Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the NHS app in England has happened again within the same organization. The article mentions that the other UK nations' Covid apps have also experienced problems in recent months. For example, users of the Scottish vaccine passport app reported issues with the app not working and not finding their data in October. Additionally, in July in Northern Ireland, some app users could see other people's data. These incidents indicate that software failures have occurred within the same organization or with its products and services [119728].
(b) The software failure incident related to the NHS app in England has also happened at multiple organizations. The article mentions that the outage was blamed on "a technical issue with a global service provider that affected many different organizations." This indicates that the software failure incident not only impacted the NHS app but also affected other organizations relying on the same global service provider [119728]. |
Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was related to the design phase. The failure was attributed to "a technical issue with a global service provider that affected many different organisations" [Article 119728]. This indicates that the failure was due to contributing factors introduced during the system development or updates rather than the operation or misuse of the system. |
Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident with the NHS app was attributed to "a technical issue with a global service provider that affected many different organisations" [119728]. This indicates that the failure originated within the system due to issues related to the service provider used by the app.
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident was caused by a technical issue with a global service provider, suggesting that the contributing factor originated from within the system rather than outside the system [119728]. |
Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the NHS app was attributed to a technical issue with a global service provider, which affected many different organizations [119728]. This indicates that the failure was due to non-human actions, specifically a technical issue introduced by a service provider.
(b) Human actions also played a role in this incident as travelers were left unable to access their Covid passes due to the app malfunction, leading to chaos and frustration among passengers [119728]. Additionally, individuals like Chuck Adolphy and Caroline Frost were directly impacted by the failure as they were denied boarding for their flights due to the inability to retrieve their Covid passes [119728]. |
Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was not attributed to hardware issues. Instead, it was mentioned that the outage of England's NHS app was due to "a technical issue with a global service provider that affected many different organisations" [119728].
(b) The software failure incident in the article was specifically attributed to a technical issue with a global service provider affecting the NHS app and nhs.uk website, indicating that the failure originated in the software [119728]. |
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is non-malicious. The failure was attributed to "a technical issue with a global service provider that affected many different organisations" [119728]. There is no indication in the article that the outage was caused by malicious intent or actions. |
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident described in Article 119728 was primarily due to poor decisions. The failure was attributed to "a technical issue with a global service provider that affected many different organisations" [119728]. This indicates that the reliance on a single global service provider without adequate contingency plans or redundancies in place led to the outage affecting multiple organizations, including the NHS app. Such a dependency on a single provider without proper risk assessment or mitigation strategies can be considered a poor decision that contributed to the software failure incident. |
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 119728 was not explicitly attributed to development incompetence. The outage of England's NHS app, which left travellers unable to access their Covid pass, was blamed on "a technical issue with a global service provider that affected many different organisations." This suggests that the failure was not directly linked to development incompetence but rather to an external technical issue.
(b) The software failure incident in Article 119728 was attributed to an accidental technical issue with a global service provider, which affected the functionality of the NHS app and nhs.uk website. This accidental failure led to chaos and fury among travellers who were unable to access their Covid pass to prove their vaccine status before boarding flights and ferries. |
Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article was temporary. The article mentions that the NHS app and nhs.uk website began malfunctioning just before noon on Wednesday and the problem was resolved by 4.30pm on the same day [119728]. This indicates that the failure was not permanent but rather temporary in nature. |
Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a crash. The NHS app and nhs.uk website malfunctioned, leaving people unable to access their Covid pass to prove their vaccine status, resulting in travellers being blocked from boarding flights and ferries [Article 119728].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. Many travellers were unable to download the required information for their trips abroad, including a QR code and details about their vaccinations, as the system told them to "try again later," leading to chaos and frustration [Article 119728].
(c) timing: The software failure incident can be linked to timing issues as well. Travellers were left in a lurch when they tried to get a digital version of their Covid pass less than four weeks before their departure, as they queued to check in, highlighting a timing issue in accessing the necessary information [Article 119728].
(d) value: The software failure incident can be associated with a value issue. The system was not performing its intended function correctly, as travellers were unable to retrieve their Covid passes to prove their vaccination status, leading to individuals being denied boarding for flights and ferries despite having their vaccine cards [Article 119728].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure, as there is no mention of inconsistent responses or interactions in the article [Article 119728].
(f) other: The other behavior exhibited by the software failure incident is the disruption of travel plans and financial loss for individuals like Chuck Adolphy and Caroline Frost, who were unable to board their flights due to the system failure, resulting in them being ushered out of the airport and incurring additional expenses [Article 119728]. |