| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the ZLoader campaign exploiting a Windows flaw that Microsoft fixed back in 2013 has happened again within the same organization or with its products and services. The Check Point researchers believe that the recent ZLoader campaign was perpetrated by the criminal hackers known as MalSmoke, who have a history of using similar techniques and have used ZLoader in past campaigns as well as other malware like "Smoke Loader" [123187].
(b) The software failure incident related to the ZLoader campaign exploiting a Windows flaw that Microsoft fixed back in 2013 has also happened at multiple organizations or with their products and services. The Check Point researchers noted that other recent ZLoader attacks from an array of actors have used various methods to distribute the malware, such as malicious word processing documents, tainted websites, and malicious ads [123187]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the ZLoader campaign discussed in Article 123187. The incident involved attackers exploiting a gap in Microsoft's signature verification, which is a design flaw in the system development. The attackers were able to manipulate a legitimate DLL file by appending a malicious script without impacting Microsoft's stamp of approval, highlighting a flaw in the design of the signature verification process [123187].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also present in the ZLoader campaign. The attackers needed to install ZLoader without detection by Windows Defender or other malware scanners, which indicates a failure in the operation or misuse of the system. This failure allowed the attackers to successfully plant their malware on devices without being blocked by security measures, showcasing an operational flaw in the system [123187]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the ZLoader campaign exploiting a Windows flaw can be categorized as within_system. The hackers took advantage of a gap in Microsoft’s signature verification process to plant their malware by modifying a legitimate Dynamic-link library (DLL) file without impacting Microsoft's stamp of approval [123187]. This indicates that the failure originated from within the system itself, specifically from a vulnerability in the software's verification process. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 123187 occurred due to non-human actions. Specifically, the incident was caused by the exploitation of a Windows flaw that Microsoft had fixed back in 2013. Hackers abused a gap in Microsoft’s signature verification process to plant their malware by modifying a legitimate Dynamic-link library (DLL) file without impacting Microsoft's stamp of approval [123187]. This non-human action of exploiting a vulnerability in the software led to the successful infiltration of the ZLoader malware.
(b) The software failure incident in Article 123187 was not directly caused by human actions. However, it is worth noting that the failure could have been prevented or mitigated if users and system administrators had applied the fix released by Microsoft in 2013 to address the vulnerability. The lack of awareness or action by humans in enabling the security update contributed to the continued exploitation of the flaw by hackers [123187]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article discusses a ZLoader campaign that infected almost 2,200 victims in 111 countries by abusing a Windows flaw that Microsoft fixed back in 2013. Hackers exploited a gap in Microsoft’s signature verification, which is a hardware-related issue, to plant their malware by modifying a legitimate Dynamic-link library (DLL) file [Article 123187].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The failure in this incident primarily originated in software, specifically in the form of a flaw in Microsoft's signature verification process that allowed attackers to manipulate a legitimate DLL file to plant malware. This flaw was exploited by hackers to bypass malware detection tools and install ZLoader on victims' devices [Article 123187]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The objective of the software failure incident was malicious, as the ZLoader campaign exploited a Windows flaw to infect victims with malware, specifically targeting victims in the United States, Canada, and India [123187]. The attackers took advantage of a gap in Microsoft’s signature verification to plant their malware in a legitimate DLL file without being detected by Windows Defender or other malware scanners. This deliberate act by the hackers aimed to compromise devices and gain control over them for criminal activities such as stealing sensitive data and conducting ransomware attacks. The attackers, identified as the criminal hacking group MalSmoke, have a history of using similar techniques to distribute malware and have targeted victims through various means like malicious word processing documents, tainted websites, and malicious ads.
(b) The software failure incident was not non-malicious; it was a deliberate act by hackers to exploit a known vulnerability in Windows systems for malicious purposes [123187]. The attackers manipulated a legitimate DLL file by appending a malicious script to it, taking advantage of a flaw that Microsoft had fixed in 2013 but was not widely implemented by users and system administrators. This intentional exploitation of the vulnerability highlights the malicious intent behind the software failure incident, as the attackers sought to bypass security measures and infect devices with malware for their criminal activities. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
- The software failure incident involving the ZLoader malware campaign exploiting a Windows flaw that Microsoft fixed in 2013 can be attributed to poor_decisions. Microsoft initially released a fix in 2013 to address the vulnerability in its code-signing process called "Authenticode." However, in 2014, Microsoft revised its plan and made the update optional due to concerns about the impact on existing software, leading to a situation where the fix was not widely implemented. This decision resulted in the vulnerability persisting and being actively exploited by hackers in targeted attacks [123187]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the ZLoader campaign that exploited a Windows flaw fixed by Microsoft back in 2013. Hackers were able to abuse a gap in Microsoft’s signature verification, allowing them to modify a legitimate Dynamic-link library (DLL) file signed by Microsoft to plant their malware [123187]. This incident highlights the consequences of not enforcing stricter verification processes and the potential risks associated with overlooking vulnerabilities in software development.
(b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is seen in Microsoft's decision to make the 2013 fix for the Windows flaw optional instead of pushing it to all Windows users. This choice was made due to concerns about the high impact on existing software, causing false positives where legitimate files were flagged as potentially malicious. As a result, many Windows devices likely do not have the fix enabled, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation by attackers [123187]. This accidental oversight in the implementation of the fix contributed to the ongoing vulnerability exploited in the ZLoader campaign. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the article is more of a permanent nature. The incident involves a long-standing flaw in Microsoft's code-signing process, specifically related to Authenticode, which was fixed in 2013 but remains unaddressed in many Windows devices due to users and system administrators not enabling the fix [123187]. This indicates that the contributing factors leading to the software failure are persistent and ongoing, making it a permanent issue. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and stops performing its intended functions.
(b) omission: The failure in this incident is not due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s).
(c) timing: The failure is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early.
(d) value: The software failure incident in the article is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Hackers exploited a flaw in Microsoft's signature verification process to append a malicious script to a legitimate DLL file, allowing them to plant malware without being detected by Windows Defender or other malware scanners [123187].
(e) byzantine: The failure does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in this case is related to exploiting a vulnerability in the system's security measures to bypass malware detection tools and install malicious software without being detected [123187]. |