Incident: Fatal Medication Error Due to Inadequate Drug Search Functionality

Published Date: 2022-04-28

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident where a nurse administered a fatal dose due to a drug mix-up in a hospital's computerized medication cabinet happened more than four years ago, as mentioned in the article [127019]. 2. Published on 2022-04-28 3. Estimated Timeline: The incident occurred more than four years ago from the publication date of the article, which would place the software failure incident in early 2018.
System The software failure incident described in the article involves the failure of medication cabinet software systems in hospitals. Specifically, the following systems/components failed: 1. Omnicell and BD medication cabinets' search functionality allowing nurses to search with only two or three letters, leading to the selection of the wrong drug [127019]. 2. Lack of a mandatory five-letter search requirement in medication cabinets to prevent drug mix-ups [127019]. 3. Failure of some hospitals to activate the five-letter search safety feature in Omnicell cabinets, leading to workflow problems and spelling errors [127019]. 4. Omnicell cabinets allowing searches with a single letter by default, potentially contributing to errors [127019]. 5. Instances where nurses struggled with spelling drug names due to the five-letter search requirement, potentially causing delays and errors [127019].
Responsible Organization 1. The hospital medication cabinets' software design allowed for the software failure incident to occur, as nurses were able to search for drugs with as few as two or three letters, leading to potential mix-ups [127019].
Impacted Organization 1. Nurses at hospitals [127019]
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was the design flaw in the computerized medication cabinets that allowed nurses to search for drugs with only two or three letters, leading to the selection of the wrong drug [127019].
Non-software Causes 1. Human error in typing the wrong drug name into the computerized medication cabinet [127019] 2. Misspelling of drug names by hospital staff [127019] 3. Staffing shortages leading to increased likelihood of mistakes [127019]
Impacts 1. The software failure incident led to a fatal dose being administered to a patient by nurse RaDonda Vaught, resulting in a criminal trial for medical mistake and her conviction of criminally negligent homicide and gross neglect of an impaired adult [127019]. 2. The incident highlighted the vulnerability in computerized medication cabinets where searching with only two or three letters could lead to administering the wrong drug, potentially causing harm to patients [127019]. 3. Following the incident, safety advocates pushed for requiring nurses to type in at least five letters of a drug's name when searching hospital cabinets to prevent similar errors in the future [127019]. 4. The software failure incident prompted the two biggest cabinet companies, Omnicell and BD, to agree to update their machines to include a five-letter search feature, although the safeguard is turned off by default [127019]. 5. Implementing the five-letter search feature in medication cabinets was seen as a step towards enhancing safety in hospitals, despite potential challenges such as spelling errors or delays in drug retrieval [127019].
Preventions 1. Requiring nurses to type in at least five letters of a drug's name when searching hospital cabinets could have prevented the incident of administering the wrong drug, as suggested by safety advocates and experts [127019]. 2. Implementing a five-letter search feature in medication cabinets through software updates, as done by companies like Omnicell and BD, could significantly reduce the likelihood of errors when selecting drugs from the cabinets [127019]. 3. Making the five-letter search feature mandatory or the default setting in medication cabinets, rather than optional, would enhance safety and reduce the risk of medication mix-ups [127019].
Fixes 1. Requiring nurses to type in at least five letters of a drug's name when searching hospital cabinets could prevent errors like the one that led to the fatal dose given by RaDonda Vaught [127019]. 2. Implementing a five-letter search feature in medication cabinets as a standard practice could significantly reduce the likelihood of drug mix-ups [127019]. 3. Updating software in medication cabinets to require a minimum of five letters for drug searches, as demonstrated by Omnicell and BD, could enhance safety in hospitals [127019].
