Incident: Ransomware Attack on Ireland's Health Service IT Systems, May 2021

Published Date: 2021-05-14

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident, a significant ransomware attack on Ireland's state health services provider, happened overnight before the article was published on May 14, 2021 [Article 114497].
System 1. HSE IT systems [114497] 2. Common system used for registering patients throughout the HSE [114497]
Responsible Organization 1. A group of cybercriminals responsible for ransomware attacks, possibly linked to Darkside, caused the software failure incident at Ireland's state health services provider [114497].
Impacted Organization 1. Health Service Executive (HSE) in Ireland [114497] 2. Hospitals, including the Rotunda maternity hospital and Cork university hospital 3. Child and family agency Tusla
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a "significant ransomware attack" that targeted the Health Service Executive's IT systems, leading to the shutdown of all IT systems and widespread disruption [114497].
Non-software Causes 1. The failure incident was caused by a "significant ransomware attack" which was described as a "human-operated attempt to access data stored on central servers" [Article 114497]. 2. The attack was perpetrated by cybercriminals, specifically a group called Darkside, who claimed responsibility for the attack on the Colonial petrochemical pipeline earlier in the week [Article 114497].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident, a significant ransomware attack on Ireland's Health Service Executive (HSE) IT systems, led to the shutdown of all IT systems and the cancellation of some medical appointments, causing widespread disruption [Article 114497]. 2. The attack affected national and local systems providing core services, leading to the cancellation of outpatient visits in several hospitals and the paralysis of the oncology department at Cork University Hospital [Article 114497]. 3. The Rotunda, a Dublin maternity hospital, experienced a "critical emergency" and had to cancel all outpatient visits except for women who were more than 35 weeks pregnant [Article 114497]. 4. The child and family agency Tusla reported that its IT systems, including email, internal systems, and the portal for child protection referrals, were not working due to the ransomware attack [Article 114497]. 5. The incident prompted the HSE to work with police, defense forces, and third-party cybersecurity experts to respond to the attack, emphasizing containment as the key priority [Article 114497].
Preventions 1. Implementing robust cybersecurity measures such as regular security audits, penetration testing, and employee training to prevent ransomware attacks [114497]. 2. Keeping software systems up to date with the latest security patches and updates to prevent exploitation of known vulnerabilities [114497]. 3. Utilizing multi-factor authentication and strong password policies to enhance system security and prevent unauthorized access [114497]. 4. Regularly backing up critical data and systems to ensure quick recovery in case of a ransomware attack, reducing the need to pay ransom demands [114497].
Fixes 1. Enhancing cybersecurity measures to prevent future ransomware attacks [114497]
References 1. Paul Reid, the Health Service Executive chief executive [Article 114497] 2. Fergal Malone, the master of the Rotunda hospital [Article 114497]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: The article mentions that earlier in the week, hackers crippled the Colonial petrochemical pipeline, causing fuel shortages and states of emergency to be declared in four states. The company reportedly paid a $5m ransom fee. This incident is similar to the ransomware attack on Ireland's Health Service Executive (HSE) IT systems, where the HSE had to shut down all its IT systems due to a significant ransomware attack [114497]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: The article mentions that ransomware attacks are common, with health service IT systems in Ireland being a high-profile target, along with the Colonial Pipeline. The attack on the Colonial Pipeline was attributed to a group of cybercriminals called Darkside. This indicates that ransomware attacks have targeted multiple organizations, not just in Ireland but also in the case of the Colonial Pipeline incident [114497].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident in Article 114497 was primarily due to a design-related factor introduced during the system development phase. The incident was caused by a "significant ransomware attack" that targeted the Health Service Executive's IT systems, leading to the shutdown of all IT systems and widespread disruption [114497]. This attack was described as a "human-operated" attempt to access data stored on central servers, indicating a design vulnerability in the system that allowed unauthorized access to critical data [114497]. (b) Additionally, the software failure incident in Article 114497 also involved operation-related factors. The attack resulted in the cancellation of medical appointments and the disruption of core services provided by the national and local systems. Hospitals had to cancel outpatient visits, and various healthcare services were paralyzed due to the IT systems being affected [114497]. This disruption was a direct consequence of the operation of the compromised IT systems, highlighting the impact of operational factors on the incident.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident, a significant ransomware attack on Ireland's Health Service Executive (HSE) IT systems, was described as a "human-operated" attempt to access data stored on central servers [Article 114497]. This indicates that the failure originated from within the system itself, as hackers managed to breach the internal security measures to launch the attack.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in Article 114497 was due to non-human_actions, specifically a significant ransomware attack that was described as a "human-operated" attempt to access data stored on central servers [114497]. (b) However, human_actions were also involved as the attack was initiated by cybercriminals who exploited vulnerabilities in the system and engaged in criminal activities to disrupt the IT systems of the Health Service Executive [114497].