| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The article reports on a software failure incident related to smart motorways managed by National Highways. The incident involved technology failures, including broken roadside message screens and overhead gantry signs, leading to delays in the control room dealing with breakdowns [120470].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article mentions that the smart motorways network, not just limited to a specific organization, has been facing serious issues as revealed by a six-week undercover investigation. Problems included broken safety cameras, misted up cameras, cameras facing the wrong way, and failures in the software used to close lanes across different smart motorway sections [120470]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The article reports on software failures related to the design phase, where issues were introduced by system development or updates. For example, the article mentions that on the affected stretch of smart motorway on the M62, a significant number of roadside message screens were broken, and two overhead gantry signs stopped working for a month due to potential manufacturing faults [120470].
(b) The article also highlights software failures related to the operation phase, where issues were introduced by the operation or misuse of the system. For instance, there were instances where breakdowns in live lanes went unseen by the control room, leading to vehicles being stuck for over an hour. Additionally, control room staff were unable to check reports of broken-down vehicles, potentially leaving motorists stranded in high-speed traffic [120470]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident reported in the articles is primarily within the system. The failures mentioned include broken roadside message screens, malfunctioning overhead gantry signs, faulty signals for lane closures, speed restrictions, and warning legends, as well as issues with stopped vehicle detection technology. These failures are attributed to potential manufacturing faults and errors within the control room, hindering the response to breakdowns and leaving vehicles stranded in live lanes for extended periods [120470].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident also involves factors originating from outside the system. For example, there are mentions of staffing issues affecting the control room's ability to respond effectively to incidents on the smart motorways. Additionally, there are concerns raised about the overall safety and design of smart motorways, including the controversial decision to eliminate hard shoulders and operate them as live lanes, which contributes to the risks faced by drivers and emergency responders [120470]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The article reports on technology failures along a stretch of smart motorway on the M62, including broken roadside message screens and overhead gantry signs [Article 120470].
- Two overhead gantry signs were left broken for over a month, contributing to the technology failures on the smart motorway [Article 120470].
- National Highways mentioned that some of the needed repairs were related to a potential manufacturing fault, indicating a non-human factor contributing to the software failure incident [Article 120470].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- The article mentions that breakdowns in live lanes regularly go unseen by the control room, with vehicles often left stuck for over an hour, indicating potential human errors or oversight in monitoring and responding to incidents [Article 120470].
- Staffing issues were also highlighted, with plans in place for different regional control centers to share the workload if necessary, suggesting potential human-related factors contributing to the software failure incident [Article 120470].
- The article mentions that control room staff were unable to check reports of broken-down vehicles, leading to motorists being stranded in high-speed traffic, indicating human actions affecting the response to incidents on the smart motorway [Article 120470]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The articles mention hardware failures contributing to the software failure incident. For example, there were issues with broken roadside message screens and overhead gantry signs on the smart motorway section between the Croft and Eccles interchanges on the M62 [120470]. Additionally, there were reports of faulty and outdated hardware, such as CCTV boxes from 2004, being in use, making it challenging for operators to locate stranded vehicles [120470].
(b) The articles also highlight software failures contributing to the incident. There were instances where the software used to close lanes went down several times in the control rooms, impacting the ability to manage traffic effectively [120470]. Furthermore, there were reports of staff struggling with outdated technology, indicating software-related challenges [120470]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The articles do not mention any malicious intent behind the software failure incident reported on the smart motorways. The failures seem to be attributed to technical issues, staffing problems, and system shortcomings rather than intentional actions to harm the system [120470].
(b) The software failure incident on the smart motorways appears to be non-malicious in nature. The failures are described as technology failures, staffing issues, lapses in technology, broken roadside message screens, faulty signals, and outdated hardware. These issues are not portrayed as intentional acts to harm the system but rather as unintended consequences of system deficiencies [120470]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to poor decisions can be inferred from the articles. The incident on the smart motorway on the M62 was plagued by technology failures, broken roadside message screens, and malfunctioning overhead gantry signs [120470]. These failures were reported to be putting drivers' lives at risk and causing delays in the control room dealing with breakdowns. The whistleblowers described the situation as 'dire' and highlighted issues such as broken signals, faulty technology, and delays in responding to breakdowns. Additionally, there were concerns raised about the safety implications of breakdowns in live lanes going unseen by the control room, leading to vehicles being stuck for extended periods [120470]. These issues suggest that the software failure incident was influenced by poor decisions related to the maintenance, monitoring, and response mechanisms of the smart motorway technology. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence:
- The article highlights issues with the smart motorway technology, including broken roadside message screens and faulty overhead gantry signs, leading to delays in the control room dealing with breakdowns [120470].
- There are reports of broken signals, faulty signs, and outdated hardware causing hindrances for traffic officers and recovery services, with some signals being faulty for months on end [120470].
- The article mentions that the software used to close lanes went down several times in the control rooms, and there were reports of CCTV blackspots and technological failures in the system [120470].
(b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally:
- The article mentions that some of the broken signs and screens were due to a potential manufacturing fault, and repairs were underway to address these issues [120470].
- It is reported that National Highways confirmed a car collided with a traffic officer's vehicle as it passed under a red 'X' on an overhead sign, indicating a potential accident caused by the software failure [120470].
- The article also mentions that control room staff were unable to check reports of broken-down vehicles, leading to motorists being stranded in high-speed traffic, which could be considered an accidental failure in the system [120470]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
The software failure incident related to the smart motorway on the M62 involved both permanent and temporary failures:
(a) Permanent Failure:
- The article mentions that on the affected stretch of smart motorway between the Croft and Eccles interchanges, a staggering 24 of the 36 roadside message screens were broken, and some signals had been faulty for months on end [Article 120470].
- Additionally, the article highlights that the software used to close lanes went down several times in the six weeks the reporter worked at one of the regional control rooms, indicating ongoing and persistent software failures [Article 120470].
(b) Temporary Failure:
- The article also mentions that two overhead gantry signs on the same stretch of smart motorway were broken for over a month but have now been repaired, indicating a temporary failure that was resolved [Article 120470].
- Furthermore, National Highways mentioned that repairs for the broken signs were underway and expected to be complete in the coming days, suggesting a temporary nature of the failure [Article 120470]. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the smart motorway system can be categorized as a crash. The incident involved failures in technology, such as broken roadside message screens and overhead gantry signs, leading to delays in the control room's response to breakdowns and leaving vehicles stranded in live lanes for extended periods [120470].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. The broken signals and screens resulted in the system omitting to provide necessary information to drivers, such as lane closures, speed restrictions, and warning legends. This omission led to traffic officers having to perform rolling road blocks for recovery services due to the lack of functioning signals [120470].
(c) timing: The software failure incident does not align with a timing failure. The issue was not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early but rather failing to perform them due to technical faults [unknown].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not align with a value failure. The issue was not related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly but rather failing to perform them due to broken technology components [unknown].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with a byzantine failure. The system did not exhibit inconsistent responses or interactions but rather experienced consistent failures in specific components, such as broken screens and signs [unknown].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be categorized as a failure due to system hardware issues. The incident involved faulty and outdated hardware, including broken cameras and misted-up screens, which made it challenging for operators to locate stranded vehicles and monitor the road effectively [120470]. |