| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the hack at New York City's Law Department highlights the failure to implement basic safeguards like multifactor authentication, which is a known measure to enhance security [116349]. This incident is a reminder of the importance of cybersecurity measures and the consequences of not implementing them effectively within an organization.
(b) The article mentions other instances where the lack of multifactor authentication has led to successful attacks, such as the Colonial Pipeline shutdown and the attempted poisoning of a water supply in a small Florida town [116349]. These examples demonstrate that the issue of failing to implement multifactor authentication is not unique to a single organization but is a widespread problem affecting various entities, including government agencies, businesses, hospitals, and infrastructure. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York City Law Department was primarily due to a failure in the design phase. The incident was enabled by the Law Department's failure to implement a basic safeguard, known as multifactor authentication, more than two years after the city began requiring it [116349]. Additionally, the Law Department's servers ran on Microsoft software released in 2003, which had not received critical security updates since 2015, making them vulnerable to exploitation by hackers [116349].
(b) The software failure incident also had elements related to the operation phase. The intrusion interrupted city lawyers, disrupted court proceedings, and thrust some of the department’s legal affairs into disarray [116349]. The disabling of the Law Department's computer system after the attack had a significant impact on New York courts, slowing cases and forcing city lawyers to ask for extensions on deadlines [116349]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident involving the hack on New York City's Law Department was primarily due to internal factors within the system. Specifically, the failure was enabled by the Law Department's failure to implement a basic safeguard, known as multifactor authentication, more than two years after it was required by the city [116349]. Additionally, the outdated Microsoft software running on the Law Department's servers, which had not received critical security updates since 2015, contributed to the vulnerability of the system [116349].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident also had external factors contributing to it. The hack on the Law Department was initiated by a hacker who infiltrated the network using a worker's pilfered email password, indicating an external threat actor gaining unauthorized access to the system [116349]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York City Law Department was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically the lack of implementation of basic safeguards like multifactor authentication [116349]. This failure allowed a hacker to infiltrate the agency's network by exploiting the absence of this security measure, rather than being directly caused by human actions such as intentional sabotage or negligence.
(b) However, human actions also played a role in the incident as the failure to implement multifactor authentication was a result of decisions made by individuals within the Law Department. The failure to update software, such as using Microsoft software released in 2003 without critical security updates, was also a human action that contributed to the vulnerability of the system [116349]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York City Law Department was not directly attributed to hardware issues. The incident was primarily caused by a hacker infiltrating the network due to a worker's pilfered email password and the failure to implement basic safeguards like multifactor authentication [116349].
(b) The software failure incident was primarily due to contributing factors originating in software, such as the lack of implementation of multifactor authentication, outdated software running on the servers, and the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the Microsoft software released in 2003 [116349]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 116349 was malicious in nature. It was a result of a hacker infiltrating the New York City Law Department's network by exploiting a worker's pilfered email password [116349]. The hack was enabled by the Law Department's failure to implement basic safeguards like multifactor authentication, which allowed the intruder to disrupt operations, steal data, and potentially demand a ransom [116349]. The incident led to the disabling of the Law Department's computer system, impacting court proceedings, legal affairs, and causing disruptions in various cases [116349].
(b) The software failure incident was non-malicious in the sense that it was not caused by unintentional errors or faults in the software itself. Instead, it was a result of human factors, specifically the failure to implement necessary security measures like multifactor authentication and the use of outdated software, which made the system vulnerable to malicious attacks [116349]. The incident highlighted the importance of cybersecurity measures such as multifactor authentication and keeping software up-to-date to prevent such attacks in the future [116349]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the hack on New York City's Law Department was primarily due to poor decisions. The incident was enabled by the Law Department's failure to implement a basic safeguard, known as multifactor authentication, more than two years after the city began requiring it [116349]. The failure to implement multifactor authentication, despite it being a widely adopted security measure, allowed the hacker to infiltrate the agency's network using a worker's pilfered email password. Additionally, the Law Department's servers ran on Microsoft software released in 2003, which had not received critical security updates since 2015, making them vulnerable to exploitation by hackers [116349]. These poor decisions regarding cybersecurity measures and software updates contributed to the successful hack on the Law Department's system. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, unknown |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York City Law Department was primarily due to development incompetence. The hack was enabled by the Law Department's failure to implement a basic safeguard, known as multifactor authentication, more than two years after the city began requiring it [116349]. The Law Department's servers ran on Microsoft software released in 2003, which the company stopped providing critical security updates for in 2015, indicating a failure to update software [116349]. These failures in implementing basic cybersecurity measures and updating critical software made the municipal systems a ripe target for hackers.
(b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is not explicitly mentioned in the articles. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in the Law Department of New York City was temporary. The incident involved a hacker infiltrating the agency's network due to a worker's pilfered email password, leading to disruption in operations, court proceedings, and legal affairs [116349]. The incident prompted the removal of the department's computers from the city's larger network, with many remaining disconnected [116349]. The impact of the attack rippled through New York courts, slowing cases and forcing city lawyers to ask for extensions on deadlines [116349].
(b) The software failure incident in the Law Department of New York City was temporary. The incident was enabled by the failure to implement multifactor authentication, a basic safeguard, more than two years after it was required by the city [116349]. The intrusion was detected by the city's Cyber Command, leading to the removal of the department's computers from the larger network [116349]. The incident disrupted operations and thrust legal affairs into disarray, but there was no evidence that the attack had damaged the city's computer systems [116349]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the New York City Law Department involved a hack that led to the intrusion interrupting city lawyers, disrupting court proceedings, and causing some of the department's legal affairs to be in disarray. The incident resulted in the department's computers being removed from the city's larger network, with many remaining disconnected [116349].
(b) omission: The hack in the Law Department's network was enabled by the failure to implement a basic safeguard, known as multifactor authentication, more than two years after it was required by the city. The lack of multifactor authentication allowed the hacker to infiltrate the agency's network using a worker's pilfered email password [116349].
(c) timing: The software failure incident did not involve a timing-related failure.
(d) value: The software failure incident did not involve a value-related failure.
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not involve a byzantine-related failure.
(f) other: The software failure incident also highlighted the failure to update the Law Department's servers running on Microsoft software released in 2003, which had not received critical security updates since 2015. This failure to update the software made the municipal systems a ripe target for hackers who exploit unpatched software [116349]. |