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident in Article 114497 was not attributed to hardware issues. The incident was specifically described as a "significant ransomware attack" affecting the Health Service Executive's IT systems, leading to the shutdown of all systems and causing widespread disruption [114497]. (b) The software failure incident in Article 114497 was directly linked to software issues. It was identified as a ransomware attack, where a ransomware virus was detected in the IT systems of the Health Service Executive, leading to the shutdown of all computer systems to protect them from the attack [114497].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident in this case is malicious. The incident was described as a "significant ransomware attack" on Ireland's state health services provider, with a "human-operated" attempt to access data stored on central servers for a presumed ransom [114497]. The attack led to the shutdown of all IT systems and widespread disruption, affecting national and local systems that provide core services [114497]. Additionally, the attack was carried out by cybercriminals who are part of an "internationally operated criminal operation" [114497]. The attack on the health service IT systems was part of a larger trend of ransomware attacks targeting high-profile organizations, with the Colonial Pipeline being another recent victim [114497].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions: - The software failure incident in Ireland's state health services provider was a result of a "significant ransomware attack" [114497]. - The attack was described as a "human-operated" attempt to access data stored on central servers for a presumed ransom [114497]. - The attack was termed as an "internationally operated criminal operation" [114497]. (b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions: - The incident involved a ransomware attack, which is a common form of criminal malware that typically infects targets through malicious emails or exploiting vulnerabilities in software [114497]. - The attack on the health service IT systems in Ireland was not a random event but a deliberate act by cybercriminals [114497].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The software failure incident reported in the news article is not attributed to development incompetence. The incident was caused by a significant ransomware attack on Ireland's state health services provider, leading to the shutdown of all IT systems and widespread disruption [114497]. (b) The software failure incident was accidental in nature as it was a result of a ransomware attack carried out by cybercriminals. The attack was described as a "human-operated" attempt to access data stored on central servers for a presumed ransom. The attack led to the shutdown of IT systems and cancellation of medical appointments, causing disruption to core services [114497].
Duration temporary (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is temporary. The incident was caused by a significant ransomware attack on Ireland's Health Service Executive (HSE) IT systems, leading to the shutdown of all IT systems and the cancellation of some medical appointments [114497]. The HSE chief executive mentioned that they were in the containment phase of the issue, working with various authorities and cybersecurity experts to respond to the attack. The incident disrupted national and local systems but did not affect Covid-19 vaccinations or ambulance services. The hospitals affected had to resort to paper-based systems as a contingency plan to continue operations while the IT systems were shut down. The incident is temporary as efforts were being made to contain and address the issue, indicating that it was not a permanent failure.
Behaviour crash (a) crash: The software failure incident in Article 114497 can be categorized as a crash. The Health Service Executive (HSE) shut down all its IT systems after a significant ransomware attack, indicating a failure due to the system losing state and not performing any of its intended functions [114497].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence harm, property, delay, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) death: There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident in the articles [114497]. (b) harm: The articles mention that the oncology department at Cork University Hospital was reportedly paralyzed due to the ransomware attack, which could potentially harm patients whose treatments were affected [114497]. (c) basic: There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted by the software failure incident in the articles [114497]. (d) property: The articles mention that the ransomware attack affected IT systems, including email and internal systems, which could impact data and potentially other property-related aspects [114497]. (e) delay: Several hospitals had to cancel outpatient visits or urge patients not to attend appointments due to the software failure incident, causing delays in medical services [114497]. (f) non-human: The articles mention that the IT systems of the child and family agency Tusla, used for child protection referrals, were not working due to the ransomware attack [114497]. (g) no_consequence: There is a clear disruption and impact on various services and systems due to the ransomware attack, indicating real consequences of the software failure incident [114497]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The articles discuss the potential consequences of ransomware attacks, such as freezing networks, funding criminal outfits, and causing disruptions, which are theoretical consequences that did occur in this case [114497]. (i) other: There are no other specific consequences mentioned in the articles beyond the disruption, cancellations, and impact on various systems and services due to the ransomware attack [114497].
Domain health (a) The software failure incident reported in Article 114497 is related to the health industry. The Health Service Executive (HSE) in Ireland had to shut down all its IT systems due to a significant ransomware attack, causing disruption to medical appointments and services [114497]. The incident affected national and local systems providing core health services, including hospitals and healthcare agencies like the Rotunda maternity hospital and Cork university hospital's oncology department [114497]. The attack also impacted the child and family agency Tusla, affecting its IT systems used for child protection referrals [114497].

Sources

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