Incident: TeslaMate App Vulnerability Allows Unauthorized Control of Tesla Vehicles

Published Date: 2022-01-12

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident where a German teenager found a vulnerability in the TeslaMate app and accessed 25 Teslas happened in January 2022 [Article 124410]. 2. The software failure incident where a 19-year-old hacker claimed to have taken over more than 20 Tesla vehicles through a software vulnerability occurred in December 2021 [Article 122906].
System 1. TeslaMate app [124410, 122906] 2. Third-party software used by Tesla owners [124410, 122906]
Responsible Organization 1. The software failure incident was caused by a vulnerability in a third-party app called TeslaMate, which allowed the German teenager, David Colombo, to exploit the app and gain unauthorized access to Tesla vehicles [124410, 122906]. 2. The fault was attributed to the Tesla owners who used the third-party software incorrectly, leading to the security breach [122906].
Impacted Organization 1. Tesla owners were impacted by the software failure incident [124410, 122906].
Software Causes 1. The software vulnerability was found in the third-party app TeslaMate, which allowed unauthorized access to Tesla vehicles, enabling actions like unlocking doors, flashing headlights, blasting music, and tracking vehicle locations [124410]. 2. The flaw was attributed to how the third-party software stored Tesla owner information, which was needed to link the cars to the program, leading to unauthorized access and control over the vehicles [122906].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of oversight in apps that some drivers can download to their cars [124410] 2. Incorrect configuration by Tesla owners and a third-party software [122906]
Impacts 1. The software vulnerability in the TeslaMate app allowed a German teenager to unlock doors, flash headlights, blast music, and track the location of Tesla vehicles, posing potential risks to drivers and their vehicles [124410]. 2. The hacker was able to take over more than 20 Tesla vehicles in 10 countries, demonstrating the widespread impact of the software vulnerability [122906]. 3. The vulnerability in the third-party software used by Tesla owners allowed unauthorized access to the vehicles, including unlocking doors, starting cars without keys, disabling security systems, and potentially spying on drivers through internal cameras [122906]. 4. The incident raised concerns about the lack of oversight in apps that drivers can download to their cars, highlighting the need for stricter restrictions on apps' access to critical data and commands to prevent future hacks [124410]. 5. The software failure incident emphasized the importance of collaboration between automakers, app makers, and car owners to enhance cybersecurity measures and protect connected vehicles from potential attacks [124410].
Preventions 1. Thoroughly restricting apps' access to data and commands could have prevented the software failure incident [124410]. 2. Implementing stricter scrutiny of third-party software that is allowed to interact with the vehicle's systems could have helped prevent the vulnerability exploited by the hacker [122906]. 3. Developing a system where cars can monitor their apps and shut them down if they are behaving inappropriately could have mitigated the risk of unauthorized access and control [124410]. 4. Creating industry standards and regulations for apps installed in vehicles to ensure cybersecurity best practices are followed could have prevented such incidents [124410]. 5. Enhancing collaboration between automakers, app makers, and car owners to address potential vulnerabilities and improve overall security measures could have been beneficial in preventing similar hacks in the future [124410].
Fixes 1. Implement more stringent restrictions on third-party apps' access to critical data and commands within Tesla vehicles, such as limiting them to viewing data without the ability to perform actions like unlocking doors [124410]. 2. Enhance collaboration between automakers, app makers, and car owners to prevent future hacks, emphasizing the importance of security in the development and deployment of in-car apps [124410]. 3. Develop a system for cars to monitor their apps and shut them down if they are engaging in unauthorized activities, ensuring the safety and security of vehicle systems [124410]. 4. Scrutinize and review apps that end up on vehicles to ensure their safety and compliance with security standards, potentially through a monitoring system that can detect and prevent malicious activities [124410]. 5. Establish industry-wide standards and best practices for cybersecurity in vehicles, including guidelines for apps installed in vehicles to mitigate the risks associated with software vulnerabilities [124410].
