Published Date: 2021-08-03
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident happened in 2020 [117482]. |
| System | 1. Department of Homeland Security's flagship cybersecurity program EINSTEIN suffered from significant limitations in detecting and preventing intrusions [117482]. 2. Six agencies failed to install security patches and other vulnerability remediation controls quickly [117482]. 3. Seven agencies used legacy systems or applications no longer supported by the vendor with security updates [117482]. |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Various US federal agencies [117482] |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Key federal agencies across the government - as reported in Article 117482. |
| Software Causes | 1. Failure to install security patches and vulnerability remediation controls quickly [117482] 2. Use of legacy systems or applications no longer supported by the vendor with security updates [117482] |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Lack of effective cybersecurity programs in federal agencies [117482] 2. Failure to protect personally identifiable information adequately [117482] 3. Inadequate maintenance of accurate and comprehensive IT asset inventories [117482] 4. Use of legacy systems or applications no longer supported by the vendor with security updates [117482] 5. Failure to install security patches and other vulnerability remediation controls quickly [117482] 6. Lack of a unified cybersecurity strategy in the federal government [117482] |
| Impacts | 1. The failure to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities at US federal agencies compromised national security and allowed cybercriminals to access personal information, leaving sensitive data open to theft and damage by hackers [117482]. 2. The shortcomings in implementing effective cybersecurity programs resulted in an average grade of C- for large federal agencies, with several departments scoring even lower, indicating a significant gap in safeguarding data [117482]. 3. The Department of Homeland Security's flagship cybersecurity program, EINSTEIN, was found to have significant limitations in detecting and preventing intrusions, potentially exposing federal agencies to cyberattacks [117482]. 4. Failure to maintain accurate and comprehensive IT asset inventories, protect personally identifiable information adequately, and retire legacy technology further exacerbated the cybersecurity risks faced by federal agencies [117482]. 5. The lack of a unified cybersecurity strategy and a single point of accountability for federal cybersecurity made government-wide information security improvements challenging, highlighting systemic issues in addressing cybersecurity threats [117482]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing effective cybersecurity programs across all federal agencies, similar to the Department of Homeland Security's program, could have prevented the software failure incident [117482]. 2. Ensuring timely installation of security patches and vulnerability remediation controls at all agencies could have helped prevent the incident [117482]. 3. Retiring legacy technology no longer supported by vendors and maintaining accurate IT asset inventories could have mitigated the risk of software failure incidents [117482]. 4. Enhancing the effectiveness of the EINSTEIN cybersecurity program to better detect and prevent intrusions could have contributed to preventing the incident [117482]. 5. Establishing a unified cybersecurity strategy and a single point of accountability for federal cybersecurity could help improve information security across government agencies and prevent future software failure incidents [117482]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing an effective cybersecurity program across all federal agencies to safeguard data and address vulnerabilities [117482]. 2. Updating and justifying the cost of the EINSTEIN cybersecurity program to enhance its capabilities in detecting and preventing intrusions [117482]. 3. Ensuring timely installation of security patches and vulnerability remediation controls [117482]. 4. Retiring legacy technology no longer supported by the vendor to improve security [117482]. 5. Establishing a single point of accountability for federal cybersecurity to streamline information security improvements [117482]. 6. Developing a unified cybersecurity strategy at the federal level to combat the evolving threat landscape [117482]. | References | 1. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 2. Department of Homeland Security 3. Department of State 4. Department of Commerce 5. Department of Education 6. Department of Transportation 7. Department of Veterans Affairs 8. Department of Housing and Urban Development 9. Department of Agriculture 10. Department of Health and Human Services 11. Social Security Administration 12. DHS Inspector General 13. Rob Portman, Senator from Ohio 14. Gary Peters, Senator from Michigan 15. EINSTEIN program |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | unknown | The articles do not provide specific information about a software failure incident happening again at a specific organization or multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | operation | (a) The article does not specifically mention any software failure incident related to the design phase, where contributing factors are introduced by system development, system updates, or procedures to operate or maintain the system. (b) The article highlights software failure incidents related to the operation phase, where contributing factors are introduced by the operation or misuse of the system. It mentions failures such as agencies failing to protect personally identifiable information adequately, maintain accurate and comprehensive IT asset inventories, retire legacy technology, install security patches, and use legacy systems no longer supported by the vendor with security updates [117482]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | (a) within_system: - The article highlights failures within the federal agencies to implement effective cybersecurity programs, maintain accurate IT asset inventories, retire legacy technology, and protect personally identifiable information adequately [117482]. - Specific examples include agencies failing to install security patches and vulnerability remediation controls quickly, using legacy systems without security updates, and allowing unauthorized access to personal information [117482]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: The article discusses systematic failures in safeguarding data across key federal agencies, leading to compromised national security and potential access to personal information by cybercriminals [117482]. These failures include issues such as the Department of Homeland Security's flagship cybersecurity program, EINSTEIN, suffering from limitations in detecting and preventing intrusions, as well as agencies failing to install security patches and vulnerability remediation controls quickly. Additionally, the report highlights failures to protect personally identifiable information adequately, maintain accurate IT asset