Published Date: 2021-04-23
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident related to Apple's AirDrop vulnerability happened in May 2019 [Article 113489, Article 113350, Article 113223]. |
| System | 1. AirDrop system failed [113489, 113350, 113223] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Hackers [113489, 113350] 2. Apple [113489, 113350, 113223] |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Apple [113489, 113350, 113223] |
| Software Causes | 1. The software cause of the failure incident was the vulnerability in Apple's AirDrop feature, specifically related to the 'Contacts Only' option, which allowed hackers to obtain phone numbers and emails of nearby users [Article 113489, Article 113350, Article 113223]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Lack of acknowledgment and action by Apple despite being informed of the vulnerability in 2019 [Article 113489, Article 113223] 2. Potential physical proximity requirement for a bad actor to exploit the vulnerability [Article 113489, Article 113223] |
| Impacts | 1. Personal information leakage: The software failure incident led to the leakage of phone numbers and emails of AirDrop users to potential hackers, posing a significant privacy risk [113489, 113350, 113223]. 2. Vulnerability exploitation: The flaw in AirDrop allowed attackers to exploit the vulnerability by using simple techniques like brute-force attacks to obtain private information [113489, 113350, 113223]. 3. Lack of response from Apple: Despite being informed of the issue in 2019, Apple did not acknowledge the problem or indicate any efforts to address the vulnerability, leaving approximately 1.5 billion Apple devices at risk [113489, 113350, 113223]. 4. Proposed solution: Researchers developed an alternative solution named 'PrivateDrop' to address the flaw in AirDrop, providing a more secure method for contact discovery without exchanging vulnerable hash values [113489, 113350]. 5. Potential misuse of leaked information: The leaked personal information could be exploited for malicious activities such as spear phishing attacks, scams, or being sold to third parties, highlighting the broader implications of the software failure incident [113350]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing the solution developed by the researchers named 'PrivateDrop' that uses private set intersection to perform the contact discovery process without disclosing vulnerable hashes could have prevented the software failure incident [113350, 113223]. 2. Apple acknowledging the reported problem and actively working on a solution after being informed by the researchers in 2019 could have prevented the software failure incident [113489, 113223]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing the solution named 'PrivateDrop' developed by researchers at Technische Universitat Darmstadt, which uses private set intersection cryptographic techniques to perform contact discovery without disclosing vulnerable hash values. This solution could be used instead of AirDrop until Apple eliminates the vulnerability. [113489, 113350, 113223] | References | 1. Technische Universitat Darmstadt in Germany [Article 113489, Article 113350, Article 113223] 2. Ars Technica [Article 113350] 3. Germany's Technical University of Darmstadt [Article 113350] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident related to AirDrop leaking user emails and phone numbers has happened again within the same organization, Apple. The vulnerability in AirDrop was first reported to Apple in 2019 by researchers at Technische Universitat Darmstadt in Germany, but as of the latest articles, Apple has not addressed the issue in subsequent software updates [Article 113489], [Article 113350], [Article 113223]. (b) The incident of AirDrop leaking user information due to a privacy gap has also been reported to have happened at other organizations or with their products and services. The researchers at Technische Universitat Darmstadt developed an alternative solution named 'PrivateDrop' to address the vulnerability in AirDrop, which doesn't rely on exchanging vulnerable hash values. This indicates that similar incidents may have occurred or could potentially occur with other organizations or their file-sharing services [Article 113350]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase: The incident with Apple's AirDrop vulnerability, where hackers could obtain phone numbers and emails of nearby users, was due to a privacy gap in the Contacts Only option of AirDrop. This option uses a mutual authentication mechanism to confirm if the sender and receiver are in each other's contact list, but this mechanism could be exploited by bad actors in physical proximity to the target. The information is encoded in hash during the process, but hackers could reverse the privacy measures using simple techniques like brute-force attacks [113489, 113350, 113223]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase: The operation-related failure in this incident occurred due to the misuse of the AirDrop feature. Hackers could exploit the vulnerability by being in physical proximity to the target and using Wi-Fi-capable devices to intercept the hashed contact information being exchanged during the discovery process. This misuse of the system's functionality allowed for the unauthorized access to private information of Apple users [113489, 113350, 113223]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | (a) The software failure incident related to the AirDrop vulnerability can be categorized as within_system. The vulnerability in AirDrop that allowed hackers to obtain phone numbers and emails