Published Date: 2021-09-14
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident mentioned in the article happened in the financial year 2020-21, which typically refers to the period from July 1, 2020, to June 30, 2021. [Article 119035] |
| System | The software failure incident mentioned in the article did not specify a particular system or software component that failed. Therefore, the specific system(s) that failed in this incident are unknown. |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Cybercriminals targeted critical infrastructure and essential services, including health care, food distribution, and energy, causing software failure incidents [Article 119035]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Critical infrastructure organizations, including essential services such as education, health, communications, electricity, water, and transport were impacted by cyber incidents [119035]. |
| Software Causes | 1. Ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure and essential services, leading to disruption, loss of revenue, and potential harm or loss of life [119035]. 2. Malicious cyber criminals escalating attacks on Australians, particularly in the health sector, during the pandemic [119035]. 3. Ransomware incidents affecting the health sector, leading to the postponement of elective surgeries [119035]. 4. Ransomware attack on a Victorian public health service affecting hospitals and aged care facilities [119035]. 5. Ransomware attack on JBS Foods leading to the suspension of operations and standing down of workers [119035]. 6. Business email compromise targeting Australian businesses and government enterprises, with an average loss of over $50,600 [119035]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Lack of cybersecurity measures in critical infrastructure organizations [119035] 2. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure assets [119035] 3. Insufficient protection of Australia's Covid-19 vaccine supply and distribution processes [119035] 4. Business email compromise targeting Australian businesses and government enterprises [119035] |
| Impacts | 1. Critical infrastructure and essential services, including health care, food distribution, and energy, were targeted in cyber incidents, leading to significant disruption in essential services, lost revenue, and potential harm or loss of life [119035]. 2. Ransomware attacks disclosed to the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) increased by 15% in the 2020-21 financial year, resulting in financial losses exceeding $33 billion from cybercrime throughout the year [119035]. 3. A ransomware attack against a Victorian public health service in March 2021 affected four hospitals and aged care facilities, leading to the postponement of elective surgeries [119035]. 4. The ransomware attack on the global meat and food processing company JBS Foods in May 2021 resulted in the suspension of operations and standing down of workers in Australia, with the US division paying a ransom equivalent to $11 million [119035]. 5. Cybercriminals targeted the health sector during the pandemic, seeking access to intellectual property or sensitive information about Australia's response to Covid-19, which escalated the attacks on Australians [119035]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing robust cybersecurity measures such as regular security audits, penetration testing, and network monitoring to detect and prevent cyber threats [119035]. 2. Ensuring timely software updates and patches to address known vulnerabilities that could be exploited by cybercriminals [119035]. 3. Providing cybersecurity training and awareness programs for employees to recognize and avoid phishing attempts and other social engineering tactics used by cybercriminals [119035]. 4. Enforcing strong password policies and multi-factor authentication to enhance the security of systems and prevent unauthorized access [119035]. 5. Collaborating with cybersecurity agencies and sharing threat intelligence to stay informed about emerging cyber threats and trends [119035]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing robust cybersecurity measures to protect critical infrastructure and essential services from cyber attacks [119035]. 2. Enforcing mandatory cyber incident reporting requirements on organizations running critical infrastructure assets to ensure immediate support in case of large-scale cyber attacks [119035]. 3. Enhancing cybersecurity awareness and training for individuals and entities to prevent falling victim to cybercrime, such as phishing attacks [119035]. 4. Strengthening defenses against ransomware attacks by regularly backing up data, updating software, and implementing multi-factor authentication [119035]. 5. Collaborating with international partners to address cyber threats and hold malicious actors accountable [119035]. | References | 1. Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) [Article 119035] 2. Australian Signals Directorate [Article 119035] 3. Assistant Defence Minister, Andrew Hastie [Article 119035] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: - The article mentions a ransomware attack against a Victorian public health service in March 2021, which affected four hospitals and aged care facilities, resulting in the postponement of elective surgeries [119035]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: - The article highlights that ransomware attacks have been on the rise, with the global meat and food processing company JBS Foods experiencing a ransomware attack in May 2021, leading to the suspension of operations and standing down of workers in Australia [119035]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The article mentions a ransomware attack against a Victorian public health service in March 2021, which affected four hospitals and aged care facilities, resulting in the postponement of elective surgeries. This incident can be attributed to a failure in the design phase, as the attack exploited vulnerabilities in the system's design or security measures [119035]. (b) The article also discusses ransomware attacks in general, where cybercriminals typically lock up the data of a target organization and demand payment to decrypt and unlock systems. These attacks can be considered failures in the operation phase, as they are often a result of the misuse or exploitation of the system by external actors [119035]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | (a) within_system: The software failure incident mentioned in the articles is primarily due to contributing factors that originate from within the system. The incidents reported include ransomware attacks, cyber intrusions, data breaches, and network disruptions affecting critical infrastructure organizations and essential services like education, health, communications, electricity, water, and transport [119035]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incidents also involve contributing factors that originate from outside the system. For example, cybercriminals sought to exploit the pandemic by using social engineering tactics to trick individuals into entering personal credentials for accessing Covid-related information or services. Additionally, state-based actors and criminal cyber actors targeted the health sector to gain access to intellectual property or sensitive information related to Australia's response to Covid, indicating external threats to the system [119035]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The articles mention several instances of software failure incidents related to non-human actions, such as cyber incidents targeting critical infrastructure and essential services, including health care, food distribution, and energy [119035]. These incidents have underscored the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to disruption, lost revenue, and potential harm or loss of life. Additionally, there were cases where federal government entities or nationally significant infrastructure suffered the removal