Incident: Apple iOS Critical Crypto Flaw: SSL Authentication Bypass Incident

Published Date: 2014-02-22

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident happened in February 2014 [24216, 24216, 24216]. 2. The incident occurred in February 2014.
System 1. iOS 7.0.6 [24216] 2. iOS 6 [24216] 3. OS X 10.9.1 [24216]
Responsible Organization 1. Apple [24408, 24409, 24326, 24216] 2. Google [24409, 24216]
Impacted Organization 1. Apple [24408, 24409, 24326, 24216] 2. iPhone, iPad, and Mac users [131298, 131289] 3. Users of iOS devices [131298, 131289] 4. Users of Mac computers running Mac OSX [24326] 5. Users of iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch devices [24326] 6. Users of iOS 6 and iOS 7 [24326]
Software Causes 1. The failure incident was caused by a critical crypto flaw in Apple's implementation of SSL encryption, specifically due to a single spurious "goto" in the authentication code, which accidentally bypassed the rest of the authentication process [24216]. 2. The bug in the authentication code allowed attackers to potentially eavesdrop on or maliciously modify data being transmitted over shared networks, such as public Wi-Fi or networks tapped by surveillance agencies [24216]. 3. The flaw in the SSL encryption could lead to attackers intercepting sensitive information like emails, social media activities, or banking transactions on iPhones and iPads [24216]. 4. The bug was identified in the iOS 7 software, prompting Apple to release an urgent patch in the form of iOS 7.0.6 to address the vulnerability [24216]. 5. The issue was related to a duplicated "goto fail" line in the authentication code, which diverted the program's execution past a critical authentication check, rendering the digital signature verification ineffective [24216].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of proper alerting and communication to users about the security vulnerability and the importance of the update [24408, 24409]. 2. Delay in fixing the vulnerability, leading to prolonged exposure to potential attacks [24407, 24216]. 3. Reluctance to issue simultaneous fixes for iOS and Mac OS X, leaving some devices vulnerable [24216]. 4. Reliance on insecure practices such as using "goto" statements in critical authentication code [24216].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident in Apple's iOS and OS X systems left millions of users vulnerable to Internet attacks, potentially allowing attackers to eavesdrop on communications or maliciously modify data transferred over shared networks [24216]. 2. The vulnerability in Apple's SSL code could have allowed hackers to seize control of iPhones, iPads, and other Apple products, leading to potential data breaches and unauthorized access to user information [131298]. 3. The flaw in Apple's implementation of SSL/TLS encryption could have compromised the security of Macs, iPhones, and iPads, making users susceptible to drive-by attacks and interception of sensitive traffic [24407]. 4. The security vulnerability known as "goto fail" in Apple's software could have allowed attackers to compromise user devices, intercept sensitive data, and potentially control how applications function, posing significant risks to user privacy and security [24409]. 5. The software flaw in Apple's iOS 7 was described as "bad" and "really bad" by cryptography experts, highlighting the severity and critical nature of the bug [24216].
Preventions 1. **Better Code Review Practices**: Implementing more thorough code review processes could have caught the critical crypto flaw in Apple's authentication code before it made its way into production [24216]. 2. **Avoiding the Use of "goto" Statements**: Following best practices and avoiding the use of "goto" statements in programming could have prevented the bypass in the authentication check that led to the vulnerability [24216]. 3. **Improved Testing Procedures**: Enhancing testing procedures, including comprehensive testing for security vulnerabilities, could have identified the flaw in the SSL encryption implementation before it became a critical issue [24216]. 4. **Timely Security Updates**: Ensuring timely release of security updates to patch known vulnerabilities could have mitigated the impact of the flaw on users' devices [24216]. 5. **Enhanced Security Awareness**: Increasing awareness among developers about common security pitfalls and vulnerabilities in software development could have led to a more secure implementation [24216].
Fixes 1. Apple released an urgent fix in the form of an update to patch the critical crypto flaw in its implementation of SSL encryption [24216]. 2. Users were advised to install the iOS 7.0.6 update to address the bug affecting iPhone and iPad devices [24216]. 3. An update for iOS 6 was also pushed out to fix the bug in that version of the operating system [24216]. 4. The fix for the vulnerability was included in the OS X 10.9.2 update to address the issue on Mac computers [24216]. 5. Security experts recommended keeping devices updated with the latest software to mitigate the risk of exploitation [131298].
