Incident: Security Vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's Phone-Cracking Tools Exposed by Signal.

Published Date: 2021-04-22

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving Signal and Cellebrite happened in April 2021. - The articles were published on April 22, 2021 [113380, 113388].
System 1. Cellebrite's phone-cracking tools used by police in Britain and around the world [113380, 113388] 2. Cellebrite's software [113380, 113388]
Responsible Organization 1. The security researcher Moxie Marlinspike, founder of Signal, was responsible for causing the software failure incident by hacking into the phone-cracking tools used by police in Britain and around the world [113380, 113388].
Impacted Organization 1. Police forces in Britain and around the world [113380] 2. Cyber-security company Cellebrite [113380, 113388]
Software Causes 1. The software causes of the failure incident were the vulnerabilities found in the surveillance devices and software used by Cellebrite, as detailed by Moxie Marlinspike, the CEO of Signal [113380, 113388]. 2. Marlinspike identified over 100 security vulnerabilities in the Cellebrite software, allowing for potential code execution, data access, and settings changes [113380, 113388]. 3. The flaws in the Cellebrite technology could potentially compromise the integrity of reports, exfiltrate data, and allow for undetectable alterations to previous and future reports [113388].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of physical security measures leading to the device falling off a truck [113380, 113388] 2. Potential mishandling or lack of proper control over physical devices containing sensitive software [113380, 113388]
Impacts 1. The software failure incident involving the hacking of Cellebrite's phone-cracking tools by Signal's CEO had the impact of exposing over 100 security vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's devices, potentially allowing for unauthorized access, data manipulation, and compromise of future and past reports [113380, 113388]. 2. The incident led to embarrassment for Cellebrite, a cyber-security company known for its claims of cracking secure systems, as Signal's findings highlighted flaws in Cellebrite's software [113388]. 3. The software failure incident raised questions about the integrity and security of Cellebrite's technology, especially considering its previous claims of cracking Signal's encryption system, which were later debunked [113388].
Preventions 1. Proper security testing and code review processes during the development of Cellebrite's software could have potentially prevented the software vulnerabilities exploited by Signal's founder [113380, 113388]. 2. Implementing secure coding practices and following industry standards for software development could have reduced the likelihood of introducing critical security flaws in Cellebrite's software [113380, 113388]. 3. Regular security audits and vulnerability assessments of Cellebrite's software could have helped identify and address security weaknesses before they were exploited [113380, 113388]. 4. Enhanced security measures such as multi-factor authentication, encryption, and access controls within Cellebrite's software could have mitigated the impact of potential security breaches [113380, 113388].
Fixes 1. Addressing the more than 100 security vulnerabilities found in Cellebrite's software through accurate repairs with high confidence [113380]. 2. Implementing strict licensing policies to govern how customers are permitted to use the technology and ensuring continual auditing and updating of the software to equip customers with the best digital intelligence solutions available [113380]. 3. Ensuring that all data produced with Cellebrite's tools is validated and forensically sound to meet and exceed the highest industry standards [113388].
References 1. Moxie Marlinspike, CEO of Signal [Article 113380, Article 113388] 2. Cellebrite, the Israeli company providing phone-cracking tools [Article 113380, Article 113388] 3. Cyber-security company Cellebrite [Article 113388] 4. Andrew Morris, a cyber-security expert [Article 113388]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to Cellebrite's security software vulnerabilities has happened again within the same organization. Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, detailed a series of vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's surveillance devices, claiming to have found more than 100 security vulnerabilities in one Cellebrite device [113380]. Marlinspike also demonstrated running a simple piece of code on a machine running Cellebrite software, showing an easy way to compromise the security company's system [113388]. (b) The software failure incident related to security flaws in software used by Cellebrite has also happened with other organizations or their products and services. Cellebrite's technology is used by police forces around the world for digital investigations, and the incident highlighted the vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's tools that could potentially affect investigations globally [113380]. Additionally, the incident involving Cellebrite's security flaws has sparked a public spat between Signal and Cellebrite, indicating a broader impact beyond just one organization [113388].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) In the articles, the software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the vulnerabilities found in the software used by Cellebrite, a cyber-security company. Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, discovered over 100 security vulnerabilities in one Cellebrite device through reverse-engineering. These vulnerabilities could allow for the modification of Cellebrite reports generated from scanned devices, affecting both past and future data analyses [113380, 113388]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the flaws found in the software used by Cellebrite. Marlinspike claimed that the software was so flawed that he could easily hack into it, suggesting that there were virtually no limits on the code that could be executed. This could potentially allow unauthorized access to data, settings changes, and more, showcasing operational vulnerabilities in the system [113388].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the articles is primarily due to contributing factors that originate from within the system. Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, detailed a series of vulnerabilities in the surveillance devices made by Cellebrite, a security company. Marlinspike claims to have found over 100 security vulnerabilities in one Cellebrite device through reverse-engineering, which could allow for modifying Cellebrite reports and affecting future investigations [113380, 113388]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident does not seem to be primarily caused by contributing factors originating from outside the system. The vulnerabilities and flaws in the Cellebrite software, as highlighted by Signal, were discovered through internal analysis and reverse-engineering by Signal's founder, rather than being a result of external factors beyond the control of the system [113380, 113388].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to vulnerabilities in the surveillance devices made by the Israeli company Cellebrite, which were exploited by Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, to hack into the system [113380]. - Marlinspike found over 100 security vulnerabilities in one Cellebrite device through reverse-engineering, allowing for the modification of reports and compromising the integrity of future reports [113380]. - The flaws in Cellebrite's software were exploited by Signal to demonstrate how easily the system could be compromised, indicating that the failure was primarily due to the inherent weaknesses in the software itself [113388]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The actions of Moxie Marlinspike, the founder of Signal, can be considered as human actions that contributed to the software failure incident. Marlinspike actively sought out vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's software and exploited them to demonstrate the flaws in the system [113380, 113388]. - Marlinspike's acquisition of Cellebrite's system, his demonstration of running code on the software, and his blog post highlighting the security flaws can be attributed to human actions that led to the exposure of the software's vulnerabilities [113388].