Incident: Title: Cyberattack on M.T.A.'s Transportation Systems by Chinese Hackers

Published Date: 2021-06-03

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the hacking group believed to have links to the Chinese government penetrating the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems occurred in April [115590]. Therefore, the software failure incident happened in April 2021.
System 1. Pulse Connect Secure system [115590]
Responsible Organization 1. A hacking group believed to have links to the Chinese government [115590] 2. China-linked hackers, one of which was likely operating on behalf of the Chinese government [115590]
Impacted Organization 1. Metropolitan Transportation Authority (M.T.A.) [115590]
Software Causes 1. The software causes of the failure incident were vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure, a widely used connectivity tool, which the hackers exploited to gain access to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems [115590].
Non-software Causes 1. The hacking incident was believed to be linked to the Chinese government, indicating a geopolitical motive [115590]. 2. The hackers exploited vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure, a widely used connectivity tool, to gain access to the systems [115590]. 3. The attack was part of a broader hacking campaign by sophisticated hackers believed to be backed by the Chinese government, targeting federal agencies, defense contractors, and financial institutions [115590].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident led to a breach in the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems by a hacking group believed to have links to the Chinese government, exposing vulnerabilities in the transportation network [115590]. 2. The hackers compromised three of the transit authority's 18 computer systems, but no employee or customer information was breached, and there was no data loss or changes to vital systems [115590]. 3. The response to the intrusion cost the agency an estimated $370,000 [115590].
Preventions 1. Implementing timely software patches and updates to fix vulnerabilities in widely used connectivity tools like Pulse Connect Secure could have prevented the software failure incident [115590]. 2. Having robust cybersecurity defense systems in place to detect and prevent the spread of cyberattacks could have helped prevent the intrusion [115590]. 3. Conducting regular cybersecurity audits and assessments to identify and address potential weaknesses in the system could have prevented the breach [115590]. 4. Enhancing employee cybersecurity training and awareness to recognize and report suspicious activities or potential security threats could have contributed to preventing the attack [115590].
Fixes 1. Implementing immediate security updates and fixes provided by the software company that owns Pulse Connect Secure, Ivanti, to address the vulnerabilities exploited by the hackers [115590]. 2. Conducting a detailed forensics audit to identify and remove malware, such as web shells, from the affected systems [115590]. 3. Requiring employees and contractors to change passwords as a precautionary measure and resetting digital certificates to enhance network security [115590].
References 1. M.T.A. document [115590] 2. FireEye, a private cybersecurity firm [115590] 3. Department of Homeland Security [115590] 4. Mineta Transportation Institute [115590] 5. Justice Department [115590] 6. Congress [115590] 7. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency [115590] 8. National Security Agency [115590] 9. F.B.I. [115590] 10. Ivanti, the software company that owns Pulse Connect Secure [115590] 11. Rob McLeod, senior director of the threat response unit at eSentire [115590] 12. David E. Sanger, reporter [115590]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (M.T.A.) experienced a cyberattack, which was the third significant cyberattack on the transit network by hackers believed to be connected to foreign governments in recent years [115590]. This incident highlights a recurring issue within the M.T.A. organization where they have been targeted by cyberattacks multiple times. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: The article mentions that the M.T.A. is one of a growing number of transit agencies across the country targeted by foreign hackers, indicating that similar cyberattacks have occurred at other transit agencies as well [115590]. Additionally, the article provides examples of other transit agencies that have been hit by cyberattacks in recent years, such as the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, Fort Worth's regional transportation agency, the Philadelphia transit authority, Sacramento's transit agency, and the state transportation department in Colorado [115590]. This suggests that cyberattacks on transit agencies are not isolated incidents and have occurred at multiple organizations in the transportation sector.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where it mentions that the hackers took advantage of vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure, a widely used connectivity tool that offers workers remote access to their employers’ networks. The hackers exploited a "zero day," or a previously unknown coding flaw in the software for which a patch did not exist, indicating a design flaw in the system [115590]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be observed in the article where it states that the hackers compromised three of the transit authority’s 18 computer systems by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure. This indicates a failure in the operation or misuse of the system that allowed the hackers to gain unauthorized access [115590].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident at the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (M.T.A.) was primarily due to contributing factors that originated from within the system. The hackers gained access to the M.T.A.'s systems by exploiting vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure, a connectivity tool used for remote access to the network. This allowed the hackers to compromise three of the transit authority's computer systems [115590]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident also had contributing factors that originated from outside the system. The hacking group believed to have links to the Chinese government was responsible for penetrating the M.T.A.'s computer systems, indicating an external threat to the system's security [115590].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The software failure incident involving the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems was a result of a hacking group believed to have links to the Chinese government penetrating the systems [115590]. - The hackers exploited vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure, a widely used connectivity tool, to gain access to the M.T.A.'s systems [115590]. - The hackers took advantage of a "zero day," a previously unknown coding flaw in software for which a patch does not exist, to compromise the M.T.A.'s computer systems [115590]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The hackers, believed to be connected to the Chinese government, were responsible for the intrusion into the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems [115590]. - The hackers took steps to erase evidence of the intrusion, indicating human actions to cover their tracks [115590]. - The M.T.A. required 3,700 employees and contractors to change passwords as a precautionary measure after the breach, highlighting human actions taken in response to the incident [115590].