Incident: NSO Group Spyware Hack on U.S. State Department iPhones

Published Date: 2021-12-03

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving the hacking of Apple Inc iPhones of at least nine U.S. State Department employees by an unknown assailant using spyware developed by NSO Group happened in the last several months [1]. Estimation: Step 1: The article mentions that the hacks took place in the last several months. Step 2: The article was published on 2021-12-03. Step 3: Based on the information provided, the incident likely occurred between September 2021 and December 2021.
System The software failure incident involving the hacking of Apple iPhones of U.S. State Department employees by spyware developed by NSO Group highlights the failure of the following systems: 1. Apple iPhones - The iPhones of at least nine U.S. State Department employees were hacked using a graphics processing vulnerability that allowed the installation of NSO surveillance software [122281]. 2. NSO Group's Pegasus spyware - The spyware developed by NSO Group, specifically the Pegasus surveillance software, was used to exploit the software vulnerability in the iPhones and carry out the cyberattacks [122281].
Responsible Organization 1. The software failure incident was caused by an unknown assailant who hacked iPhones of at least nine U.S. State Department employees using spyware developed by the Israel-based NSO Group [1].
Impacted Organization 1. U.S. State Department employees [122281]
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a graphics processing vulnerability in Apple's iOS that allowed NSO Group's spyware, Pegasus, to take control of iPhones by sending tainted iMessage requests to the device [122281].
Non-software Causes 1. The hack was carried out by an unknown assailant using sophisticated spyware developed by the Israel-based NSO Group [1]. 2. The victims were infected through a graphics processing vulnerability in Apple iPhones that Apple did not learn about and fix until September [1]. 3. The victims were easily identifiable as U.S. government employees because they associated email addresses ending in state.gov with their Apple IDs [1]. 4. The targeted State Department employees in Uganda were using iPhones registered with foreign telephone numbers, without the U.S. country code [1].
Impacts 1. At least nine U.S. State Department employees had their iPhones hacked by an unknown assailant using spyware developed by NSO Group, leading to a breach of sensitive information and potential surveillance of the victims [1]. 2. The victims, who were U.S. government employees, were easily identifiable due to their association with email addresses ending in state.gov with their Apple IDs, potentially compromising their privacy and security [1]. 3. The software flaw in Apple's graphics processing vulnerability allowed the NSO customers to take control of iPhones without the victims needing to interact with any prompts, indicating a significant security loophole that was exploited [1]. 4. The incident led to Apple suing NSO Group, accusing them of aiding customers in breaking into Apple's mobile software, iOS, highlighting the legal repercussions faced by the software company [1]. 5. The U.S. government's crackdown on companies like NSO and the pursuit of new global discussions about spying limits were influenced by the threat posed to U.S. personnel abroad, indicating broader implications of the software failure incident [1].
Preventions 1. Implementing timely software updates and patches to fix known vulnerabilities could have prevented the software failure incident [122281]. 2. Conducting thorough security assessments and audits of the software to identify and mitigate potential risks and vulnerabilities could have helped prevent the incident [122281]. 3. Enforcing stricter controls on the export and use of spyware technology by companies like NSO Group to prevent misuse and unauthorized access to sensitive information could have potentially averted the incident [122281].
Fixes 1. Fixing the graphics processing vulnerability that allowed the hack to occur on iPhones by sending tainted iMessage requests [122281].
