Published Date: 2022-02-01
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident of Tesla's Full Self-Driving software enabling rolling stops at intersections without stopping happened in October 2021 [Article 122828]. 2. The incident occurred in October 2021. |
| System | 1. Full Self-Driving software by Tesla [Article 122828] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Tesla [122828] |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Tesla owners of 54,000 cars equipped with Full Self-Driving software [122828] 2. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [122828] |
| Software Causes | 1. The software cause of the failure incident was the Full Self-Driving software feature that allowed vehicles to roll slowly through intersections without stopping, leading to safety concerns and violations of traffic regulations [122828]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Lack of compliance with traffic regulations leading to rolling stops at intersections [122828] 2. Mechanical defects in the cars affecting safety [122828] |
| Impacts | 1. The software failure incident led to the recall of 54,000 Tesla cars equipped with Full Self-Driving software to disable the feature that allowed vehicles to roll slowly through intersections without stopping, which was in violation of traffic regulations [122828]. 2. The incident raised concerns about safety issues involving Tesla, including crashes in Autopilot mode involving emergency vehicles, a braking problem, and two separate mechanical defects that could affect safety [122828]. 3. The software failure incident resulted in Tesla agreeing to disable a feature that allowed front passengers or drivers to play video games on the dashboard screen while the cars were in motion [122828]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing thorough testing procedures before releasing software updates to ensure all features comply with traffic regulations and safety standards could have prevented the rolling-stop issue [122828]. 2. Conducting comprehensive risk assessments and scenario testing to identify potential safety hazards and address them proactively before releasing software updates could have prevented the incident [122828]. 3. Enhancing communication and collaboration between the software development team and regulatory agencies to ensure compliance with federal laws and safety requirements could have prevented the software failure incident [122828]. |
| Fixes | 1. Disabling the feature that allows vehicles to roll slowly through intersections without stopping [122828] 2. Implementing a software update to address the rolling-stop issue and ensure compliance with traffic regulations [122828] | References | 1. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) [Article 122828] 2. Tesla [Article 122828] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization | (a) The software failure incident related to rolling stops at intersections due to Tesla's Full Self-Driving software is not the first safety issue involving Tesla. In the past, Tesla has faced safety concerns and recalls related to its Autopilot system, including crashes involving emergency vehicles and a braking problem [122828]. (b) The software failure incident involving Tesla's Full Self-Driving software and the issue of rolling stops at intersections is specific to Tesla and its products. There is no mention in the article of similar incidents happening at other organizations or with their products and services [122828]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the case of Tesla's Full Self-Driving software. The article mentions that the software allowed vehicles to perform "rolling stops" at intersections, which was in violation of traffic regulations. This feature was enabled through a software update in October, indicating a design flaw in the system development process [122828]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the case of Tesla's Full Self-Driving software as well. The article highlights that despite the software being in a test phase and requiring active engagement by a human driver, there were instances where the system failed to recognize and stop for emergency vehicles, leading to crashes. This indicates a failure in the operation or misuse of the system [122828]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the Tesla Full Self-Driving software allowing rolling stops at intersections without stopping was a within-system issue. This was a feature enabled by Tesla's software that violated traffic regulations and posed a safety risk by not stopping at stop signs. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration confirmed the recall of 54,000 cars equipped with this software due to the rolling-stop problem, which was a result of the software's functionality [122828]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident related to non-human actions occurred when Tesla's Full Self-Driving software allowed vehicles to perform rolling stops through intersections without stopping, which was in violation of traffic regulations. This issue was identified after a software update in October introduced driving modes that enabled this behavior [122828]. (b) The software failure incident related to human actions involved Tesla enabling the feature that allowed rolling stops through intersections, despite the potential safety risks associated with not stopping at stop signs. This decision to enable the feature was made by Tesla, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration criticized the automaker for allowing such behavior [122828]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The article mentions that Tesla is recalling 54,000 cars equipped with its Full Self-Driving software to disable a feature that allows vehicles to roll slowly through intersections without stopping. This issue is related to the software controlling the hardware of the vehicles [122828]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The article highlights that the software issue with the Full Self-Driving feature allowed cars to perform rolling stops at intersections, which is a violation of traffic regulations. This issue originated in the software programming of the Full Self-Driving system [122828]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | non-malicious | (a) The software failure incident related to the Tesla Full Self-Driving software enabling rolling stops at intersections without stopping was non-malicious. The issue was identified as a safety concern by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, leading to a recall of 54,000 cars equipped with the software to disable this feature. Tesla stated that the rolling stops were allowed only when no cars, pedestrians, or bicyclists were detected, and the company was not aware of any crashes resulting from this behavior [122828]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions | (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be inferred from the article. Tesla faced criticism for enabling "rolling stops" in violation of traffic regulations with its Full Self-Driving software. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration highlighted that failing to stop at a stop sign can increase the risk of a crash, leading to the decision to recall 54,000 cars to disable this feature [Article 122828]. This indicates that the software failure incident was a result of poor decisions made in enabling a feature that compromised safety and violated traffic regulations. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence, accidental | (a) The software failure incident related to the Tesla Full Self-Driving software enabling rolling stops at intersections without stopping can be attributed to development incompetence. This is evident from the fact that the feature allowing rolling stops was added in a software update in October, indicating a decision made during the development process that did not align with traffic regulations and safety standards [122828]. Additionally, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration criticized Tesla for enabling rolling stops, highlighting a lack of professional competence in ensuring the software's compliance with traffic regulations [122828]. (b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental to some extent. The article mentions that Tesla was not aware of any crashes resulting from the rolling stops enabled by the Full Self-Driving software, suggesting that the unintended consequence of rolling stops was not anticipated or deliberately introduced by the development team [122828]. The decision to allow rolling stops may have been accidental or a result of oversight rather than a deliberate choice to violate traffic regulations. |