References 1. Independent security researchers and industry professionals [24408] 2. Google Zero team [24409] 3. Symantec [24510] 4. SkyCure [24510] 5. Israeli start-up [24510] 6. Georgia Tech Information Security Center [24510] 7. Trustwave [24510] 8. Azimuth Security [24510] 9. IOActive Labs [24510] 10. Lacoon Mobile Security [24510] 11. Johns Hopkins cryptography professor Matthew Green [24216] 12. Google web encryption expert Adam Langley [24216]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: - The incident of a critical crypto flaw in Apple's authentication code bypassing SSL encryption was reported in iOS 7.0.6, affecting iPhone and iPad users [Article 24216]. - This flaw allowed attackers to potentially eavesdrop or modify data when users accessed the internet from shared networks like public Wi-Fi [Article 24216]. - The bug was due to a single spurious "goto" in Apple's authentication code, diverting the program's execution past a critical authentication check [Article 24216]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: - The article did not mention any similar incident happening at other organizations or with their products and services.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) In the software failure incident related to the critical crypto flaw in iOS 7, the bug was identified as a single spurious "goto" in Apple's authentication code that accidentally bypassed the rest of it, leading to a vulnerability in SSL encryption [Article 24216]. This flaw was a result of a simple programming error in the code implementation, specifically in the authentication process, which allowed attackers to potentially eavesdrop or modify data transmitted over shared networks. (b) The software failure incident also involved the operation phase, where users could be affected by the vulnerability when using their devices on public Wi-Fi networks or other tapped connections [Article 24216]. This aspect of the failure highlights the impact on users during the operation or use of the system, emphasizing the potential risks associated with the flaw in the authentication process.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) The software failure incident related to the critical crypto flaw in iOS 7 was within the system. The flaw was a result of a single spurious "goto" in Apple's authentication code that bypassed the rest of the authentication process, leading to a vulnerability in SSL encryption [24216]. (b) The software failure incident was also influenced by factors outside the system, such as the potential for attackers to exploit the vulnerability when users are on shared networks like public Wi-Fi or networks tapped by surveillance agencies like the NSA [24216].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The software failure incident reported in Article 24216 was due to a critical crypto flaw in iOS 7, which was a result of a single spurious "goto" in Apple's authentication code that accidentally bypassed the rest of it. This flaw allowed attackers to potentially eavesdrop or modify data transmitted over SSL encryption [24216]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The software failure incident reported in Article 24407 was due to a human error in the code, specifically an extra, duplicative "goto fail" line that diverted the program's execution past a critical authentication check, rendering the actual digital signature verification dead code. This human error led to a serious security vulnerability in Apple's SSL/TLS implementation [24407].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - There is no specific information in the provided articles about the software failure incident occurring due to contributing factors originating in hardware. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The software failure incident discussed in the articles is related to a critical crypto flaw in Apple's implementation of SSL encryption, affecting iOS devices like iPhone and iPad [Article 24216]. - The flaw was caused by a single spurious "goto" in Apple's authentication code, which bypassed the rest of the authentication process, potentially allowing attackers to eavesdrop or modify data transmitted over shared networks [Article 24216]. - Apple released iOS updates (iOS 7.0.6 and updates for iOS 6) to patch the bug in SSL encryption [Article 24216]. - The bug was described as a simple yet critical flaw that could have serious security implications for users accessing sensitive information over public Wi-Fi or other tapped networks [Article 24216].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious, non-malicious (a) malicious: The software failure incident related to the critical crypto flaw in iOS 7 was considered malicious. The flaw was a result of a single spurious "goto" in Apple's authentication code that bypassed critical authentication checks, potentially allowing attackers to eavesdrop or modify data on iPhones and iPads [24216]. (b) non-malicious: The software failure incident related to the security vulnerability in Apple's SSL code, affecting iPhone, iPad, and Mac devices, was considered non-malicious. The flaw was unintentional, caused by a coding error in the implementation of SSL encryption, leading to a breach in security defenses against eavesdropping and web hijacking [24216].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) poor_decisions: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by poor decisions The software failure incident related to the critical crypto flaw in iOS 7 was due to a poor decision in the implementation of SSL encryption by Apple. The flaw was caused by a single spurious "goto" in the authentication code, which accidentally bypassed critical authentication checks, leaving the encryption vulnerable to eavesdropping and web hijacking [24216]. Additionally, the delay in fixing the vulnerability in Mac OS X 10.9.1 while iOS was patched highlights a poor decision in prioritizing security updates across different platforms [24216]. (b) accidental_decisions: Failure due to contributing factors introduced by mistakes or unintended decisions The software failure incident related to the "goto fail" bug in Apple's SSL authentication code was described as a simple mistake rather than a deliberate action. The bug was a result of a typo in the code, where an extra, duplicative "goto fail" line diverted the program's execution past a critical authentication check, rendering the authentication ineffective [24216]. The accidental nature of the bug was emphasized by experts like Adam Langley from Google, who believed it was a mistake made by someone slipping in an editor while creating the code [24216].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The software failure incident related to the critical crypto flaw in iOS 7 was due to a single spurious "goto" in Apple's authentication code that accidentally bypassed the rest of it, leading to a vulnerability in SSL encryption [Article 24216]. - The flaw in Apple's SSL/TLS verification code, known as the "gotofail" bug, was a result of a duplicate statement that created the glitch, indicating a lack of proper code review and testing practices [Article 24407]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The critical crypto flaw in iOS 7, which allowed attackers to eavesdrop or modify data on iPhones and iPads, was described as a simple bug caused by a single spurious "goto" in the authentication code, indicating an accidental introduction of the vulnerability [Article 24216]. - The "goto fail" bug in Apple's SSL/TLS implementation was described as a typo in the code, where an extra, duplicative line diverted the program's execution past a critical authentication check, suggesting an accidental coding error [Article 24216].