References 1. Four people familiar with the matter 2. NSO Group spokesperson 3. State Department spokesperson 4. Apple spokesperson 5. Commerce Department 6. Researchers who investigated the espionage campaign 7. Senior Biden administration official 8. Sen. Ron Wyden 9. Israeli Ministry of Defense 10. Israeli embassy in Washington [122281]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the NSO Group's spyware, specifically the Pegasus software, has happened again within the same organization. The incident involved the hacking of iPhones of at least nine U.S. State Department employees using sophisticated spyware developed by NSO Group [122281]. NSO Group has faced criticism and legal actions due to the use of its spyware for malicious purposes, targeting government officials, journalists, activists, and others [122281]. (b) The software failure incident involving the NSO Group's spyware has also occurred at multiple organizations. The Commerce Department placed NSO Group on an entity list along with another spyware firm for developing and supplying spyware used by foreign governments to target various individuals, including government officials, journalists, businesspeople, activists, academics, and embassy workers [122281]. This indicates that the use of NSO Group's spyware has been a concern beyond just one organization.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where it mentions a software flaw in Apple's iOS that allowed some NSO customers to take control of iPhones by sending invisible yet tainted iMessage requests to the device [122281]. This flaw was not discovered and fixed by Apple until September, indicating a design vulnerability that was exploited by the attackers. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article where it describes how the targeted State Department employees were infected through a graphics processing vulnerability that allowed the NSO customers to take control of iPhones without the victims needing to interact with a prompt for the hack to be successful [122281]. This indicates a failure in the operation or misuse of the system that led to the successful exploitation of the vulnerability.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: - The software failure incident involving the hacking of iPhones of U.S. State Department employees was due to a vulnerability in Apple's iOS software that allowed the NSO Group's spyware to take control of the devices [122281]. - The vulnerability in the graphics processing of iPhones allowed the NSO customers to exploit the flaw by sending tainted iMessage requests to the devices, enabling the installation of the surveillance software [122281]. (b) outside_system: - The software failure incident was initiated by an unknown assailant who used sophisticated spyware developed by the Israel-based NSO Group to hack into the iPhones of U.S. State Department employees [122281]. - The NSO Group, a third-party entity, developed and supplied spyware to foreign governments, which was used to maliciously target government officials, journalists, businesspeople, activists, academics, and embassy workers, as determined by the Commerce Department [122281].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically the exploitation of a software vulnerability in Apple's iPhones by sophisticated spyware developed by the NSO Group. The hack involved sending invisible yet tainted iMessage requests to the devices, exploiting a graphics processing vulnerability that allowed the NSO customers to take control of the iPhones without the victims needing to interact with any prompts [122281]. (b) Human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. The NSO Group, a company known for developing spyware, was accused of supplying spyware to foreign governments that maliciously targeted government officials, journalists, businesspeople, activists, academics, and embassy workers. The Commerce Department placed NSO Group on an entity list, making it harder for U.S. companies to do business with them due to their involvement in supplying spyware for such purposes [122281].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The software failure incident involving the hacking of Apple iPhones of U.S. State Department employees was attributed to a graphics processing vulnerability in the iPhones, which allowed the attackers to take control of the devices by sending tainted iMessage requests [122281]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The software failure incident was primarily due to the exploitation of a software flaw in Apple's iOS that allowed the NSO Group's surveillance software, Pegasus, to be installed on the iPhones without the users' interaction or awareness [122281].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious, non-malicious (a) The software failure incident in this case is malicious. The incident involved the hacking of iPhones belonging to at least nine U.S. State Department employees by an unknown assailant using sophisticated spyware developed by the Israel-based NSO Group [122281]. The spyware, known as Pegasus, was used to infiltrate the devices and gather sensitive information, including encrypted messages and photos, without the users' knowledge. This malicious attack was aimed at government officials and was part of a wider espionage campaign targeting individuals in multiple countries [122281]. (b) The software failure incident is also non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerability exploited in the hack was a graphics processing vulnerability in Apple's iOS that allowed the NSO customers to take control of iPhones by sending tainted iMessage requests to the devices [122281]. This flaw was not known to Apple until September, and the victims did not need to interact with any prompts for the hack to be successful. The incident highlights a software flaw that was exploited by malicious actors, leading to the compromise of the affected devices.