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles was not due to hardware issues but rather due to vulnerabilities in software. The hackers exploited vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure, a widely used connectivity tool, to gain access to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems [115590]. The cyberespionage campaign involved two groups of China-linked hackers, one likely operating on behalf of the Chinese government, indicating that the root cause of the incident was related to software vulnerabilities rather than hardware issues [115590]. (b) The software failure incident was primarily attributed to software vulnerabilities rather than hardware failures. The hackers took advantage of a "zero day," a previously unknown coding flaw in software for which a patch does not exist, to gain access to the M.T.A.'s systems [115590]. Additionally, the malware found in the Pulse Connect Secure applications included web shells, which provide hackers a backdoor to remotely access and control certain servers, indicating a software-related breach [115590].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident reported in Article 115590 was malicious in nature. The incident involved a hacking group believed to have links to the Chinese government penetrating the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems. The hackers exploited vulnerabilities in the Pulse Connect Secure software, a widely used connectivity tool, to gain unauthorized access to the M.T.A.'s systems. The hackers were able to compromise three of the transit authority's computer systems, including those used by New York City Transit, Long Island Rail Road, and Metro-North Railroad. The attack involved the use of a "zero day" coding flaw in the software for which a patch did not exist, indicating a deliberate attempt to exploit a previously unknown vulnerability [115590]. Additionally, the attack was part of a broader hacking campaign by sophisticated hackers believed to be backed by the Chinese government. The hackers did not make any financial demands but appeared to be part of a series of widespread intrusions aimed at gaining unauthorized access to critical American infrastructure. The attack raised concerns about the vulnerability of the state-owned China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation and its potential impact on American transportation infrastructure [115590].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions: - The software failure incident involving the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (M.T.A.) being hacked by a group believed to have links to the Chinese government was likely driven by the intent to gain insights into the inner workings of the transit system to potentially benefit China's efforts to dominate the rail car market [115590]. - The hackers targeted vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure, a widely used connectivity tool, to gain access to the M.T.A. and other systems, indicating a deliberate effort to exploit known weaknesses for unauthorized access [115590]. (b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental decisions: - There is no indication in the articles that the software failure incident was a result of accidental decisions.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, unknown (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as the hackers, believed to be linked to the Chinese government, penetrated the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Pulse Connect Secure software [115590]. This breach occurred due to the hackers taking advantage of a "zero day," a previously unknown coding flaw in the software for which a patch did not exist, indicating a failure in the software development process to identify and address such critical vulnerabilities. (b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article.
Duration temporary The software failure incident reported in the articles was temporary. The hackers gained access to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems in April and the access continued at least until the intrusion was identified on April 20 [115590]. The hackers compromised three of the transit authority’s 18 computer systems, but there was no employee or customer information breached, no data loss, and no changes to vital systems [115590]. The software company that owns Pulse Connect Secure provided immediate steps to mitigate the damage and released a security update to fix the vulnerabilities, which New York transit officials implemented within 24 hours of their release [115590].
Behaviour other (a) crash: The software failure incident did not involve a crash where the system lost state and did not perform any of its intended functions. The hackers did not make any changes to the agency’s operations, collect any employee or customer information, or compromise any M.T.A. accounts [115590]. (b) omission: The software failure incident did not involve omission where the system omitted to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The hackers did not compromise customers’ personal information, and there was no employee or customer information breached, no data loss, and no changes to vital systems [115590]. (c) timing: The software failure incident did not involve timing issues where the system performed its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early. The incident was more focused on the breach itself and the potential vulnerabilities exposed rather than timing issues [115590]. (d) value: The software failure incident did not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The hackers did not make any changes to the agency’s operations or compromise any M.T.A. accounts [115590]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit byzantine behavior where the system behaved erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident primarily involved a breach by hackers who did not make any changes to the agency’s operations or compromise any M.T.A. accounts [115590]. (f) other: The software failure incident involved a security breach by hackers who gained access to the M.T.A.'s systems through vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure, a widely used connectivity tool. The hackers compromised three of the transit authority’s 18 computer systems, but there was no employee or customer information breached, no data loss, and no changes to vital systems [115590].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, theoretical_consequence (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure The software failure incident involving the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (M.T.A.) being hacked by a group believed to have links to the Chinese government did not result in any direct harm to individuals. However, the hackers compromised three of the transit authority's computer systems, potentially putting sensitive data at risk. The forensic audit conducted by IBM and Mandiant found no evidence of compromised employee or customer information like credit card numbers, but the breach did involve malicious software known as "web shells" that could provide hackers with a backdoor to access and control certain servers over an extended period of time. The response to the intrusion cost the agency an estimated $370,000 [115590].
Domain transportation, finance, government (a) The failed system was related to the transportation industry, specifically the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's computer systems [115590]. The M.T.A. oversees the subway, buses, Long Island Rail Road, and Metro-North Railroad, which are all part of the transportation sector. (h) The incident also had implications for the finance industry as it mentioned that the Chinese government has used cyberattacks as a way to advance its economy and become a dominant global superpower [115590]. (l) The government sector was directly impacted by the software failure incident as the Department of Homeland Security, the National Security Agency, and the F.B.I. were involved in issuing alerts and providing guidance on mitigating the damage caused by the cyberattack on the M.T.A.'s systems [115590].

Sources

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