| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the New York City Board of Elections is not the first time such issues have occurred within the organization. The board has a history of blunders and scandals, including mistakenly purging about 200,000 people from voter rolls, forcing voters to wait in long lines, and sending erroneous ballots to thousands of New Yorkers in the past [116350].
(b) The incident at the New York City Board of Elections is not an isolated case, as other jurisdictions have been more responsive to outreach from the supplier of the software used for ranked-choice voting. The Ranked Choice Voting Resource Center offered assistance to various jurisdictions using its software, indicating that similar incidents may have occurred or been avoided in other locations [116350]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York City Board of Elections was primarily due to contributing factors introduced by system development and procedures to operate or maintain the system. The incident was related to the ranked-choice voting software, where the board had mistakenly included more than 130,000 test ballots in the preliminary count, leading to the results being retracted [116350]. Additionally, the board faced delays in testing the software to generate the ranked-choice results due to an impasse with the State Board of Elections, which took more than a year to resolve [116350].
(b) The software failure incident also had contributing factors introduced by the operation of the system. The board ignored offers of technological assistance from the supplier of the software, which could have helped catch the test ballots that were inadvertently added to the tally on Tuesday [116350]. Furthermore, delays in training employees on the software and ranked-choice voting itself were reported, with some employees not receiving training until after early voting had already begun [116350]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the New York City Board of Elections releasing inaccurate ranked-choice vote totals was primarily within the system. The incident was attributed to human error within the agency, specifically a staffer not removing test ballot images from the Election Management System, leading to the inclusion of over 130,000 test ballots in the preliminary count [116350]. Additionally, the board faced delays in testing the software and training employees due to internal issues and an impasse with the State Board of Elections [116350]. The failure was not directly caused by the software itself but rather by the agency's staff and internal processes [116350]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York City Board of Elections was primarily due to non-human actions. The incident occurred because the board mistakenly included more than 130,000 test ballots in the preliminary count, which led to the results being retracted as they were no longer trustworthy [116350]. Additionally, the delay in testing the software to generate ranked-choice results was caused by an impasse with the State Board of Elections, which took more than a year to resolve, and delays in training employees on the software and ranked-choice voting also occurred [116350].
(b) Human actions also played a role in the software failure incident. The board's remaining leaders declined help with the ranked-choice software and delayed training for employees, creating confusion among the staff [116350]. Furthermore, the board ignored offers of technological assistance from the supplier of the software, which could have helped prevent the inclusion of test ballots in the tally [116350]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York City Board of Elections was not directly attributed to hardware issues. The incident was primarily caused by human error, specifically a staffer's mistake in not removing test ballot images from the Election Management System, leading to the inclusion of over 130,000 test ballots in the preliminary count [116350].
(b) The software failure incident was primarily attributed to contributing factors originating in software. The incident was a result of human error where a staffer failed to remove test ballot images from the Election Management System, causing the software to include these test ballots in the preliminary count, leading to the release of inaccurate ranked-choice vote totals [116350]. Additionally, the Board ignored offers of technological assistance from the supplier of the software, which could have helped prevent the error. The delay in testing the software and training employees on the software also contributed to the failure [116350]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York City Board of Elections related to the ranked-choice voting can be categorized as non-malicious. The incident was primarily attributed to human error within the agency rather than any malicious intent. The failure was caused by the inclusion of more than 130,000 test ballots in the preliminary count, which led to the results being retracted as they were no longer trustworthy [116350].
The article mentions that the issue was not caused by the software itself but by a human error where a staffer failed to remove the test ballot images from the Election Management System. The supplier of the software, Ranked Choice Voting Resource Center, offered assistance multiple times to help run the ranked-choice voting election and ensure the accuracy of the results, but the offers were declined by the board [116350]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the New York City Board of Elections and the ranked-choice voting system seems to be primarily due to poor decisions made by the agency. The agency faced turmoil with the loss of key personnel, delays in training, and a lack of leadership during an intense election period [116350]. Additionally, the board declined offers of technological assistance from the supplier of the software, which could have helped prevent the inclusion of test ballots in the preliminary count [116350]. The delay in testing the software and training employees also contributed to the failure [116350].
(b) The software failure incident also involved accidental decisions or mistakes made by the agency's staff. The inclusion of over 130,000 test ballots in the preliminary count was attributed to human error, where a staffer failed to remove the test ballot images from the Election Management System [116350]. This accidental decision led to the release of inaccurate ranked-choice vote totals, causing outrage and confusion [116350]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the New York City Board of Elections was primarily due to development incompetence. The incident was caused by human error where a staffer failed to remove test ballot images from the Election Management System, leading to the inclusion of over 130,000 test ballots in the preliminary count [116350]. Additionally, the board declined offers of technological assistance from the supplier of the software, which could have helped prevent the error. The delay in testing the software and training employees also contributed to the failure, showcasing a lack of professional competence in managing the ranked-choice voting software [116350].
(b) The software failure incident can also be attributed to accidental factors. The inclusion of the test ballots in the preliminary count was a result of human error, where a staffer mistakenly left them in the system. This accidental mistake led to the release of inaccurate ranked-choice vote totals, causing confusion and outrage across the city [116350]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident related to the New York City Board of Elections' ranked-choice voting system can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident was caused by contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances, such as human error in not removing test ballot images from the Election Management System, delays in testing the software due to an impasse with the State Board of Elections, and challenges in training employees on the software and ranked-choice voting [116350]. These factors led to the erroneous release of preliminary ranked-choice vote totals, which was later retracted, indicating a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the New York City Board of Elections involved a crash where the system lost state and did not perform its intended functions. The preliminary ranked-choice vote totals were released, only to be retracted hours later, acknowledging that they were no longer trustworthy due to mistakenly including more than 130,000 test ballots in the count [116350].
(b) omission: The software failure incident also involved an omission where the system omitted to perform its intended functions at an instance. The board ignored offers of technological assistance from the supplier of the software that it would use to tabulate the ranked-choice votes, which could have helped catch the test ballots inadvertently added to the tally [116350].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident was also a factor. Delays plagued the plan to train employees on the software and ranked-choice voting itself, with some employees not receiving training until after early voting had already begun. Additionally, the board struggled to decide how and when to release the results of the ranked-choice voting, facing pressure to release results earlier than initially planned [116350].
(d) value: The software failure incident did not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly.
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not involve a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The software failure incident also involved a leadership vacuum during an intense election with a new method of voting, causing tumult at the board for months. The board's structure, which empowers Democratic and Republican Party bosses to choose staffers, has been criticized for nepotism, ineptitude, and corruption, contributing to the recurring issues faced by the agency [116350]. |