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware can be seen in the articles as Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, claimed to have acquired Cellebrite's system hardware after it "fell off a truck" in front of him. He mentioned finding the latest versions of Cellebrite software, a hardware dongle designed to prevent piracy, and a large number of cable adapters [113388]. (b) The software failure incident related to software vulnerabilities is evident in the articles as Moxie Marlinspike detailed a series of vulnerabilities in the surveillance devices made by Cellebrite, which could allow anyone to plant code on a phone to take over Cellebrite’s hardware. Marlinspike found more than 100 security vulnerabilities in one Cellebrite device through reverse-engineering, which could modify Cellebrite reports and affect future investigations [113380].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to a malicious objective. Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, claimed to have hacked into the phone-cracking tools used by police in Britain and around the world, which were developed by the security company Cellebrite. Marlinspike detailed vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's surveillance devices, allowing anyone to plant code on a phone that could take over Cellebrite's hardware if used to scan the device. This could not only affect future investigations but also rewrite data saved from previous analyses [113380, 113388]. Additionally, Marlinspike demonstrated running a piece of code on a machine running Cellebrite software, showing an easy way to compromise the security company's system. He mentioned that it was possible to execute any code and that a real exploit payload could alter previous reports, compromise the integrity of future reports, or exfiltrate data from the Cellebrite machine [113388]. These actions and claims indicate a malicious intent to harm the system.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) poor_decisions: The software failure incident involving Cellebrite's phone-cracking tools being hacked by Signal's CEO can be attributed to poor decisions made by Cellebrite in the design and implementation of their software. Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, identified over 100 security vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's devices, indicating a lack of robust security measures and oversight in their software development process [113380, 113388]. (b) accidental_decisions: The software failure incident does not seem to be related to accidental decisions or unintended mistakes. Instead, it appears to be a deliberate action by Signal to expose the security flaws in Cellebrite's software [113380, 113388].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the articles as Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, discovered and exploited multiple security vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's software. Marlinspike detailed these vulnerabilities, indicating a lack of professional competence in Cellebrite's development process [113380, 113388]. (b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also present in the articles. Marlinspike humorously mentioned finding the latest versions of Cellebrite software after a package fell off a truck in front of him, implying an accidental acquisition of the software [113388].
Duration temporary The software failure incident reported in the articles is temporary. The incident involved flaws and vulnerabilities found in the software used by the cyber-security company Cellebrite, as highlighted by Signal's CEO, Moxie Marlinspike. Marlinspike detailed a series of vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's surveillance devices, which could allow anyone to plant code on a phone to take over Cellebrite's hardware if used to scan the device [113380]. Additionally, Marlinspike demonstrated running a simple piece of code on a machine running Cellebrite software, showing an easy way to compromise the security company's system [113388]. These incidents point to temporary software failure due to specific vulnerabilities in the software that were exploited.
Behaviour value, other (a) crash: The articles do not mention any instances of the software crashing and losing its state. (b) omission: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). (c) timing: The incident does not relate to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. (d) value: The software failure incident is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Signal's founder, Moxie Marlinspike, claimed to have found vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's software that could allow for unauthorized access, data alteration, and compromise of the security company's system [113380, 113388]. (e) byzantine: The incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The other behavior observed in this software failure incident is related to the system being hacked or compromised by an external party. Marlinspike claimed to have hacked into the phone-cracking tools used by police, exposing vulnerabilities in Cellebrite's software [113380, 113388].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - No mention of people losing their lives due to the software failure incident in the provided articles. [113380, 113388] (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - No mention of people being physically harmed due to the software failure incident in the provided articles. [113380, 113388] (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - No mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure incident in the provided articles. [113380, 113388] (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident did not directly impact people's material goods, money, or data as per the articles. However, there were implications related to data security and potential unauthorized access to information. [113380, 113388] (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There is no mention of people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure incident in the provided articles. [113380, 113388] (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident primarily involved vulnerabilities in the surveillance devices used by police, which could potentially impact the effectiveness of digital investigations. [113380, 113388] (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The articles discuss significant consequences related to potential unauthorized access, data manipulation, and security vulnerabilities resulting from the software failure incident. [113380, 113388] (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles mention theoretical consequences such as the ability to plant code on a phone, take over hardware, rewrite data, compromise the integrity of reports, and exfiltrate data due to the identified vulnerabilities. [113380, 113388] (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The articles do not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure incident beyond those related to data security, potential unauthorized access, and manipulation of information. [113380, 113388]
Domain information (a) The failed system in the articles was related to the industry of information, specifically digital forensics and digital investigations. The software failure incident involved vulnerabilities in the software used by cyber-security company Cellebrite, which is utilized by police forces around the world for digital investigations and extracting information from mobile devices [Article 113380, Article 113388].

Sources

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