| Duration | temporary | The software failure incident related to Tesla's Full Self-Driving software allowing rolling stops at intersections without stopping was temporary. This temporary failure was due to contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances, specifically the software update in October that added driving modes allowing cars to roll through intersections at low speeds [122828]. |
| Behaviour | omission, other | (a) crash: The software failure incident in the article is not related to a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. [122828] (b) omission: The software failure incident in the article is related to omission, as the Full Self-Driving software in Tesla vehicles was allowing "rolling stops" at intersections in violation of traffic regulations, omitting the required stopping behavior. This omission could increase the risk of a crash. [122828] (c) timing: The software failure incident in the article is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. [122828] (d) value: The software failure incident in the article is not related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. [122828] (e) byzantine: The software failure incident in the article is not related to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. [122828] (f) other: The other behavior observed in this software failure incident is the system allowing front passengers or drivers to play video games on the dashboard screen while the Tesla cars were moving, which was considered a safety concern. Tesla agreed to disable this feature in response to the safety agency's investigation. [122828] |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | embedded_software | (a) sensor: The software failure incident related to Tesla's Full Self-Driving software disabling the feature that allowed rolling stops at intersections was not explicitly mentioned to be related to sensor errors. The issue was more about the feature allowing cars to roll slowly through intersections without stopping, which was in violation of traffic regulations. The focus was on the behavior of the software feature rather than sensor errors [Article 122828]. (b) actuator: The articles did not mention any failure related to actuators in the context of the Tesla software incident. The main concern was the behavior of the Full Self-Driving software allowing rolling stops at intersections, which led to the recall of 54,000 cars equipped with the software [Article 122828]. (c) processing_unit: The software failure incident with Tesla's Full Self-Driving software and the issue of rolling stops at intersections did not point to a failure introduced by errors in the processing unit. The focus was on the behavior of the software feature and its compliance with traffic regulations [Article 122828]. (d) network_communication: The articles did not indicate any failure related to network communication errors in the context of the Tesla software incident involving the disabling of the rolling stop feature. The issue was more about the software feature's behavior and its impact on traffic safety [Article 122828]. (e) embedded_software: The software failure incident with Tesla's Full Self-Driving software and the subsequent recall to disable the rolling stop feature can be attributed to errors or issues in the embedded software. The decision to disable the feature was a response to the software allowing cars to roll slowly through intersections without stopping, which raised safety concerns and violated traffic regulations [Article 122828]. |
| Communication | unknown | (a) The failure related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system that failed is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Application | FALSE | The software failure incident reported in Article 122828 regarding Tesla's Full Self-Driving software enabling "rolling stops" at intersections without stopping does not directly indicate that the failure was related to the application layer of the cyber physical system. The issue mentioned in the article seems to be more related to a feature design flaw or incorrect behavior of the software rather than a bug, operating system error, unhandled exception, or incorrect usage typically associated with application layer failures. Therefore, it is unknown if the failure was related to the application layer based on the information provided in the article. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | harm, property, non-human, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident reported in the articles [122828]. (b) harm: The articles mention that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration highlighted the risk of crashes due to the software issue of vehicles rolling slowly through intersections without stopping [122828]. (c) basic: There is no indication that people's access to food or shelter was impacted by the software failure incident [122828]. (d) property: The articles mention that Tesla issued recalls for various software and mechanical defects that could affect safety, indicating potential impact on people's material goods [122828]. (e) delay: There is no mention of any delays caused by the software failure incident in the articles [122828]. (f) non-human: The safety agency opened an investigation into a feature that allowed playing video games on the dashboard screen while Tesla cars were moving, impacting non-human entities (the feature was later disabled) [122828]. (g) no_consequence: The articles do not state that there were no real observed consequences of the software failure incident [122828]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The safety agency raised concerns about Tesla potentially preventing customers from sharing safety information with the agency, indicating a theoretical consequence that did not occur [122828]. (i) other: The articles do not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure incident [122828]. |
| Domain | transportation | (a) The software failure incident reported in the news article is related to the transportation industry. Tesla is recalling 54,000 cars equipped with its Full Self-Driving software due to a feature that allows the vehicles to roll slowly through intersections without stopping, which poses a risk of crashes [Article 122828]. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration criticized Tesla for enabling "rolling stops" in violation of traffic regulations, emphasizing the safety concerns associated with failing to stop at stop signs [Article 122828]. (b) The software failure incident is directly linked to the transportation industry as it involves Tesla vehicles equipped with Full Self-Driving software, which is a technology aimed at enhancing the driving experience and potentially enabling autonomous driving features [Article 122828]. (c) The software failure incident does not pertain to the extraction of materials from Earth (natural resources). (d) The software failure incident is not related to the sales industry, which involves the exchange of money for products. (e) The software failure incident is not associated with the construction industry, which involves creating the built environment. (f) The software failure incident is not connected to the manufacturing industry, which involves creating products from materials. (g) The software failure incident is not related to the utilities industry, which includes power, gas, steam, water, and sewage services. (h) The software failure incident is not linked to the finance industry, which involves manipulating and moving money for profit. (i) The software failure incident is not associated with the knowledge industry, which includes education, research, and space exploration. (j) The software failure incident is not related to the health industry, which encompasses healthcare, health insurance, and food industries. (k) The software failure incident is not connected to the entertainment industry, which includes arts, sports, hospitality, and tourism. (l) The software failure incident is not directly linked to the government industry, which involves politics, defense, justice, taxes, and public services. (m) The failed system in this incident is not related to an industry outside of the options provided in (a) to (l) [Article 122828]. |
Article ID: 122828