of users was due to a privacy gap in the feature itself. The issue stemmed from the 'Contacts Only' option in AirDrop, which used a mutual authentication mechanism to check if a user's phone number and email were in someone else's contacts list. This information was encoded in hash during the process, but bad actors in physical proximity to a target could exploit this vulnerability using simple techniques like brute-force attacks [113489, 113350, 113223]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The software failure incident in the articles is related to a vulnerability in Apple's AirDrop feature that allows hackers to obtain phone numbers and emails of nearby users through the 'Contacts Only' option [113489, 113350, 113223]. - The vulnerability is rooted in Apple's use of hash functions for 'obfuscating' the exchanged phone numbers and email addresses during the discovery process [113489]. - The issue was reported to Apple in 2019, but the tech giant has not acknowledged the problem or indicated that they are working on a solution [113489, 113223]. - The researchers developed a solution to the flaw named 'PrivateDrop,' which could be used instead of AirDrop until Apple eliminates the vulnerability [113489, 113350]. - PrivateDrop is based on optimized cryptographic private set intersection protocols that can securely perform the contact discovery process between two users without exchanging vulnerable hash values [113350]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The vulnerability in AirDrop was discovered by researchers at Technische Universitat Darmstadt in Germany [113489, 113350, 113223]. - The researchers informed Apple of the potential vulnerability in May 2019, but the issue hasn't been addressed in subsequent software updates [113223]. - The vulnerability allows bad actors in physical proximity to a target to obtain private information through simple techniques such as brute-force attacks [113489, 113223]. - The researchers highlighted that the leakage of hashed contact identifiers could be exploited by planting "bugs" in public hot spots or other places of interest [113350]. - The leakage of hashes can lead to personal information being abused for spear phishing attacks, scams, or being sold [113350]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The articles report a software failure incident related to hardware in the context of Apple's AirDrop feature. The vulnerability in AirDrop allows hackers to obtain phone numbers and emails of nearby users through the 'Contacts Only' option, which involves a mutual authentication mechanism using Wi-Fi and Bluetooth connections [113489, 113350, 113223]. (b) The software failure incident is primarily due to contributing factors originating in software. The vulnerability in AirDrop is related to how the software handles the authentication process and encryption of user information, allowing for the leakage of sensitive data to potential attackers [113489, 113350, 113223]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious, non-malicious | (a) The software failure incident related to the AirDrop vulnerability can be categorized as malicious. The incident involved a privacy gap in AirDrop's 'Contacts Only' option, which allowed hackers in physical proximity to a target to obtain phone numbers and emails of AirDrop users through brute-force attacks [113489, 113350, 113223]. The vulnerability was exploited by bad actors to potentially obtain personal information of Apple users for malicious purposes such as spear phishing attacks, scams, or selling the information [113350]. The incident was reported to Apple in 2019, but the tech giant did not acknowledge the problem or indicate working on a solution [113489, 113223]. (b) The software failure incident can also be considered non-malicious as it was a result of a privacy gap in the AirDrop feature, specifically in the 'Contacts Only' option, which used a mutual authentication mechanism to check if a user's phone number and email were in someone else's contacts list [113223]. The vulnerability was identified by security researchers at a German university, who proposed an alternative solution named PrivateDrop that aimed to eliminate the vulnerability without relying on exchanging vulnerable hash values [113223]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | unknown | (a) The intent of the software failure incident: The software failure incident related to AirDrop leaking user emails and phone numbers was not due to poor decisions but rather due to a vulnerability in the feature's design and implementation. The issue stemmed from the Contacts Only option in AirDrop, which allowed a nearby stranger to discover the phone number and email of an AirDrop user due to a privacy gap in the feature. The information was encoded in hash during the process, but a bad actor in physical proximity could exploit this vulnerability using simple techniques such as brute-force attacks ([113223], [113350]). (b) The intent of the software failure incident: The intent of the software failure incident was not accidental but rather a result of a vulnerability that was exploited by bad actors. The incident was not due to mistakes or unintended decisions but rather a flaw in the design and implementation of the AirDrop feature, which allowed for the leakage of sensitive user information ([113223], [113350]). |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The software failure incident related to AirDrop leaking user emails and phone numbers was due to a privacy vulnerability in the Contacts Only option, which allowed hackers to obtain private information through a mutual authentication