| Recurring |
unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems machines used in Georgia has not been reported to have happened again within the same organization or with its products and services [123671].
(b) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems machines used in Georgia has not been reported to have happened again at other organizations or with their products and services [123671]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles seems to be related to the design phase. The voting technology expert, J. Alex Halderman, identified "multiple severe security flaws" in the Dominion Voting Systems machines used in Georgia and other states, which could allow attackers to install malicious software [Article 123671]. The vulnerabilities were discovered during a 12-week examination of the voting machines, indicating that the flaws were introduced during the development or design phase of the system.
(b) There is no specific information in the articles indicating that the software failure incident was due to factors introduced by the operation or misuse of the system. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in this case is related to security vulnerabilities in the voting machines used by Georgia, as identified by the voting technology expert J. Alex Halderman. Halderman's report detailed multiple severe security flaws in the Dominion Voting Systems machines, which could allow attackers to install malicious software [123671].
(b) outside_system: The incident also involves external factors such as the legal proceedings and decisions regarding the disclosure of the report. U.S. District Judge Amy Totenberg expressed concerns about the report being exploited by bad actors if made public, indicating a consideration of external threats beyond the system itself [123671]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case appears to be related to non-human actions, specifically vulnerabilities in the voting machines identified by the voting technology expert, J. Alex Halderman. Halderman identified "multiple severe security flaws" in the Dominion Voting Systems machines used in Georgia and other states, which could allow attackers to install malicious software [Article 123671].
(b) Human actions also played a role in this incident as there were disputes and legal proceedings regarding the release of the report detailing the security vulnerabilities in the voting machines. Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger called for the public release of the report, while there were objections and delays in making the report public by various parties involved in the lawsuit [Article 123671]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The article does not provide information about the software failure incident occurring due to hardware issues [123671].
(b) The software failure incident reported in the article is related to software vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems machines identified by J. Alex Halderman. Halderman identified "multiple severe security flaws" in the voting machines that would allow attackers to install malicious software [123671]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is related to potential malicious intent. The voting technology expert, J. Alex Halderman, identified "multiple severe security flaws" in the Dominion Voting Systems machines used in Georgia and other states that would allow attackers to install malicious software [Article 123671]. The incident involves vulnerabilities that could be exploited by bad actors, as mentioned by the U.S. District Judge Amy Totenberg and the concern that the report could be exploited by bad actors [Article 123671].
(b) There is no indication in the articles that the software failure incident was due to non-malicious factors. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor decisions can be inferred from the article. The failure was due to contributing factors introduced by poor decisions made in the handling of the report detailing alleged security vulnerabilities in the voting machines used by Georgia. The report by J. Alex Halderman, a voting technology expert, was initially filed under seal in federal court in Atlanta, classified as "attorneys' eyes only," meaning only the lawyers and experts could see it, not the actual parties to the case [Article 123671]. This decision to keep the report confidential and not disclose it publicly led to a situation where the parties involved, including the state's lawyers and Dominion, had seen the report, but no one in the secretary of state's office had seen it. This lack of transparency and decision to keep the report private despite calls for public disclosure contributed to the software failure incident in this case. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as it discusses the alleged security vulnerabilities identified by voting technology expert J. Alex Halderman in the Dominion Voting Systems machines used in Georgia and other states. Halderman identified "multiple severe security flaws" that could allow attackers to install malicious software [Article 123671].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident in this case appears to be more of a permanent nature. The voting technology expert, J. Alex Halderman, identified "multiple severe security flaws" in the Dominion Voting Systems machines used in Georgia and other states [Article 123671]. These vulnerabilities were described as allowing attackers to install malicious software, indicating a fundamental issue with the security of the voting machines. The fact that the report highlighted specific vulnerabilities and ways they could be exploited suggests a long-standing and inherent problem with the system rather than a temporary glitch or error.
(b) There is no specific mention in the article of the software failure incident being temporary. The focus is more on the identified security vulnerabilities in the voting machines, which are described as severe and potentially exploitable by attackers. This indicates a more permanent issue with the software rather than a temporary failure caused by specific circumstances. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The incident described in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [123671].
(b) omission: There is no specific mention of the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) in the article [123671].
(c) timing: The failure described in the article does not involve the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early [123671].
(d) value: The software failure incident in the article does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [123671].
(e) byzantine: The behavior of the software failure incident in the article does not align with the definition of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [123671].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a failure related to security vulnerabilities in the voting machines used by the state, as identified by the voting technology expert J. Alex Halderman. The failure is related to potential risks and flaws in the system that could allow attackers to install malicious software, rather than a specific behavior like crash, omission, timing, or byzantine behavior [123671]. |