| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to encryption flaws in the mandatory smartphone app for athletes in China for the Olympics raises concerns about the security of the systems used to track Covid-19 outbreaks. The app, called MY2022, had serious encryption flaws that failed to verify signatures and encrypt data properly, as reported by Citizen Lab [Article 122838]. This incident highlights the challenges faced by China's tech industry in protecting consumer data while also sharing it with government censors and surveillance.
(b) The article mentions that issues with incomplete or nonexistent encryption have long plagued China's tech industry, which is tasked with the challenging duty of protecting consumer data while sharing it with government censors and surveillance [Article 122838]. Additionally, the incident with the MY2022 app is part of a broader trend where apps used for tracking coronavirus exposures in various countries have been rife with security flaws, leading to concerns about scams, identity theft, and extensive government tracking [Article 122838]. This indicates that similar incidents related to security flaws in tracking apps have occurred in multiple countries. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the encryption flaws found in the mandatory smartphone app, MY2022, used by athletes in China for the Olympics. The app had serious encryption flaws, with portions failing to verify the signature used in encrypted transfers or not encrypting data at all. The flaws were identified by Citizen Lab, a cybersecurity watchdog, and reported to the Beijing Organizing Committee, but no response was received. An update to the software in January did not fix the issues, potentially putting the app in violation of China's personal data protection laws and privacy policies required by app stores like Google and Apple [122838].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the fact that the app, MY2022, failed to confirm a unique encryption signature with the server when transferring data. This flaw meant that hackers could intercept the data without Chinese officials necessarily knowing. Additionally, the app's built-in messaging service failed to encrypt metadata, making it easy for network owners or telecoms to detect which phone was messaging another and at what time. These operational flaws could lead to sensitive information being intercepted and potentially used for identity theft [122838]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the MY2022 app used for the Olympics in China was primarily due to serious encryption flaws within the system. The app had issues with verifying signatures used in encrypted transfers, incomplete encryption of data, and failure to encrypt metadata in its messaging service, making it vulnerable to interception by hackers [Article 122838]. These flaws were identified by Citizen Lab, a cybersecurity watchdog, and were not addressed even after a January update to the software. The lack of proper encryption could lead to data interception and potential identity theft, indicating that the failure originated from within the system itself. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically serious encryption flaws in the mandatory smartphone app used by athletes in China for the Olympics. The flaws included issues such as incomplete or nonexistent encryption, failure to verify encryption signatures, and failure to encrypt data properly, making it vulnerable to interception by hackers [122838].
(b) However, human actions also played a role in the software failure incident as the app included a list of political keywords for censorship, indicating intentional design decisions related to content control [122838]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 122838 is primarily related to software issues rather than hardware. The incident involves serious encryption flaws in the mandatory smartphone app MY2022 used by athletes in China for the Olympics. The flaws include issues with encryption verification, data encryption, and encryption of metadata, making it vulnerable to interception by hackers. These flaws are related to software design and implementation rather than hardware components [122838]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is non-malicious. The encryption flaws in the mandatory smartphone app used by athletes in China for the Olympics were not intentional acts of sabotage but rather unintentional vulnerabilities that could potentially be exploited by hackers [122838]. The flaws in the app's encryption and data security were identified by Citizen Lab, a cybersecurity watchdog, and were not fixed even after being disclosed to the Beijing Organizing Committee. These flaws could allow for interception of sensitive data without the knowledge of Chinese officials, potentially leading to identity theft or other malicious activities [122838].
(b) The software failure incident is non-malicious as it was not caused by any intentional actions to harm the system. The flaws in the app's encryption and data security were likely unintentional and could be attributed to inadequate security practices rather than deliberate attempts to compromise the system [122838]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
- The software failure incident related to the encryption flaws in the mandatory smartphone app used by athletes in China for the Olympics was likely not due to poor decisions but rather accidental decisions. The report by Citizen Lab highlighted serious encryption flaws in the app, such as incomplete or nonexistent encryption, failure to verify signatures, and lack of encryption for certain data transfers [122838].
- The researchers speculated that the security flaws were probably unintentional, as proper encryption might interfere with China's surveillance tools, and the government would already be receiving data from the app without the need to intercept it during transfer [122838]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 122838 can be attributed to development incompetence. The mandatory smartphone app MY2022 designed for athletes in China for the Olympics was found to have serious encryption flaws by Citizen Lab, a cybersecurity watchdog. The app failed to verify the signature used in encrypted transfers and did not encrypt data properly, potentially allowing hackers to intercept sensitive information. The report speculated that proper encryption might interfere with China's surveillance tools, indicating a lack of professional competence in ensuring secure data transmission [122838].
(b) Additionally, the software failure incident can also be considered accidental. The flaws in the app, such as incomplete encryption and lack of data protection, were likely unintentional according to the researchers. While the app included a list of political keywords for censorship, it was noted that this feature was not actively used in the chat and file transfer functions. The accidental introduction of these vulnerabilities could have led to potential data interception and misuse, highlighting unintentional flaws in the software [122838]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article is more likely to be temporary rather than permanent. The article mentions that the app, MY2022, had serious encryption flaws that failed to verify signatures and encrypt data properly [122838]. These flaws were identified by Citizen Lab, a cybersecurity watchdog, and were reported to the Beijing Organizing Committee. Despite an update to the software in January, the issues were not fixed, indicating that the failure was due to specific circumstances related to the encryption implementation in the app. Additionally, the article discusses how the flaws in the app could allow hackers to intercept data without Chinese officials knowing, suggesting that the failure was not a permanent issue but rather a specific vulnerability in the software that could potentially be addressed with proper encryption measures. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident mentioned in the article does not specifically describe a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [Article 122838].
(b) omission: The software failure incident involves a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Specifically, the app failed to encrypt data properly, leading to the omission of this crucial security measure [Article 122838].
(c) timing: The software failure incident does not relate to a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [Article 122838].
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. In this case, the encryption flaws in the app led to the incorrect handling of sensitive data [Article 122838].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [Article 122838].
(f) other: The software failure incident involves a failure related to security flaws in the app, such as incomplete or nonexistent encryption, which could potentially lead to data interception and identity theft. This behavior could be categorized as a security vulnerability [Article 122838]. |