inventories, and retire legacy technology no longer supported by vendors [117482]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: The article mentions that the failures to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities at US federal agencies are attributed to the agencies themselves not doing everything possible to safeguard America's data, as stated by Senator Portman [117482]. It is noted that cyberattacks are ongoing, and federal agencies need to take more proactive measures to protect sensitive information. Additionally, the lack of a unified cybersecurity strategy and a single point of accountability for federal cybersecurity contribute to the challenges faced in improving government-wide information security [117482]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | software | (a) The articles do not specifically mention any software failure incident occurring due to contributing factors originating in hardware. (b) The articles highlight software failure incidents related to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and shortcomings in federal agencies' cybersecurity programs. These failures include agencies failing to implement effective cybersecurity programs, issues with the Department of Homeland Security's flagship cybersecurity program EINSTEIN, failures to protect personally identifiable information adequately, maintain accurate IT asset inventories, retire legacy technology, install security patches, and address cybersecurity vulnerabilities. These software failures are primarily due to contributing factors originating in software and cybersecurity practices rather than hardware-related issues [117482]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious, non-malicious | (a) The articles mention state-sponsored hacks and ransomware cybersecurity incidents affecting federal agencies, compromising national security and allowing cybercriminals to access personal information [117482]. These incidents indicate malicious software failures introduced by humans with the intent to harm the system. Additionally, the report highlights failures to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities at US federal agencies, leaving national security and sensitive personal information open to theft and damage by increasingly sophisticated hackers [117482]. (b) The articles also discuss failures such as shortcomings in implementing effective cybersecurity programs, issues with cybersecurity tools like EINSTEIN, failures to protect personally identifiable information adequately, and failures to maintain accurate IT asset inventories or retire legacy technology [117482]. These non-malicious factors contribute to software failures without the intent to harm the system. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | unknown | The articles do not specifically mention any software failure incident related to poor decisions or accidental decisions. Therefore, the intent of the software failure incident in this context is unknown. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | accidental | (a) The articles do not specifically mention a software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence. (b) The articles highlight failures in cybersecurity practices across various federal agencies, indicating failures due to contributing factors introduced accidentally rather than due to development incompetence. These failures include shortcomings in safeguarding data, failures to protect personally identifiable information adequately, failures to maintain accurate and comprehensive IT asset inventories, and failures to retire legacy technology no longer supported by the vendor [117482]. |
| Duration | unknown | The articles do not specifically mention a software failure incident being either permanent or temporary. The focus of the articles is on the overall cybersecurity shortcomings and failures within various federal agencies, rather than a specific software failure incident with a clear duration. |
| Behaviour | omission, other | (a) crash: The articles do not specifically mention a software failure incident related to a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. (b) omission: The articles mention failures related to agencies omitting to perform their intended functions, such as failing to protect personally identifiable information adequately, maintain accurate IT asset inventories, and retire legacy technology no longer supported by the vendor [117482]. (c) timing: The articles do not mention a software failure incident related to timing, where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. (d) value: The articles do not mention a software failure incident related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. (e) byzantine: The articles do not mention a software failure incident related to a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident mentioned in the articles is related to cybersecurity vulnerabilities, failures to safeguard data, and shortcomings in implementing effective cybersecurity programs across federal agencies [117482]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of people losing their lives due to the software failure incident in the provided article [117482]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of people being physically harmed due to the software failure incident in the provided article [117482]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure incident in the provided article [117482]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident compromised national security and allowed cybercriminals to access personal information [117482]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There is no mention of people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure incident in the provided article [117482]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident compromised national security and allowed cybercriminals to access personal information [117482]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident had consequences such as compromising national security and allowing cybercriminals to access personal information [117482]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The article discusses the potential consequences of the failures to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities at US federal agencies, leaving national security and sensitive personal information open to theft and damage by hackers [117482]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The article does not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure incident beyond those related to compromised national security and personal information access [117482]. |
| Domain | information, government | (a) The failed system was related to the industry of information. The software failure incident mentioned in the articles pertains to the cybersecurity failures within key federal agencies responsible for safeguarding data and information [Article 117482]. The incident highlights the vulnerabilities in protecting personally identifiable information and the need for effective cybersecurity programs to prevent cybercriminals from accessing sensitive data. |
Article ID: 117482