are non-malicious in nature. The failures were primarily attributed to issues such as confusing interfaces for older adults, reusable appointment links leading to overbookings, glitches in scheduling systems, lack of knowledge on how to use the software, constantly shifting needs of states, condensed development timelines leading to glitches, varied approaches to determining eligibility, and the inability of systems to communicate with each other [111842]. These factors point to failures introduced without the intent to harm the system. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles can be attributed to poor decisions made in the selection and implementation of the appointment scheduling software for COVID-19 vaccinations. State health officials in Virginia initially turned to the VAMS software recommended by the CDC, which was found to be confusing for older adults to use. Subsequently, they switched to PrepMod, but this system also had issues such as reusable appointment links leading to overbookings and chaos at vaccination events [111842].
(b) On the other hand, the failure can also be linked to accidental decisions or unintended consequences. For example, the issues with the software tools used for vaccine appointments were exacerbated by the constantly shifting needs of states and the evolving nature of the pandemic, which required a high level of flexibility from the software platforms. Additionally, the varied approaches to determining eligibility in different localities made it challenging to develop a one-size-fits-all solution, leading to glitches and delays in the software rollout [111842]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article where state health officials in Virginia faced challenges with the software systems recommended for scheduling vaccine appointments. The software called VAMS was deemed confusing for older adults to use, leading to issues with appointments and overbookings [111842]. Additionally, the article highlights how some developers condensed work that would normally take years into weeks, leading to glitches in the software rollout [111842].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is seen in the article where issues arose with the software systems used for vaccine appointments due to constantly shifting needs of states and evolving pandemic situations. For example, criticisms of the PrepMod system were attributed to health providers' lack of knowledge about how to use it and the challenges of keeping up with the evolving pandemic [111842]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as both temporary and permanent:
Temporary: The articles mention instances where the software failures were temporary due to specific circumstances. For example, the article discusses how the vaccine appointment website in Massachusetts went down for several hours after a surge in demand, which was a temporary issue [111842]. Similarly, the MyTurn system offered more appointments than it was supposed to at a vaccination site in San Diego, forcing the site to close for several days because it ran out of doses, indicating a temporary failure [111842].
Permanent: On the other hand, the articles also highlight underlying issues that contribute to a more permanent state of failure. These include fundamental flaws in the software systems used for vaccine appointments, such as confusing interfaces, reusable appointment links leading to overbookings, and inability to reserve appointment slots properly [111842]. The challenges faced by various states and localities with different software providers and the lack of interoperability between systems also point to more systemic and long-term issues in the software infrastructure for vaccine distribution.
Therefore, the software failure incident can be seen as a combination of temporary failures caused by specific circumstances and permanent failures resulting from broader systemic issues in the software tools being used for vaccine distribution. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, timing, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident mentioned in the articles includes crashes, where the systems lost state and did not perform their intended functions. For example, the HealthCare.gov site crashed early on [111842]. Additionally, the vaccine appointment website in Massachusetts went down for several hours after a surge in demand [111842].
(b) omission: The incident also involved failures where the systems omitted to perform their intended functions at instances. For instance, the PrepMod system did not reserve an appointment slot as people filled out their information, leading to them being booted out if someone else beat them to that particular slot [111842].
(c) timing: There were instances of failures due to timing issues, where the systems performed their intended functions correctly but either too late or too early. An example is when the MyTurn system offered more appointments than it was supposed to at a vaccination site in San Diego, forcing the site to close for several days because it ran out of doses [111842].
(d) value: The software failure incident also involved failures where the systems performed their intended functions incorrectly. For example, tech mishaps in California allowed ineligible people to snatch up appointments [111842].
(e) byzantine: The incident did not specifically mention failures due to byzantine behavior, which involves erroneous and inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The software failure incident exhibited various other behaviors not covered by the options listed, such as reusable appointment links being shared widely, causing overbookings and confusion [111842]. |