| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to security vulnerabilities in wireless home alarm systems has been reported to have occurred with multiple organizations. The researchers found identical problems in all the wireless alarm systems they examined, including those made by ADT, Vivint, a third unidentified company, and Swann [28132].
(b) The incident has also been reported to have happened with multiple organizations. The researchers found that more than half a dozen popular systems used in Australia, including ones made by Swann and other Australian firms, exhibited the same security vulnerabilities in their wireless alarm systems [28132]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the articles. The security vulnerability in wireless home alarm systems was due to a design flaw where the systems failed to encrypt or authenticate the signals being sent from sensors to control panels, making it easy for attackers to intercept the data, decipher the commands, and play them back to control panels at will. This design flaw allowed for false alarms to be triggered and for the alarm to be suppressed without proper authentication [28132].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase can also be identified in the articles. The vulnerability in the systems allowed for the operation of intercepting unencrypted signals and discovering stored passwords on the devices, which could be used to arm and disarm the alarm systems without proper authentication. This operation flaw enabled attackers to defeat the security of the systems by capturing and replaying codes transmitted in the clear via radio frequency [28132]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident discussed in the articles is primarily within the system. The vulnerability lies in the wireless alarm systems themselves, specifically in the lack of encryption and authentication of signals being sent from sensors to control panels. This flaw allows attackers to intercept the data, decipher the commands, and play them back to control panels at will, leading to false alarms or the suppression of alarms [28132]. Additionally, the use of fixed codes for arming and disarming alarms without encryption makes the systems vulnerable to replay attacks, further highlighting the internal weaknesses of the software systems [28132]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure in this case was primarily due to vulnerabilities in wireless home alarm systems that allowed for easy subversion and manipulation of the alarm signals without human participation. The systems failed to encrypt or authenticate the signals being sent from sensors to control panels, making it easy for someone to intercept the data, decipher the commands, and play them back to control panels at will. Additionally, the signals could be jammed to prevent alarms from triggering, further highlighting the non-human action aspect of the failure [28132].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The software failure incident also involved human actions contributing to the failure. For example, the researchers found that most of the systems they examined used only a single code for arming and disarming alarms, making it easy for attackers to capture and replay these codes to defeat the security of the systems. Additionally, manufacturers chose the easier method of implementing fixed codes instead of more secure rolling codes, prioritizing convenience over security, which was a human decision that contributed to the vulnerability of the systems [28132]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The incident involved wireless home alarm systems that were vulnerable to attacks due to hardware-related issues such as lack of encryption and authentication in the signals sent between sensors and control panels [28132].
- Researchers used hardware tools like software-defined radios (SDRs) to intercept and replay communications, demonstrating vulnerabilities in the hardware components of the alarm systems [28132].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident was primarily caused by software-related issues such as the lack of encryption and authentication in the signals sent between sensors and control panels, making it easy for attackers to intercept and manipulate the data [28132].
- The vulnerability in the software of the alarm systems allowed for the interception of unencrypted signals and the discovery of stored passwords, compromising the security of the systems [28132]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The security researchers discovered vulnerabilities in wireless home alarm systems that could be easily exploited by attackers to suppress alarms, create false alarms, intercept unencrypted signals, and even discover stored passwords on the devices. These vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to enter a home undetected, disable the alarm system, and potentially carry out criminal activities without being noticed. The incident highlights how the lack of encryption, authentication, and proper security measures in these systems can be exploited by malicious actors to compromise the security of individuals' homes [28132]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was not due to poor decisions but rather due to inherent vulnerabilities in the design and implementation of the wireless home alarm systems. The failure was a result of the lack of encryption and authentication in the signals being sent from sensors to control panels, making it easy for attackers to intercept and manipulate the data [28132]. Additionally, the use of fixed codes for arming and disarming the alarms, as well as the storage of passwords in an insecure manner, contributed to the vulnerability of the systems [28132]. These issues were not a result of poor decisions but rather a lack of robust security measures in the design and implementation of the alarm systems. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to development incompetence. The security researchers found that the wireless home alarm systems from various brands, including ADT, Vivint, and Swann, had critical vulnerabilities due to the lack of encryption and authentication in the signals being sent from sensors to control panels. This allowed attackers to easily intercept, decipher, and replay the commands to control panels, leading to false alarms or suppression of alarms [28132]. The lack of proper security measures in these systems indicates a failure in professional competence during the development of the alarm systems.
(b) Additionally, the vulnerabilities discovered in the home alarm systems, such as the lack of encryption, the use of fixed codes for arming and disarming, and the ability to capture stored passwords, can also be considered as accidental failures. These weaknesses were likely not intentionally designed into the systems but rather resulted from inadequate security practices or oversights during the development process [28132]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles seems to be more of a permanent failure. The security vulnerability in the wireless home alarm systems, as highlighted by the researchers, is a fundamental flaw in the design and implementation of these systems. The lack of encryption and authentication in the signals being sent from sensors to control panels makes it easy for attackers to intercept and manipulate the data, leading to a persistent security risk. Additionally, the researchers found that even the countermeasures implemented in some systems could be bypassed, indicating a systemic issue in the security protocols of these devices [28132]. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident is more related to security vulnerabilities in wireless home alarm systems that can be easily subverted, intercepted, and manipulated by attackers [28132].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the vulnerability lies in the lack of encryption and authentication in the signals being sent from sensors to control panels, allowing attackers to intercept and replay commands to trigger false alarms [28132].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to a failure due to the system performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early. The focus is on the lack of security measures in the wireless alarm systems that make them vulnerable to manipulation and interception by attackers [28132].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The issue lies in the lack of encryption and authentication in the signals of the wireless alarm systems, making them susceptible to unauthorized access and manipulation [28132].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The vulnerability in the wireless home alarm systems allows attackers to intercept and replay signals, leading to false alarms and potential security breaches [28132].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability that exposes the wireless home alarm systems to potential attacks. Attackers can easily subvert the alarms, suppress them, create false alarms, and even discover stored passwords, compromising the security of the systems [28132]. |