| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Windows Hello facial-recognition system vulnerability has happened again within the same organization, Microsoft. The incident involved a method for duping the Windows Hello system, which was discovered by researchers from the security firm CyberArk. Microsoft acknowledged the finding as a "Windows Hello security feature bypass vulnerability" and released patches to address the issue [116331].
(b) The software failure incident related to the Windows Hello vulnerability showcases a potential vulnerability in facial-recognition authentication systems, particularly those relying on third-party hardware like webcams. This incident highlights the broader issue of trust between the computer and the camera, indicating that similar vulnerabilities could exist in other systems that accept face data. The concept of the attack, known as a "downgrade attack," where a device is tricked into relying on a less secure mode, is a known attack pathway that Microsoft should have been more vigilant about [116331]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The incident with Microsoft's Windows Hello facial-recognition system was due to a vulnerability in the design of the system. Researchers from the security firm CyberArk discovered that by manipulating a USB webcam to deliver an attacker-chosen image, they could trick Windows Hello into unlocking the device. This vulnerability was a result of the system relying on input from the camera, making it susceptible to attacks exploiting the design flaw [116331].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. The hack to bypass Windows Hello facial recognition required physical access to the device and a good-quality infrared image of the target's face. This indicates that the failure was partly due to the operation or misuse of the system, as attackers needed to physically interact with the device to carry out the exploit [116331]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident discussed in the article is within_system. The vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Hello facial-recognition system was due to a flaw in how the system processed facial recognition data from webcams, specifically relying on infrared sensor data without properly verifying it against RGB data [116331]. This flaw allowed attackers to manipulate a USB webcam to deliver an attacker-chosen image, tricking Windows Hello into unlocking the device [116331]. Microsoft acknowledged this as a "Windows Hello security feature bypass vulnerability" and released patches to address the issue [116331]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was due to non-human actions, specifically a vulnerability in the Windows Hello facial-recognition system that allowed for bypassing the authentication using manipulated images from a USB webcam. This vulnerability was exploited by researchers from the security firm CyberArk by tricking the system into unlocking with an infrared image and a black frame, without human participation [116331].
(b) On the other hand, human actions were involved in discovering and exploiting the vulnerability in the Windows Hello facial-recognition system. The researchers from CyberArk actively investigated and manipulated the system to demonstrate the security flaw, highlighting the importance of understanding potential vulnerabilities and taking proactive measures to address them [116331]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was related to hardware. The incident involved a vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Hello facial-recognition system that could be exploited by manipulating a USB webcam to deliver an attacker-chosen image, tricking the system into unlocking the device [116331]. The vulnerability stemmed from the diversity of Windows hardware and the reliance on third-party webcams with varying levels of security features, specifically the need for an infrared sensor in addition to the regular RGB sensor in the webcam for Windows Hello to function properly.
(b) The software failure incident also had a software component as the vulnerability was within the Windows Hello facial-recognition system itself. Microsoft acknowledged the issue as a "Windows Hello security feature bypass vulnerability" and released patches to address the issue [116331]. The software flaw allowed the system to be tricked into unlocking a device with a manipulated image, highlighting a weakness in the facial-recognition authentication process. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is malicious in nature. Researchers from the security firm CyberArk discovered a method to dupe Microsoft's Windows Hello facial-recognition system by manipulating a USB webcam to deliver an attacker-chosen image, tricking the system into unlocking the victim's device [116331]. This action was intentional and aimed at bypassing the security measures put in place by Microsoft.
(b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that it was not caused by unintentional factors. The vulnerability in Windows Hello's facial-recognition system was identified by the researchers from CyberArk through a deliberate exploration of the system's flow and potential weak points. The incident was not a result of accidental errors or faults but rather a targeted effort to uncover a security flaw in the system [116331]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Windows Hello facial-recognition system being tricked by a manipulated USB webcam to unlock a device when it shouldn't be can be attributed to poor decisions made in the design and implementation of the system. The vulnerability exploited by the researchers from CyberArk was a result of the system relying solely on the infrared sensor of the webcam and not verifying the RGB data, making it susceptible to being bypassed with a simple image manipulation technique. This oversight in the design of the system led to a significant security flaw that allowed unauthorized access to Windows Hello-protected devices [116331].
(b) On the other hand, the failure can also be seen as a result of accidental decisions or unintended consequences. The researchers at CyberArk identified a potential vulnerability in the Windows Hello facial-recognition system, not necessarily due to deliberate poor decisions but rather as a consequence of the system architecture and the reliance on specific hardware components. The fact that the system did not adequately verify the RGB data from the webcam, allowing for the bypass, could be considered an unintended consequence of the design choices made in implementing the facial-recognition authentication [116331]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article [116331] where researchers from the security firm CyberArk discovered a method to dupe Microsoft's Windows Hello facial-recognition system by manipulating a USB webcam to deliver an attacker-chosen image. This vulnerability was due to a flaw in how Windows Hello facial recognition worked with webcams, specifically relying on an infrared sensor without even looking at RGB data. The researchers found a way to exploit this flaw, highlighting a lack of professional competence in ensuring robust protections in how the system collects and transmits data.
(b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is also present in the same article [116331] where Microsoft acknowledged the finding as a "Windows Hello security feature bypass vulnerability" and released patches to address the issue. The company did not respond to a request for comment from WIRED about the CyberArk findings, indicating a potential accidental oversight in anticipating attacks against third-party cameras like the one devised by CyberArk. This oversight led to the exploitation of the vulnerability, showcasing an accidental introduction of contributing factors that allowed the software failure incident to occur. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident discussed in the articles is more temporary rather than permanent. The incident involved a vulnerability in Microsoft's Windows Hello facial-recognition system that allowed attackers to bypass the security feature by tricking the system with manipulated images from a USB webcam [116331]. Microsoft responded to this vulnerability by releasing patches to address the issue and suggesting users enable enhanced sign-in security [116331]. The incident required attackers to have physical access to the device and a good-quality infrared image of the target's face, making it a temporary failure based on specific circumstances rather than a permanent failure affecting all users under all circumstances. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article is not related to a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident involves a vulnerability in the Windows Hello facial-recognition system that allows unauthorized access by tricking the system with manipulated images [116331].
(b) omission: The incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the vulnerability allows the system to perform its function of facial recognition but incorrectly accepts manipulated images as valid, leading to unauthorized access [116331].
(c) timing: The failure is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The vulnerability allows the system to unlock based on manipulated images, indicating a failure in the accuracy of the facial recognition process rather than a timing issue [116331].
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Specifically, the vulnerability allows the Windows Hello facial-recognition system to accept manipulated images as valid, leading to unauthorized access to the device [116331].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The vulnerability in the Windows Hello system allows consistent unauthorized access by tricking the system with manipulated images, rather than exhibiting inconsistent behavior [116331].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability where the system is tricked into accepting manipulated images as valid for facial recognition, leading to unauthorized access. This behavior falls under the category of a security flaw in the system's authentication process [116331]. |