| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
- The software failure incident related to smart motorways radar system failing to detect breakdowns within 20 seconds has been reported multiple times within the National Highways organization. Control room staff reported that the radar system gives false warnings, misses stranded cars, and is unreliable [119029].
- Internal reports revealed that staff flagged system failures to National Highways bosses several times over the past few months, indicating a recurring issue with the radar system [119029].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
- The article does not provide information about the same software failure incident happening at other organizations or with their products and services. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the smart motorways radar system. The radar system, known as Stopped Vehicle Detection (SVD), was designed to alert the control room to breakdowns within 20 seconds but was found to give false warnings and miss stranded cars. Control room staff reported that the system often goes off for non-breakdown reasons like slow-moving traffic or road signs, leading to a low priority for actual breakdown alerts. This failure in the design of the radar system contributed to the inefficiency and unreliability of the smart motorway technology [119029].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be observed in the smart motorways where the radar system, meant to detect breakdowns, was reported to be constantly going off but missing actual breakdowns. Control room staff mentioned that the system was not functioning as it should, leading to a false sense of security and a lack of urgency in responding to real breakdowns. This failure in the operation of the radar system contributed to the risks and dangers faced by motorists on smart motorways due to the unreliable technology [119029]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the smart motorways radar system can be categorized as within_system. The failure of the radar system to detect breakdowns within 20 seconds, giving false warnings, missing stranded cars, and having glitches like constant false alarms and suppression of alerts were all internal issues within the system itself. The system was meant to be a critical component of the smart motorways to ensure the safety of motorists, but it was found to be unreliable and ineffective, leading to potential dangers on the roads [119029].
(b) The software failure incident related to the smart motorways radar system can also be categorized as outside_system. This is because the failure of the radar system was not solely due to technical issues within the system but also due to external factors such as the spacing of emergency bays being too far apart, leaving motorists stranded dangerously when they break down. The lack of adequate emergency refuge areas on smart motorways was highlighted as a contributing factor to the failures of the radar system, indicating issues originating from outside the system itself [119029]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The software failure incident in the smart motorways system was primarily due to critical flaws in the radar software system, known as Stopped Vehicle Detection (SVD), which is meant to alert the control room to breakdowns within 20 seconds but was giving false warnings and missing stranded cars [Article 119029].
- The radar system was described as impossible to rely on, with staff viewing alerts as low priority because they were triggered by slow-moving traffic and road signs, leading to missed breakdowns [Article 119029].
- Internal reports revealed that the radar system had been flagging system failures to highways bosses several times over the past few months, indicating ongoing issues with the technology [Article 119029].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- The decision to implement smart motorways without adequate safety measures, such as emergency bays being too far apart, was a human action that contributed to the software failure incident [Article 119029].
- Former roads ministers and MPs were described as disturbed by the revelations and called for urgent action to address the flaws in the smart motorways system, indicating human actions that led to the failure incident [Article 119029].
- The failure to address the technological difficulties and proceed with the expansion of the smart motorway network despite concerns from the police and the public was a human action that contributed to the ongoing software failure incident [Article 119029]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The articles do not specifically mention any hardware-related failures contributing to the incident reported in the news articles [119029].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The incident reported in the news articles [119029] primarily revolves around software failures related to the radar system used on smart motorways. The radar system, known as Stopped Vehicle Detection (SVD), was highlighted as giving false warnings, missing stranded cars, and being unreliable. Control room staff mentioned that the system often goes off for non-essential reasons, leading to a low priority on actual breakdown alerts. Additionally, internal reports revealed multiple instances of system failures being flagged to management, indicating software-related issues affecting the system's functionality. Staff also noted that the radar system failed to detect a car sitting in high-speed traffic for over 30 minutes, showcasing the software's inefficiency in detecting real breakdowns. The software failures in the radar system were a significant factor contributing to the safety concerns and incidents on smart motorways. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to the smart motorways can be categorized as non-malicious. The failure was due to critical flaws in the radar software system, known as Stopped Vehicle Detection (SVD), which is meant to alert the control room to breakdowns within 20 seconds but was giving false warnings and missing stranded cars [119029]. The failure was attributed to glitches in the technology and unreliable devices, leading to a situation where motorists could find themselves in a stopped vehicle in a live lane without the authorities being aware of the incident [119029]. The failure was not intentional but rather a result of technological shortcomings and system inadequacies. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
- The software failure incident related to the smart motorways radar system was primarily due to poor decisions made in the implementation and reliance on the technology. The radar system, known as Stopped Vehicle Detection (SVD), was meant to alert the control room to breakdowns within 20 seconds but was plagued with critical flaws. Control room staff reported that the system gave false warnings, missed stranded cars, and was unreliable, leading to a dangerous situation for motorists [119029].