References 1. David Colombo, the 19-year-old hacker who identified the vulnerability in the TeslaMate app [124410, 122906] 2. Tesla Product Security Team [122906] 3. Third-party maintainer of the software [122906] 4. Twitter users discussing the incident [122906]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to Tesla vehicles being hacked through a third-party app has happened again within the same organization. A German teenager identified a vulnerability in the TeslaMate app installed in some Teslas, allowing him to unlock doors, flash headlights, blast music, and track the location of Tesla vehicles [124410]. This incident highlights the lack of oversight in apps that drivers can download to their cars. The hacker immediately reported the vulnerability to Tesla, but he was not compensated as the vulnerability was in a third-party app, not Tesla infrastructure. This incident raises concerns about the security of in-car apps and the need for automakers to enhance cybersecurity measures [124410]. (b) The software failure incident involving Tesla vehicles being hacked through a third-party app has also occurred with other organizations or their products and services. The hacker exploited a vulnerability in third-party software, such as Teslamate, which allowed unauthorized access to Tesla vehicles in multiple countries [122906]. The issue was related to how the software stored Tesla owners' information needed to link the cars to the program. This incident demonstrates the risks associated with third-party apps and the importance of scrutinizing apps that end up on vehicles to ensure safety [122906].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to the design phase. The vulnerability exploited by the hacker was found in a third-party app called TeslaMate, which some Tesla owners use to analyze data from their vehicles [124410, 122906]. This vulnerability allowed the hacker to unlock doors, flash headlights, blast music, and track the location of Tesla vehicles. The flaw was related to how the software stored Tesla owner's information needed to link the cars to the program, indicating a design flaw in the third-party software. (b) The software failure incident can also be linked to the operation phase. The hacker was able to take over more than 25 Tesla vehicles in 10 countries through a software vulnerability [122906]. This exploit allowed the hacker to unlock doors, start cars without keys, disable security systems, and even use the internal Tesla cameras to spy on the driver. The issue with the software was how it stored Tesla owner's information, which was needed to link the cars to the program, suggesting operational weaknesses in how the software was being used by Tesla owners.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is primarily within_system. The vulnerability was found in a third-party app called TeslaMate, which some Tesla owners use to analyze data from their vehicles. The hacker, David Colombo, identified this vulnerability in the app, allowing him to access and control certain functions of the Tesla vehicles, such as unlocking doors, flashing headlights, and playing music [124410, 122906]. Colombo reported the vulnerability to Tesla and the third-party maintainer to coordinate disclosure and mitigation efforts [122906]. The flaw was related to how the third-party software stored Tesla owner information, enabling unauthorized access and control over the vehicles [122906]. The incident highlights the risks associated with apps that have direct access to vehicle controls and data, emphasizing the need for stricter access restrictions and security measures within the system to prevent such hacks in the future [124410].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The software vulnerability in the TeslaMate app allowed a German teenager to access and control Tesla vehicles, including unlocking doors, flashing headlights, and playing music without human intervention [124410]. - The flaw was found in third-party software, not directly in Tesla's infrastructure, which stored Tesla owner information in a way that allowed unauthorized access and control of the vehicles [122906]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - The vulnerability in the third-party software, such as TeslaMate, was caused by incorrect configurations made by Tesla owners and the third-party maintainers, which led to unauthorized access and control of the vehicles [122906]. - The issue with how the software stored Tesla owner information was a result of human actions in setting up and using the third-party software, rather than a direct fault in Tesla's infrastructure [122906].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The articles do not provide information about the software failure incident occurring due to contributing factors that originate in hardware. (b) The software failure incident reported in the articles occurred due to contributing factors that originate in software. The incident involved a vulnerability found in a third-party app called TeslaMate, which allowed a 19-year-old hacker to access and control certain functions of Tesla vehicles, such as unlocking doors, flashing headlights, blasting music, and tracking vehicle locations [124410, 122906]. The flaw was related to how the software stored Tesla owner's information, enabling unauthorized access and control over the vehicles. The hacker was able to exploit this vulnerability to manipulate the vehicles through the app, highlighting the risks associated with software vulnerabilities in connected devices like cars.