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The software failure incident involving the hacking of Apple iPhones of U.S. State Department employees by an unknown assailant using spyware developed by NSO Group can be attributed to poor decisions. This is evident from the fact that NSO Group's spyware, known as Pegasus, was used to maliciously target government officials, journalists, businesspeople, activists, academics, and embassy workers [122281]. Additionally, NSO Group's technology has been associated with systemic abuse in multiple countries, prompting the Biden administration to crack down on companies like NSO and pursue new global discussions about spying limits [122281]. (b) The software failure incident can also be linked to accidental decisions. For instance, the victims of the hack were infected through a graphics processing vulnerability in Apple iPhones that the company was not aware of and did not fix until September [122281]. This software flaw allowed NSO customers to take control of iPhones by sending invisible yet tainted iMessage requests to the device, without the victims needing to interact with a prompt for the hack to be successful [122281].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident in the news article can be attributed to development incompetence. The incident involved the hacking of Apple iPhones of U.S. State Department employees using sophisticated spyware developed by the Israel-based NSO Group [122281]. The spyware developed by NSO Group, known as Pegasus, exploited a graphics processing vulnerability in iPhones, allowing attackers to take control of the devices without the victims needing to interact with any prompts. This flaw in Apple's software was not discovered and fixed until September, leaving the devices vulnerable to exploitation [122281]. (b) The software failure incident can also be categorized as accidental. The victims of the hack, including U.S. government employees, were easily identifiable due to their association with email addresses ending in state.gov with their Apple IDs. The victims were infected through the same graphics processing vulnerability that Apple was not aware of until September, indicating that the exploitation was accidental and not intentional on the part of the victims [122281].
Duration temporary The software failure incident related to the hacking of Apple iPhones of U.S. State Department employees by spyware developed by NSO Group can be categorized as a temporary failure. This is because the hack occurred due to a specific vulnerability in Apple's software that allowed the spyware to take control of the iPhones by sending tainted iMessage requests, which Apple only learned about and fixed in September [122281]. The incident was not a permanent failure caused by inherent flaws in the software but rather a temporary failure resulting from a specific vulnerability that was exploited by the spyware.
Behaviour other (a) crash: The software failure incident in this case does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident involves the hacking of iPhones of U.S. State Department employees by an unknown assailant using spyware developed by NSO Group [122281]. (b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the incident revolves around the successful intrusion and compromise of iPhones of U.S. officials through a vulnerability in the software [122281]. (c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The incident is primarily about the exploitation of a software vulnerability to hack into iPhones of U.S. State Department employees [122281]. (d) value: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The incident is centered around the successful hacking of iPhones using sophisticated spyware developed by NSO Group [122281]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident is focused on the unauthorized access and compromise of iPhones of U.S. officials through the exploitation of a software vulnerability [122281]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security breach resulting from the successful exploitation of a software vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information on iPhones of U.S. State Department employees. This incident highlights the impact of sophisticated spyware developed by NSO Group on compromising the security and privacy of individuals [122281].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence, other (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident reported in the articles [122281]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - The articles do not mention any physical harm caused to individuals due to the software failure incident [122281]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no information indicating that people's access to food or shelter was impacted by the software failure incident [122281]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident resulted in the hacking of iPhones belonging to at least nine U.S. State Department employees, potentially leading to the compromise of sensitive information and data [122281]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - The articles do not mention any activities being postponed due to the software failure incident [122281]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident primarily affected iPhones and the spyware developed by the NSO Group, impacting the security and privacy of the individuals targeted [122281]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident had significant consequences, including the hacking of iPhones belonging to U.S. State Department employees and the potential compromise of sensitive information [122281]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles discuss the potential consequences of the NSO spyware being used to target government officials, journalists, businesspeople, activists, academics, and embassy workers, but it is not explicitly mentioned that these consequences occurred as a result of this specific incident [122281]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The software failure incident led to a breach of security and privacy for the targeted individuals, potentially exposing sensitive information and communications to unauthorized access [122281].
Domain information (a) The failed system was related to the information industry as it involved the hacking of iPhones belonging to U.S. State Department employees by using sophisticated spyware developed by the NSO Group [Article 122281]. The incident highlighted the vulnerability of information systems and the potential risks associated with cyber espionage in the information sector.

Sources

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