| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident at Service NSW seems to have happened before within the same organization. The article mentions that the payment system crashed, causing chaos and long queues at its offices. Customers were frustrated with the situation, with one person stating that the issue had not been resolved despite Service NSW claiming it was fixed. This indicates a recurring issue with the payment system at Service NSW [123625].
(b) There is no specific mention in the article about similar incidents happening at other organizations or with their products and services. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident at Service NSW, where the payment system crashed, can be attributed to the design phase. The incident was caused by an issue with the payment systems, affecting various services such as renewing driver's licenses and getting identity cards [123625]. This indicates that the failure was due to contributing factors introduced during system development or updates.
(b) Additionally, the software failure incident can also be linked to the operation phase. Customers reported long queues and chaos at Service NSW offices due to the payment system crash, leading to delays in processing services like working with children checks [123625]. This aspect highlights that the failure was influenced by factors related to the operation or misuse of the system. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident, in this case, the crash of Service NSW's payment system, was due to factors originating from within the system itself. The article mentions that Service NSW's payment system crashed, causing chaos and long queues at its offices [Article 123625]. Additionally, Service NSW acknowledged the issue and stated that the outage with its payment systems had been restored, indicating an internal system failure that was later resolved [Article 123625].
(b) outside_system: There is no specific mention in the article about the software failure incident being caused by contributing factors originating from outside the system. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was due to non-human actions, specifically a crash in Service NSW's payment system that caused chaos and long queues at its offices [123625]. The outage with the payment systems was later restored by Service NSW, indicating that the issue was resolved without direct human intervention in the system failure. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 123625 was primarily due to a software issue rather than hardware. The incident involved the payment system of Service NSW crashing, leading to long queues and chaos at their offices. Service NSW acknowledged the issue with their payment systems and mentioned that electronic payments had been restored by 2.30pm [123625]. This indicates that the root cause of the failure was related to the software system rather than hardware issues. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident reported in Article 123625 does not indicate any malicious intent behind the failure. The incident seems to be a non-malicious failure caused by technical issues within the payment system of Service NSW, leading to chaos, long queues, and inconvenience for customers [123625]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident at Service NSW, where the payment system crashed, leading to chaos and long queues, could be attributed to poor decisions. Customers were frustrated as they were unable to make payments for services like renewing driver's licenses or getting identity cards. One customer requested Service NSW to use their social media accounts to inform customers about the payment system issue and its resolution [Article 123625]. This lack of proactive communication and the resulting inconvenience caused by the crash could indicate poor decisions made in managing the software system. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in Article 123625 was not explicitly attributed to development incompetence. The article mainly focused on the consequences of the payment system crash at Service NSW, the long queues, delays in services, and the inconvenience caused to customers. There was no mention of the failure being directly linked to incompetence in development.
(b) The software failure incident in Article 123625 was described as an accidental event where the payment system at Service NSW crashed, leading to chaos, long queues, and delays in processing payments and services. The article highlighted how customers were caught off guard by the sudden failure, leading to frustration and inconvenience. The cause of the outage was not explicitly mentioned, but it was portrayed as an unexpected event that impacted the organization and its customers. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident reported in Article 123625 was temporary. The incident caused chaos and long queues at Service NSW offices, affecting anyone needing to make a payment. Customers were forced to leave and use ATMs for cash payments as the payment system crashed. Service NSW acknowledged the issue and later claimed that electronic payments had been restored by 2.30pm on the same day [123625]. This indicates that the software failure was temporary and not permanent. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the Service NSW payment system resulted in a crash, causing chaos and long queues at its offices. Customers were unable to make payments for services like renewing a driver's license or getting an identity card due to the system losing its state and not performing its intended functions [123625].
(b) omission: The payment system crash led to the omission of the system to perform its intended functions at that instance. Customers were unable to complete transactions, leading to delays in services like working with children checks being processed [123625].
(c) timing: There is no specific mention of the software failure incident being related to timing issues in the articles.
(d) value: The software failure incident did not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly.
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit behaviors of the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The other behavior observed during the software failure incident was the system requiring customers to resort to using cash or cheques instead of electronic payments, indicating a disruption in the normal payment process [123625]. |