| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to false forward-collision warnings and unexpected activation of emergency brakes has happened again at Tesla Inc. The incident prompted a recall of nearly 12,000 vehicles sold since 2017 due to a communication error caused by a software update [Article 121016, Article 120871].
(b) There is no information in the provided articles about the software failure incident happening again at multiple organizations or with their products and services. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in the Tesla vehicles was related to a communication error that may cause a false forward-collision warning or unexpected activation of the emergency brakes. This issue was prompted by a software update to vehicles in the limited early access version 10.3 Full-Self Driving (FSD) (Beta) population. Tesla uninstalled FSD 10.3 after reports of inadvertent activation of the automatic emergency braking system and then updated the software to release FSD version 10.3.1 to address the issue [121016, 120871].
(b) The operation-related contributing factor in this software failure incident was the inadvertent activation of the automatic emergency braking system due to a software communication disconnect between two onboard chips. This could lead to the automatic emergency braking system unexpectedly activating while driving, potentially raising the risk of a rear-end collision. Tesla took actions to address this issue, including canceling the FSD update on vehicles that had not installed it and disabling certain features on affected vehicles until a software update was deployed [121016, 120871]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the Tesla vehicles' recall was primarily due to a communication error within the system caused by a software update. Tesla mentioned that the issue was prompted by a software communication disconnect between two onboard chips, leading to negative object velocity detections and inadvertent activation of the automatic emergency braking system [121016, 120871]. This indicates that the failure originated from within the system itself, specifically related to the software update and communication between components. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the Tesla vehicles was primarily due to a communication error caused by a software communication disconnect between two onboard chips, leading to negative object velocity detections when other vehicles are present. This non-human action resulted in a false forward-collision warning or unexpected activation of the emergency brakes [121016, 120871].
(b) Human actions were also involved in addressing the software failure incident. Tesla uninstalled the problematic software version (FSD 10.3) after receiving reports of issues, updated the software to version 10.3.1, and released it to the affected vehicles. Additionally, Tesla canceled the FSD update on vehicles that had not installed it, disabled certain features on affected vehicles, and later re-enabled them after deploying an over-the-air software update. Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, acknowledged the issues with the software update and rolled back to a previous version temporarily, highlighting that such issues are expected with beta software [121016, 120871]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles was primarily due to a hardware issue. The incident was caused by a software communication disconnect between two onboard chips in Tesla vehicles, leading to a problem that could result in "negative object velocity detections when other vehicles are present" [121016, 120871]. This hardware-related issue prompted the false forward-collision warning and unexpected activation of emergency brakes, leading to the safety recall of nearly 12,000 Tesla vehicles sold since 2017.
(b) The software failure incident also involved contributing factors originating in software. Tesla had to uninstall the Full-Self Driving (FSD) version 10.3 after reports of inadvertent activation of the automatic emergency braking system. Subsequently, Tesla updated the software to version 10.3.1 to address the issue [121016, 120871]. The software glitch led to the unexpected activation of safety features, which could potentially increase the risk of rear-end collisions. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is non-malicious. The incident was caused by a communication error in the software update that led to a false forward-collision warning or unexpected activation of the emergency brakes in Tesla vehicles. Tesla acknowledged the issue and took steps to address it, including uninstalling the problematic software update, releasing a new version, and disabling certain features on affected vehicles until a fix was implemented [121016, 120871]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Tesla vehicles' recall was primarily due to poor decisions made during the software update process. Tesla installed a software update (FSD 10.3) on vehicles in its limited early access version, which led to a communication error causing false forward-collision warnings and unexpected activation of emergency brakes [121016, 120871]. This poor decision to release the update without thorough testing resulted in safety concerns and prompted the recall of nearly 12,000 vehicles.
(b) Additionally, accidental decisions or unintended consequences were also a factor in the software failure incident. The software communication disconnect between two onboard chips led to issues such as producing "negative object velocity detections when other vehicles are present" [121016]. This unintended consequence of the software update caused the automatic emergency braking system to unexpectedly activate while driving, increasing the risk of rear-end collisions. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident reported in the articles seems to be more related to development incompetence. The incident was caused by a software communication disconnect between two onboard chips, leading to a problem that could produce "negative object velocity detections when other vehicles are present" [121016, 120871]. This issue resulted in the inadvertent activation of the automatic emergency braking system, potentially increasing the risk of a rear-end collision. Additionally, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) asked Tesla about its software updates and safety issues, indicating concerns about the development and implementation of the software [121016, 120871].
(b) The software failure incident does not appear to be accidental. The incident was specifically attributed to a software communication disconnect between two onboard chips, which was a deliberate change made during the software update process [121016, 120871]. The activation of the automatic emergency braking system was not an accidental occurrence but a direct result of the software issue introduced by the update. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident reported in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. This is evident from the fact that the issue was prompted by a software communication disconnect between two onboard chips, leading to negative object velocity detections when other vehicles are present. Tesla acknowledged the issue, uninstalled the problematic software version, released an updated version, and disabled certain features on affected vehicles until a fix was deployed [121016, 120871]. Additionally, Tesla's CEO, Elon Musk, mentioned that issues with the software version were expected with beta software, indicating a temporary nature of the failure [121016]. |
| Behaviour |
value |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the articles is not described as a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident involves a communication error that may cause a false forward-collision warning or unexpected activation of the emergency brakes, but the system is still operational and able to perform functions ([121016], [120871]).
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the issue is related to the system's communication error leading to unintended activations of safety features ([121016], [120871]).
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The issue is more about the system's communication error causing unexpected activations rather than timing-related errors ([121016], [120871]).
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Specifically, the issue involves a software communication disconnect between two onboard chips leading to negative object velocity detections and inadvertent activation of the automatic emergency braking system ([121016], [120871]).
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The issue is more focused on a specific communication error causing safety feature activations ([121016], [120871]).
(f) other: The software failure incident involves a specific software communication error between two onboard chips that leads to unintended activations of safety features, particularly the automatic emergency braking system. This behavior could be categorized as a specific type of software fault related to communication errors ([121016], [120871]). |