| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident has happened again at one_organization:
The article discusses how vulnerabilities in TCP/IP stacks, including the Nucleus NET from Siemens, have been exposed, impacting an estimated 100 million devices worldwide. This incident highlights a recurring issue within the organization's products and services [112973].
(b) The software failure incident has happened again at multiple_organization:
The article mentions that similar flaws in TCP/IP stacks have been found by Forescout and JSOF in other proprietary and open-source stacks, exposing hundreds of millions or even possibly billions of devices worldwide. This indicates that the software failure incident has occurred at multiple organizations or with their products and services [112973]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the vulnerabilities found in the TCP/IP stacks, such as FreeBSD and Nucleus NET, which are integral to how devices communicate with the internet. These vulnerabilities, collectively known as Name:Wreck, were discovered by researchers at security firms Forescout and JSOF. The flaws in these TCP/IP stacks allowed attackers to crash devices, take them offline, or gain remote control, posing significant risks to critical infrastructure, healthcare, and manufacturing settings [112973].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the challenges in implementing patches for the vulnerabilities discovered in the TCP/IP stacks. Despite patches being available, the actual deployment of these fixes in devices is hindered by the prevalence of older software versions and the lack of mechanisms for updating the code in many devices. This operational issue can leave devices exposed to potential exploitation, emphasizing the importance of effective cybersecurity practices in device operation and maintenance [112973]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is primarily within_system. The vulnerabilities, dubbed Name:Wreck, were found in four ubiquitous TCP/IP stacks used in various devices and IT management servers [112973]. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to crash devices, take them offline, or gain remote control. The vulnerabilities were present in operating systems like FreeBSD and Nucleus NET from Siemens, indicating that the flaws originated from within the system itself. The article also mentions that the vulnerabilities were discovered by security firms Forescout and JSOF, and patches were made available, but the challenge lies in implementing these fixes in actual devices that often run older software versions [112973].
(b) The software failure incident also has elements of outside_system factors. The vulnerabilities exposed an estimated 100 million devices worldwide, including internet-of-things products and IT management servers [112973]. The article highlights that the vulnerabilities could potentially wreak havoc in critical infrastructure, healthcare, or manufacturing settings, indicating that the impact of the failure extends beyond the immediate system affected. Additionally, the researchers coordinated the disclosure of the flaws with developers, the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and other vulnerability-tracking groups, showing collaboration with external entities to address the issue [112973]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles is primarily due to non-human actions, specifically vulnerabilities in TCP/IP stacks that allow attackers to crash devices or gain remote control [112973].
(b) The software failure incident also involves human actions in terms of researchers discovering the vulnerabilities, coordinating disclosure with developers and cybersecurity agencies, and releasing patches to mitigate the risks [112973]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles is related to hardware vulnerabilities in TCP/IP stacks that underpin how devices communicate with the internet. These vulnerabilities expose an estimated 100 million devices worldwide, including internet-of-things products and IT management servers. The vulnerabilities allow attackers to crash a device, take it offline, or gain remote control, potentially wreaking havoc in critical infrastructure, healthcare, or manufacturing settings [112973].
(b) The software failure incident is also related to software vulnerabilities in TCP/IP stacks, specifically in how these stacks implement the Domain Name System (DNS) internet phone book. The vulnerabilities allow attackers to crash devices, take them offline, or gain remote control. While patches are available, the challenge lies in ensuring these fixes are implemented in actual devices, especially those running older software versions. The incident highlights the common weaknesses found in TCP/IP stacks, both proprietary and open source, which have been passed down through decades without significant security updates [112973]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the articles is malicious in nature. The vulnerabilities, known as Name:Wreck, were found in TCP/IP stacks used in various devices, allowing attackers to crash devices, take them offline, or gain remote control. These vulnerabilities could potentially wreak havoc in critical infrastructure, healthcare, or manufacturing settings. The vulnerabilities were discovered by researchers at security firms Forescout and JSOF, and patches have been made available. However, the exposure of potentially billions of devices to these vulnerabilities highlights the malicious nature of the incident [112973].
(b) The incident does not involve non-malicious factors as the vulnerabilities were intentionally discovered by security researchers and were not introduced accidentally or without intent. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions is evident in the software vulnerabilities found in the TCP/IP stacks, such as FreeBSD and Nucleus NET, which allowed attackers to crash devices or gain remote control. These vulnerabilities were due to how the stacks implemented the Domain Name System, exposing an estimated 100 million devices worldwide [112973].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions is highlighted by the fact that the vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP stacks were not actively exploited by attackers in the wild at the time of discovery. The vulnerabilities were a result of outdated code in devices that were written with a security mentality of 20 years ago, which became insecure once connected to the internet [112973]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to development incompetence. The vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP stacks, dubbed Name:Wreck, were found in basic code that underpins how devices communicate with the internet. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to crash devices, take them offline, or gain remote control. The vulnerabilities were present in operating systems like FreeBSD and Nucleus NET from Siemens, indicating a lack of professional competence in implementing secure communication protocols [112973].
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental as the vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP stacks were not intentionally created but were a result of outdated code that had been passed down untouched through decades. The flaws were found in both proprietary and open-source TCP/IP stacks, highlighting how these vulnerabilities were accidentally inherited over time due to the lack of updates and security measures in the code [112973]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article [112973] is more temporary in nature. The vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP stacks, known as Name:Wreck, allowed attackers to crash devices or gain remote control, potentially wreaking havoc in various sectors. Patches have been made available, but the challenge lies in ensuring these fixes are implemented in actual devices, especially older versions that may not receive updates. The incident is characterized by the need for immediate mitigation measures and ongoing efforts to address the vulnerabilities, indicating a temporary nature of the failure. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article involves vulnerabilities in TCP/IP stacks that could allow an attacker to crash a device and take it offline [112973].
(b) omission: The vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP stacks could also potentially allow an attacker to gain control of a device remotely, which could lead to the system omitting to perform its intended functions [112973].
(c) timing: The article does not specifically mention any failures related to timing issues.
(d) value: The vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP stacks could lead to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, such as allowing unauthorized control of devices [112973].
(e) byzantine: The article does not describe the software failure incident as exhibiting byzantine behavior.
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited by the software failure incident is the potential for the vulnerabilities to be exploited by attackers to disrupt networks, critical infrastructure, healthcare systems, or manufacturing settings, which could lead to a wide range of consequences beyond the typical crash or incorrect functioning of the system [112973]. |