| Recurring |
unknown |
The articles do not mention any specific instances of the software failure incident happening again at one organization or multiple organizations. Therefore, the information related to these options is unknown. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the Formula One race, specifically related to the failure to let all cars unlap themselves following the deployment of the safety car, was attributed to human error introduced by the manual process of identifying lapped cars. The report mentioned that "human error lead to the fact that not all cars were allowed to un-lap themselves" and highlighted the need for software development to automate the communication of the list of cars that must unlap themselves in the future [125315].
(b) The operation-related contributing factors to the software failure incident involved the distracting radio exchanges from Mercedes and Red Bull personnel with the race director, Michael Masi, during the race. The pressure and communication from the teams during the race influenced Masi's decisions, ultimately leading to the failure to allow all cars to unlap themselves as intended. This operational aspect of the incident was highlighted in the report, mentioning the immense pressure applied by the teams on Masi during the race [125315]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the boundary of the system can be categorized as within_system. The failure was attributed to "human error" from the race director, Michael Masi, in not allowing all cars to unlap themselves following the deployment of the safety car [125315]. This human error in identifying lapped cars manually led to the failure, prompting the development of software to automate the communication of the list of cars that must unlap themselves in the future [125315]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily attributed to non-human actions. The report highlighted that "human error" from Michael Masi led to the failure to let all cars unlap themselves, as the process of identifying lapped cars was manual and not all cars were allowed to un-lap themselves due to this manual intervention. As a result, software has been developed to automate the communication of the list of cars that must un-lap themselves to prevent such errors in the future [125315].
(b) However, human actions also played a significant role in the failure incident. The article mentioned that Michael Masi, the race director, came under immense pressure from distracting radio exchanges from Mercedes and Red Bull during the race. The pressure applied by personnel from both teams over the radio influenced Masi's decisions, ultimately leading to the failure in allowing all cars to unlap themselves. Additionally, the report acknowledged the immense pressure being applied by the teams on Masi during the race, which contributed to the challenging circumstances he faced in making decisions under significant time constraints [125315]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in the Abu Dhabi race was not directly attributed to hardware issues but rather to human error in the manual process of identifying lapped cars. The report highlighted that the process of identifying lapped cars was manual, leading to human error in not allowing all cars to un-lap themselves. To mitigate this risk of human error, software has been developed to automate the communication of the list of cars that must un-lap themselves in the future [125315].
(b) The software failure incident in the Abu Dhabi race was primarily attributed to human error in the manual process of identifying lapped cars. The report mentioned that human error led to the failure of not allowing all cars to un-lap themselves. To address this issue, software has been developed to automate the communication of the list of cars that must un-lap themselves in the future. Additionally, the 2022 Formula 1 Sporting Regulations have been updated to clarify that all cars, not just any cars, must be permitted to un-lap themselves, indicating a software-related change to prevent similar incidents in the future [125315]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case was non-malicious. The failure was attributed to "human error" from the race director, Michael Masi, who failed to let all cars unlap themselves following the deployment of the safety car. The incident was described as a result of manual interventions that carried a higher risk of human error, leading to the decision to develop software to automate the communication of the list of cars that must un-lap themselves in the future [125315]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
The software failure incident related to the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix race director's decision not to let all cars unlap themselves was primarily attributed to poor decisions rather than accidental decisions. The failure was a result of human error in manually identifying lapped cars, leading to not all cars being allowed to un-lap themselves. As a response to this, software has been developed to automate the communication of the list of cars that must un-lap themselves in the future, indicating a recognition of the need to address the poor decision-making process that contributed to the failure [125315]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the Formula One race was attributed to human error in the manual process of identifying lapped cars, leading to not all cars being allowed to un-lap themselves. This manual intervention carried a higher risk of human error, prompting the development of software to automate the communication of the list of cars that must un-lap themselves in the future [125315].
(b) The incident also involved accidental factors, such as the immense pressure faced by the race director from distracting radio exchanges from Mercedes and Red Bull personnel during the race. This pressure contributed to the decision-making process that ultimately led to the software failure incident where only specific cars were allowed to un-lap themselves, impacting the race outcome [125315]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident related to the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix race involved a temporary failure. The failure was attributed to human error in the manual process of identifying lapped cars, which led to not all cars being allowed to un-lap themselves. As a result, software has been developed to automate the communication of the list of cars that must un-lap themselves in the future races [125315]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in this case did not involve a crash where the system lost state and did not perform any of its intended functions. The failure was related to human error in allowing cars to unlap themselves during a safety car period, leading to an unfair advantage for one driver over another [125315].
(b) omission: The software failure incident can be categorized as an omission where the system omitted to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The failure occurred because not all cars were allowed to unlap themselves due to human error in the manual process of identifying lapped cars. This omission led to an unfair advantage for one driver in the championship race [125315].
(c) timing: The software failure incident can also be attributed to timing issues where the system performed its intended functions, but too late or too early. The report on the incident was released just two hours before qualifying for the new season, which was a poor reflection on the FIA given that the controversy unfolded 97 days earlier. The timing of the report was criticized for being delayed [125315].
(d) value: The software failure incident did not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The issue was more related to the omission of allowing all cars to unlap themselves, leading to an unfair advantage, rather than the system providing incorrect outputs [125315].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit behavior characteristic of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The failure was more straightforward, involving human error in the manual process of identifying lapped cars, which led to an unfair advantage for one driver in the championship race [125315].
(f) other: The software failure incident can be described as a failure resulting from a combination of human error, manual processes, and time constraints rather than a specific behavior outlined in options (a) to (e). The incident highlighted the need for automation in the communication of the list of cars that must unlap themselves to avoid similar issues in the future [125315]. |