or damage of sensitive data or intellectual property, as well as active network intrusions or temporary disruptions to systems or services [119035]. (b) The articles also highlight software failure incidents related to human actions. For example, ransomware attacks targeting various sectors, including the health sector, were reported. The report mentions a ransomware attack against a Victorian public health service that affected hospitals and aged care facilities, resulting in the postponement of elective surgeries [119035]. Additionally, there is a mention of the government bill that would impose mandatory cyber incident reporting requirements on organizations running critical infrastructure assets, emphasizing the need for organizations to report incidents caused by human actions [119035]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | software | (a) The articles do not provide specific information about a software failure incident occurring due to hardware issues [119035]. (b) The articles mention several instances of software failure incidents due to contributing factors originating in software. For example, there were ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure and essential services, including the health sector, resulting in disruptions, data breaches, and financial losses [119035]. Additionally, the report highlights incidents where federal government entities or nationally significant infrastructure suffered the removal or damage of sensitive data or intellectual property due to cyber incidents [119035]. These incidents point to software failures originating in malicious cyber activities targeting software systems. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious, non-malicious | (a) The articles mention several instances of malicious software failure incidents, particularly ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure and essential services in Australia. These attacks were carried out by cybercriminals with the intent to harm the systems and organizations. For example, the ransomware attack against a Victorian public health service in March 2021 affected hospitals and aged care facilities, leading to the postponement of elective surgeries [119035]. (b) The articles also highlight non-malicious software failure incidents, such as cases where federal government entities or nationally significant infrastructure suffered the removal or damage of sensitive data or intellectual property. These incidents may have been caused by factors other than deliberate malicious intent, but still resulted in disruptions and potential harm to the systems and services [119035]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | unknown | (a) The articles do not provide specific information about a software failure incident related to poor decisions. [119035] |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | accidental | (a) The articles do not specifically mention any software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence. (b) The articles do mention software failure incidents occurring accidentally, such as ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure organizations like health, communications, electricity, water, and transport [119035]. These incidents were not intentional but rather accidental in nature, leading to disruptions in essential services and potential harm or loss of life. |
| Duration | unknown | The articles do not provide specific information about a software failure incident being permanent or temporary. |
| Behaviour | omission, value, other | (a) crash: The article mentions a ransomware attack against a Victorian public health service in March 2021, which resulted in the postponement of elective surgeries due to the attack affecting four hospitals and aged care facilities [119035]. (b) omission: The article discusses ransomware attacks where criminals typically lock up the data of a target organization and demand payment to decrypt and unlock systems, sometimes threatening to leak stolen data if the request is rebuffed. This can be seen as the system omitting to perform its intended functions of data access and security [119035]. (c) timing: The article does not specifically mention any incidents related to timing failures. (d) value: The article mentions that cybercriminals sought to exploit the pandemic by encouraging recipients to enter personal credentials to access Covid-related information or services. This can be considered a failure of the system to perform its intended functions correctly, as it led to potential harm or loss of personal information [119035]. (e) byzantine: The article does not specifically mention any incidents related to byzantine failures. (f) other: The article discusses the increasing willingness of criminals to extort money from vulnerable and critical elements of society through ransomware attacks. This behavior could be categorized as a form of extortion, which is not explicitly covered in the options provided [119035]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, delay, non-human, unknown | (a) unknown (b) unknown (c) unknown (d) [119035] The article mentions that in a ransomware attack against a Victorian public health service, four hospitals and aged care facilities were affected, resulting in the postponement of elective surgeries. This indicates that people's access to healthcare services was impacted due to the software failure incident. (e) [119035] The article mentions that the ransomware attack against the Victorian public health service resulted in the postponement of elective surgeries, indicating a delay in medical procedures due to the software failure incident. (f) [119035] The article mentions a ransomware attack on the global meat and food processing company JBS Foods, which led to the suspension of operations and standing down of workers in Australia. This indicates that non-human entities (the company's operations) were impacted due to the software failure incident. (g) unknown (h) unknown (i) unknown |
| Domain | information, utilities, health, government | (a) The failed system was intended to support the information industry, particularly in the context of cyber incidents targeting critical infrastructure and essential services, including health care, food distribution, and energy [119035]. (b) The transportation industry was not specifically mentioned in the articles provided. (c) The failed system did not directly relate to the extraction of natural resources. (d) The articles did not mention any specific software failure incident related to the sales industry. (e) The construction industry was not specifically mentioned in the context of the software failure incident. (f) The manufacturing industry was not directly linked to the software failure incident discussed in the articles. (g) The failed system was intended to support the utilities industry, as critical infrastructure organizations providing services such as electricity, water, and transport were affected by cybersecurity incidents [119035]. (h) The finance industry was not explicitly mentioned in the context of the software failure incident reported. (i) The failed system did not directly relate to the knowledge industry encompassing education, research, and space exploration. (j) The health industry was significantly impacted by the software failure incident, with ransomware attacks targeting the health sector, affecting public health services, hospitals, and aged care facilities [119035]. (k) The entertainment industry was not specifically mentioned in relation to the software failure incident discussed in the articles. (l) The government sector was affected by the software failure incident, with federal government entities and nationally significant infrastructure experiencing the removal or damage of sensitive data or intellectual property, as well as network intrusions and disruptions to systems or services [119035]. (m) The failed system was not directly associated with an industry outside of the options provided in (a) to (l). |
Article ID: 119035