- Former roads minister Sir Mike Penning expressed shock at the investigation findings and emphasized the need for action from National Highways to address the failures in the system. He highlighted that now that evidence of the system's shortcomings was available, action needed to be taken to rectify the situation [119029]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to development_incompetence:
- The smart motorways radar system, known as Stopped Vehicle Detection (SVD), was reported to have critical flaws and failures. Control room staff mentioned that the system gave false warnings, missed stranded cars, and was impossible to rely on due to constant false alarms and failures to detect breakdowns [119029].
- Internal reports revealed that staff had flagged system failures to highways bosses multiple times over the past few months, indicating a lack of proper functioning and reliability of the radar system [119029].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to accidental factors:
- The article mentions instances where the radar system failed to detect breakdowns, leading to potential dangers for motorists. This failure seems to be accidental in nature, as it was not intentional but rather a result of the system's limitations and glitches [119029].
- The unreliable technology and faulty devices within the smart motorway system, such as non-functioning cameras and faulty computers, contributed to the failures and safety risks, which can be seen as accidental factors leading to the software failure incident [119029]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident related to the smart motorways radar system can be categorized as a temporary failure. The radar system, known as Stopped Vehicle Detection (SVD), was reported to give false warnings, miss stranded cars, and have various glitches [119029]. Control room staff mentioned that the system often goes off for non-essential reasons like slow-moving traffic or road signs, leading to a low priority for actual breakdown alerts. Additionally, internal reports revealed multiple instances of system failures and staff flagging these issues to management [119029]. These issues indicate that the failure of the radar system was due to contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances but not all, making it a temporary failure. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, timing, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the articles can be categorized as a crash. The radar system, known as Stopped Vehicle Detection (SVD), which is a critical component of smart motorways, was failing to detect stranded cars and providing false warnings while missing actual breakdowns. This failure led to a situation where vehicles could be stranded in live lanes without the control room being aware, posing a significant risk to motorists [119029].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. The SVD system was omitting to perform its intended function of accurately detecting and alerting the control room about breakdowns within 20 seconds. Control room staff reported that the system often missed actual breakdowns, leading to a situation where stranded vehicles were not being detected promptly [119029].
(c) timing: The software failure incident can be categorized as a timing issue. The SVD system was intended to alert the control room to breakdowns within 20 seconds. However, the system was often failing to do so in a timely manner, leading to delays in responding to stranded vehicles on the smart motorways. This timing issue compromised the safety of motorists using the smart motorway network [119029].
(d) value: The software failure incident can be categorized as a value issue. The radar system, which was a significant investment costing £122 million, was not providing the expected value in terms of accurately detecting and alerting the control room about breakdowns on smart motorways. The system's performance issues undermined its intended value of enhancing safety on the roads [119029].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine behavior as described in the articles. There is no indication of inconsistent responses or interactions from the radar system or the control room software in the context of the smart motorway failures reported [119029].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized as a failure related to system reliability and accuracy. The radar system's inability to effectively detect and alert the control room about breakdowns, coupled with frequent false warnings and missed breakdowns, highlights a fundamental issue with the system's reliability and accuracy in performing its critical function on smart motorways [119029]. |