| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident has happened again at the Home Office. The article mentions that the Home Office has mishandled a series of other IT projects, including a walkie-talkie system called the Emergency Services Network and an IT system for UK border guards. This indicates a pattern of software failure incidents within the same organization [121902].
(b) The software failure incident has also happened at other organizations. The article mentions that in August, the Daily Mail revealed that one of the new border IT systems at Heathrow was 'crashing repeatedly,' leading to massive queues. This indicates that similar incidents have occurred at other organizations as well [121902]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the development phase can be attributed to the design of the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) system. The article mentions that the Home Office has mishandled various IT projects, including the NLEDS project, leading to a 'staggering' increase in costs and significant delays. The report criticized the Home Office for wasting time and funding without making meaningful progress on the project, indicating failures in the design and management of the system [121902].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can be seen in the case of the Police National Computer (PNC) suffering a 'significant data loss' in January, where records of nearly 113,000 criminals were erased due to 'human error.' It took five months to recover the records, highlighting a failure in the operation or maintenance of the system [121902]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) project, which aimed to replace the Police National Computer (PNC), was primarily due to factors originating from within the system. The failure was attributed to a 'staggering' increase in costs to over £1 billion and a delay of at least five years. The Home Office was criticized for mishandling large IT projects, including the NLEDS project, indicating internal issues with project management and execution [121902].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident related to the NLEDS project was also influenced by factors originating from outside the system. For example, the article mentions that the PNC, the system being replaced by NLEDS, faced a significant data loss incident in January due to 'human error,' which could be considered an external factor impacting the system's performance [121902]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident related to non-human actions:
- The article mentions a 'significant data loss' in the Police National Computer (PNC) in January, where records of nearly 113,000 criminals were erased. It took five months to recover the records, and the Home Office attributed it to 'human error' [121902].
(b) The software failure incident related to human actions:
- The article highlights that the Home Office has 'wasted both vital time and scarce funding without making any meaningful progress' on the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) project, indicating failures in project management and decision-making [121902].
- Additionally, the article mentions that one of the new border IT systems, the 'Border Crossing' database, was 'crashing repeatedly,' leading to massive queues at Heathrow. This issue could be attributed to human actions involved in the development and implementation of the system [121902]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article mentions a 'significant data loss' incident in January where records of nearly 113,000 criminals were erased from the Police National Computer (PNC) due to 'human error' [121902].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The failure of the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) project, which is a new police IT system, is attributed to a 'staggering' increase in cost and a delay of at least five years. The report criticizes the Home Office for mishandling large IT projects, including the NLEDS, the Emergency Services Network, and an IT system for UK border guards, indicating failures originating in software development and management [121902]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) project, which aimed to replace the Police National Computer (PNC), does not seem to be malicious. The failure was attributed to factors such as mismanagement, cost overruns, delays, and human errors rather than intentional harm to the system. The article mentions that the Home Office's mishandling of large IT projects, including the NLEDS, was characterized as a "perpetual failure" on IT projects, indicating a lack of malicious intent [121902].
(b) The software failure incident related to the NLEDS project and the Police National Computer (PNC) replacement appears to be non-malicious. The failure was primarily due to issues such as cost overruns, delays, mismanagement, and human errors rather than intentional harm to the system. The article highlights the staggering increase in costs, delays, and lack of progress in the project, indicating non-malicious contributing factors [121902]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) project can be attributed to poor decisions made by the Home Office. The Commons public accounts committee criticized the Home Office for the 'perpetual failure' on large IT projects, mishandling programs like the Emergency Services Network and the IT system for UK border guards [121902]. The report highlighted that the Home Office had wasted vital time and scarce funding without making meaningful progress on the NLEDS project, indicating poor decision-making in managing the project. Additionally, the committee recommended changes to the management of NLEDS, suggesting a lack of effective decision-making processes in place [121902].
(b) The software failure incident also involved accidental decisions that led to significant issues. For example, in January, the Police National Computer (PNC) suffered a 'significant data loss' where records of nearly 113,000 criminals were erased due to 'human error' [121902]. This accidental decision resulted in a five-month effort to recover the lost records, indicating a mistake that had unintended consequences. Additionally, the Daily Mail reported that one of the new border IT systems was 'crashing repeatedly,' causing massive queues at Heathrow, which could be attributed to unintended consequences of rushing the system into use [121902]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the news article. The article mentions that the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) project, intended to replace the outdated Police National Computer (PNC), faced a 'staggering' increase in costs to over £1 billion and a delay of at least five years. The Commons public accounts committee criticized the Home Office for its 'perpetual failure' on large IT projects, including mishandling other programs like the Emergency Services Network and an IT system for UK border guards. The committee expressed concerns that the department was not learning from past mistakes, indicating a lack of professional competence in managing such projects [121902].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is also highlighted in the article. For instance, in January, the PNC experienced a 'significant data loss' where records of nearly 113,000 criminals were erased due to 'human error.' It took five months to recover the lost records, indicating that the incident was accidental in nature rather than intentional [121902]. |
| Duration |
permanent, temporary |
The software failure incident related to the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) can be categorized as both temporary and permanent based on the information provided in the article.
Temporary:
- The article mentions a 'significant data loss' incident in January where records of nearly 113,000 criminals were erased from the Police National Computer (PNC). It took five months to recover the records, and the Home Office attributed this incident to 'human error' [121902].
Permanent:
- The overall delay of at least five years in the implementation of the NLEDS project and the significant increase in costs from £671 million to £1.1 billion can be considered as a permanent failure in terms of the project timeline and budget [121902].
Therefore, the software failure incident can be seen as both temporary (data loss incident) and permanent (overall project delay and cost increase). |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, timing |
(a) crash: The article mentions a significant data loss incident in January where records of nearly 113,000 criminals were erased from the Police National Computer (PNC). It took five months to recover the records, indicating a crash scenario where the system lost critical data and failed to perform its intended functions [121902].
(b) omission: The delay in the implementation of the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) by at least five years and the failure to have the system up and running by 2025 as originally planned can be considered as an omission failure. The system omitted to perform its intended functions within the expected timeframe [121902].
(c) timing: The delay in the implementation of the NLEDS by at least five years and the uncertainty about its readiness by 2025 can also be attributed to a timing failure. The system is not performing its intended functions at the right time, causing significant delays [121902].
(d) value: The article does not explicitly mention any instances of the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, leading to a value failure.
(e) byzantine: The article does not provide information about the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions, indicating no evidence of a byzantine failure.
(f) other: The article does not describe any other specific behavior of the software failure incident beyond the crash, omission, and timing issues mentioned. |