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involved a 19-year-old hacker, David Colombo, who identified a vulnerability in a third-party app called TeslaMate that allowed him to access and control certain functions of Tesla vehicles, such as unlocking doors, flashing headlights, blasting music, and tracking vehicle locations [124410, 122906]. Colombo exploited this vulnerability to demonstrate the potential risks associated with the lack of oversight in apps that interact with vehicles, highlighting the dangers posed by malicious actors who can manipulate such software for unauthorized access and control.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident in the articles seems to be related to poor decisions made by the Tesla owners and the third-party software developers. The vulnerability that allowed the hacker to take control of Tesla vehicles was attributed to how the third-party software stored Tesla owner's information, which was needed to link the cars to the program [122906]. Additionally, the hacker mentioned that the flaw was not in Tesla's infrastructure but was caused by the Tesla owners and the third-party software [122906]. This indicates that poor decisions in configuring the third-party software and handling sensitive information led to the software failure incident.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: - The vulnerability in the TeslaMate app that allowed the hack to occur was identified by a 19-year-old hacker named David Colombo [124410, 122906]. - The flaw in the third-party software used by Tesla owners was related to how it stored information needed to link the cars to the program, indicating a potential lack of professional competence in handling sensitive data [122906]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: - The hacker, David Colombo, mentioned that the vulnerability was not in Tesla's infrastructure but was caused by the Tesla owners and a third party, suggesting that the incident was accidental rather than intentional [122906]. - Colombo clarified that he was not trying to make the situation look worse than it was and acknowledged the hype and speculation surrounding the incident due to limited details available for public disclosure [122906].
Duration temporary (a) The software failure incident described in the articles appears to be temporary. The incident was caused by a vulnerability in a third-party app called TeslaMate, which allowed a 19-year-old hacker named David Colombo to access and control certain functions of Tesla vehicles. Colombo identified the vulnerability and reported it to Tesla and the third-party maintainer to coordinate disclosure and mitigation efforts [124410, 122906]. The vulnerability was not in Tesla's infrastructure but in the third-party software, indicating that the failure was temporary and specific to the circumstances surrounding the use of that particular app.
Behaviour omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. (b) omission: The incident involves a vulnerability in a third-party app used by Tesla owners, which allowed the hacker to unlock doors, flash headlights, blast music, and track the location of Tesla vehicles. The software omitted to restrict access to critical functions, leading to unauthorized control over the vehicles [124410, 122906]. (c) timing: The incident does not involve a timing failure where the system performs its intended functions too late or too early. (d) value: The software failure incident falls under the category of performing its intended functions incorrectly. The vulnerability in the third-party app allowed the hacker to manipulate various controls of the Tesla vehicles, such as unlocking doors and flashing lights, in an unauthorized manner [124410, 122906]. (e) byzantine: The incident does not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The other behavior observed in this software failure incident is unauthorized access and control over the Tesla vehicles through a third-party app, highlighting the risks associated with insufficient security measures in place for such apps [124410, 122906].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) death: There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident in the articles [124410, 122906]. (b) harm: The articles mention that the software vulnerability allowed the hacker to unlock doors, flash headlights, blast music, and track the location of Tesla vehicles, but there is no specific mention of physical harm caused to individuals due to the software failure [124410, 122906]. (c) basic: The incident did not impact people's access to food or shelter [124410, 122906]. (d) property: The software failure incident did potentially impact people's property, as the hacker was able to unlock doors, start cars without keys, disable security systems, and access internal Tesla cameras [124410, 122906]. (e) delay: There is no mention of people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure incident [124410, 122906]. (f) non-human: The software failure incident impacted Tesla vehicles, as the hacker was able to manipulate various functions of the cars through the vulnerability in the third-party app [124410, 122906]. (g) no_consequence: The articles do not indicate that there were no real observed consequences of the software failure incident [124410, 122906]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The articles discuss potential consequences of the software failure incident, such as the need for automakers to enhance security measures in in-car apps and the risks associated with the increasing use of such apps in vehicles [124410]. (i) other: There is no mention of any other specific consequences of the software failure incident beyond those discussed in the options (a) to (h) [124410, 122906].
Domain transportation, utilities (a) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to the transportation industry. The vulnerability was found in an app called TeslaMate, which is a third-party app used by some Tesla owners to analyze data from their vehicles. The hack allowed unauthorized access to Tesla vehicles, enabling actions such as unlocking doors, flashing headlights, and playing music [124410, 122906]. (g) The incident also has implications for the utilities industry. As cars become more connected and reliant on software, there is a growing need for cybersecurity measures to protect against hacks that could compromise the safety and functionality of vehicles. The article mentions the importance of automakers and app makers collaborating to enhance security measures in the industry [124410]. (m) Additionally, the software failure incident can be linked to the technology industry. The vulnerability in the third-party app used by Tesla owners highlights the risks associated with software vulnerabilities in connected devices and the need for robust cybersecurity measures in the tech sector [124410, 122906].

Sources

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