mechanism [113489, 113350, 113223]. - The issue was reported to Apple in 2019 by researchers at Technische Universitat Darmstadt, but Apple did not acknowledge the problem or indicate that they were working on a solution, indicating a lack of response or action towards addressing the vulnerability [113489, 113223]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The vulnerability in AirDrop that led to the leakage of user emails and phone numbers was not intentional but rather a result of a privacy gap in the feature, which allowed bad actors in physical proximity to exploit the mutual authentication mechanism using simple techniques such as brute-force attacks [113350, 113223]. - The accidental nature of the vulnerability is highlighted by the fact that the researchers developed an alternative solution named PrivateDrop that aimed to address the flaw without relying on exchanging vulnerable hash values, indicating a proactive response to mitigate the accidental vulnerability [113350]. |
| Duration | permanent, temporary | (a) The articles report on a software failure incident that can be considered permanent. The vulnerability in Apple's AirDrop feature, allowing hackers to obtain phone numbers and emails of nearby users, has not been addressed by Apple despite being reported to them in 2019 [113489, 113350, 113223]. (b) The software failure incident can also be considered temporary as researchers have developed an alternative solution named 'PrivateDrop' to address the vulnerability in AirDrop until Apple eliminates the flaw [113489, 113350]. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, value, other | (a) crash: - Article 113489 mentions a vulnerability in Apple's AirDrop where hackers can obtain phone numbers and emails of nearby users through the 'Contacts Only' option, indicating a potential crash in the system's security mechanism. - Article 113350 discusses how AirDrop is leaking user emails and phone numbers due to vulnerabilities, which could lead to a crash in the system's privacy measures. (b) omission: - Article 113223 reports that a privacy gap in AirDrop's 'Contacts Only' option could lead to the omission of performing the intended function of securely sharing files without exposing phone numbers and emails. (c) timing: - There is no specific mention of a timing-related failure in the articles. (d) value: - Article 113489 highlights that the encryption used by Apple in AirDrop can be easily cracked using 'simple techniques such as brute-force attacks,' indicating a failure in the system's value of securely exchanging data. - Article 113350 also discusses how the system's hashing mechanism can be exploited by hackers to obtain personal information, indicating a failure in maintaining the value of user privacy. (e) byzantine: - There is no specific mention of a byzantine-related failure in the articles. (f) other: - The behavior of the software failure incident in this case involves a security vulnerability in Apple's AirDrop that allows hackers to obtain personal information of users through the 'Contacts Only' option, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privacy breaches. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, non-human, theoretical_consequence, other | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any deaths caused by the software failure incident in the provided articles. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of physical harm caused to individuals due to the software failure incident in the provided articles. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted by the software failure incident in the provided articles. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident led to the potential exposure of personal information such as phone numbers and emails of Apple device users [113489, 113350, 113223]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There is no mention of people having to postpone activities due to the software failure incident in the provided articles. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident primarily affected the security and privacy of Apple device users, with the potential risk of personal information exposure [113489, 113350, 113223]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident had real observed consequences related to the potential exposure of personal information [113489, 113350, 113223]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discuss potential consequences such as the risk of personal information exposure, spear phishing attacks, scams, and privacy breaches due to the software failure incident [113350]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The primary consequence of the software failure incident was the potential compromise of personal information like phone numbers and emails of Apple device users, leading to privacy concerns and security risks [113489, 113350, 113223]. |
| Domain | information, finance | (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to the industry of information. The incident involves a vulnerability in Apple's AirDrop feature that could potentially lead to the leakage of personal information such as phone numbers and emails of users [Article 113489, Article 113350, Article 113223]. (h) The incident also has implications for the finance industry as the leaked personal information could be exploited for spear phishing attacks, scams, or for sale, which could impact individuals financially [Article 113350]. (m) The software failure incident is not directly related to any other specific industry mentioned in the options provided. |
Article ID: 113489
Article ID: 113350
Article ID: 113223