Duration temporary (a) The software failure incident described in the articles was temporary. The incident was due to a critical crypto flaw in Apple's implementation of SSL encryption, specifically a single spurious "goto" in the authentication code that accidentally bypassed the rest of it. This flaw allowed attackers to potentially eavesdrop or maliciously modify data when users were accessing sensitive information over shared networks like public Wi-Fi. Apple released updates to patch the bug in iOS versions, indicating that the issue was not permanent [24216]. (b) The incident was not described as a permanent failure, but rather a specific vulnerability that was addressed through software updates. The flaw was identified in the SSL encryption implementation, and the fix was made available through iOS updates [24216].
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: Failure due to system losing state and not performing any of its intended functions - The software failure incident mentioned in Article 24216 resulted in a critical crypto flaw in iOS 7, where a single spurious "goto" in Apple's authentication code accidentally bypassed the rest of it, leading to a crash in the system's encryption process [24216]. (b) omission: Failure due to system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) - The software failure incident in Article 24216 involved a critical omission in the authentication check process of SSL encryption on iOS devices, where a duplicated "goto fail" line caused the program to skip a crucial authentication step, leading to the omission of proper verification [24216]. (c) timing: Failure due to system performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early - The software failure incident in Article 24216 did not involve a timing-related failure. (d) value: Failure due to system performing its intended functions incorrectly - The software failure incident in Article 24216 resulted in a value-related failure where the system incorrectly verified the encryption key due to the duplicated "goto fail" line, leading to incorrect authentication checks [24216]. (e) byzantine: Failure due to system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions - The software failure incident in Article 24216 did not involve a byzantine-related failure. (f) other: Failure due to system behaving in a way not described in the (a to e) options; What is the other behaviour? - The software failure incident in Article 24216 involved a critical flaw in the SSL encryption implementation on iOS devices, leading to a vulnerability where attackers could eavesdrop or modify data on devices connected to shared networks [24216].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence, other (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any deaths caused by the software failure incident in the provided articles. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of any physical harm caused to individuals due to the software failure incident in the provided articles. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted by the software failure incident in the provided articles. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident impacted the security of data and information on Apple devices, potentially exposing users to eavesdropping and data interception [Article 24216]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There is no mention of people having to postpone activities due to the software failure incident in the provided articles. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident affected the security of Apple devices, potentially allowing attackers to intercept and modify data transferred over the internet [Article 24216]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident had real observed consequences related to data security vulnerabilities on Apple devices [Article 24216]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discuss potential consequences of the software failure, such as data interception and eavesdropping, but these consequences were addressed through software updates [Article 24216]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The software failure incident led to a critical security vulnerability in Apple's SSL encryption implementation, potentially exposing users to data interception and manipulation on shared networks [Article 24216].
Domain information, finance, knowledge, government (a) The failed system was related to the information industry, specifically affecting the encryption of data transmitted over the internet, such as emails, social media interactions, and online banking. The bug in Apple's SSL encryption implementation left users vulnerable to eavesdropping and data modification when using shared networks like public Wi-Fi [Article 24216]. (b) The transportation industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (c) The natural_resources industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (d) The sales industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (e) The construction industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (f) The manufacturing industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (g) The utilities industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (h) The finance industry was indirectly related to the software failure incident, as the bug in Apple's SSL encryption could potentially compromise sensitive financial data when users accessed their bank accounts online [Article 24216]. (i) The knowledge industry was indirectly related to the incident, as the encryption flaw could impact educational institutions and research organizations that rely on secure data transmission over the internet [Article 24216]. (j) The health industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (k) The entertainment industry was not directly mentioned in the articles. (l) The government industry was indirectly related to the incident, as secure communication and data protection are crucial for government agencies involved in defense, justice, and public services [Article 24216]. (m) The other industry was not explicitly mentioned in the articles.

Sources

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