References 1. Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) [127019] 2. ECRI [127019]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the medication mix-up at hospitals has happened again at Ballad Health, a chain of 21 hospitals in Tennessee and Virginia. Ballad Health activated the five-letter search feature on their Omnicell cabinets after the incident involving nurse RaDonda Vaught. The CEO of Ballad Health, Alan Levine, mentioned that many nurses were misspelling drug names, such as morphine, and the transition to the five-letter search feature revealed that even highly trained professionals can be bad spellers [127019]. (b) The software failure incident related to medication mix-ups at hospitals has also happened at other hospitals besides the one involving nurse RaDonda Vaught. According to a review of reports provided by the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP), there have been at least seven other incidents of hospital staffers searching medication cabinets with three or fewer letters and then administering or nearly administering the wrong drug. These incidents were reported by front-line health care workers to ISMP, indicating that similar incidents have occurred at multiple hospitals [127019].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the case of the medication cabinets used in hospitals. The incident involving nurse RaDonda Vaught occurred due to a flaw in the design of the medication cabinet software. The system allowed nurses to search for drugs with as few as two letters, leading to the selection of the wrong drug and resulting in a fatal dose being administered to a patient [127019]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the misuse or operation of the medication cabinets by hospital staff. Several incidents were reported where hospital staffers searched for medications with three or fewer letters and ended up administering or nearly administering the wrong drug due to the ease of selecting the wrong drug based on incomplete search terms. This misuse of the system during operation led to medication mix-ups and potential harm to patients [127019].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident discussed in the articles is primarily within the system. The failure occurred due to the design flaw in the medication cabinets' software, specifically the search functionality that allowed nurses to search for drugs with as few as one to three letters, leading to medication mix-ups [127019]. The incident highlights how the software design within the medication cabinets contributed to the errors made by hospital staff members, emphasizing the need for improvements in the software to prevent such mistakes in the future.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: The incident described in the article is related to a software failure caused by a design flaw in the computerized medication cabinets used in hospitals. Specifically, the incident involved nurses being able to search for drugs with as few as two or three letters, leading to the selection of the wrong medication and potentially harmful outcomes for patients. The vulnerability in the software design allowed for the possibility of selecting the wrong drug based on incomplete search criteria, highlighting a non-human action contributing to the failure [127019]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: The software failure incident also involved human actions contributing to the failure. In the case of the nurse RaDonda Vaught, the initial error was made when she inadvertently withdrew the wrong drug from the cabinet after typing just two letters. This human action of selecting the medication based on incomplete search criteria set the stage for subsequent errors in administering the incorrect drug, ultimately leading to a fatal outcome for the patient. The incident underscores the importance of human actions in the chain of events that resulted in the software failure [127019].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The article does not mention any software failure incident occurring due to contributing factors originating in hardware. Therefore, there is no information available to support this option. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The software failure incident discussed in the article is related to a medication mix-up caused by the software design of computerized medication cabinets. Nurses were able to select the wrong drug from the search results by typing in only a few letters, leading to potentially fatal errors [127019].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) non-malicious (a) The incident described in the article is non-malicious. It involved a nurse, RaDonda Vaught, who made a fatal medication error by selecting the wrong drug from a hospital's computerized medication cabinet due to the system's vulnerability in allowing searches with only two letters. This error led to the administration of a fatal dose to a patient. The software vulnerability that allowed this error was not intentionally introduced to harm the system but was a design flaw that persisted in many U.S. hospitals, leading to similar incidents [127019]. (b) The incident was not caused by malicious intent but rather by a software design flaw that allowed for the error to occur. The focus of the article is on improving the software systems in hospitals to prevent such errors in the future, indicating a non-malicious nature of the failure incident.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions: The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to poor decisions made in the design and implementation of the medication cabinets' software. Specifically, the incident where a nurse inadvertently administered the wrong drug was a result of the software allowing searches with only two or three letters, leading to confusion between similarly named drugs like metronidazole and metformin [127019]. (b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions: The software failure incident can also be attributed to accidental decisions or mistakes made by hospital staff. For example, the nurse who administered the wrong drug did so accidentally after typing in just two letters, which led to the fatal medication error. Additionally, the article mentions instances where hospital employees mixed up drugs due to similar names, highlighting the accidental nature of these errors [127019].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident occurring due to development incompetence: The incident involving the Tennessee nurse RaDonda Vaught giving a patient a fatal dose due to a drug mix-up was attributed to a software vulnerability in the computerized medication cabinets. The error occurred because nurses were able to search for drugs with as few as two or three letters, leading to the selection of the wrong medication. Safety advocates highlighted that requiring nurses to type in at least five letters of a drug's name could prevent such errors, emphasizing the lack of professional competence in the design of the software [127019]. (b) The software failure incident occurring accidentally: The incident involving the nurse RaDonda Vaught giving a patient a fatal dose was described as a medical mistake that occurred due to a software vulnerability in the hospital's computerized medication cabinets. The error was unintentional and accidental, as Vaught inadvertently selected the wrong drug from the search results. The software flaw that allowed for such mistakes was not intentional but rather a design flaw that made it easy for users to make errors accidentally [127019].
Duration temporary The software failure incident discussed in the articles is more related to a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. This temporary failure was due to contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances but not all. The incident involved a nurse inadvertently administering the wrong drug due to the software's search functionality allowing searches with too few letters, leading to medication mix-ups. The articles highlight how the software update requiring a minimum of five letters for drug searches was implemented to address this issue and improve patient safety [127019].
Behaviour crash, omission, value, other (a) crash: The incident involving the Tennessee nurse RaDonda Vaught and the fatal drug mix-up can be categorized as a crash. The software failure in this case led to a critical error where the nurse inadvertently withdrew the wrong drug from the medication cabinet after typing just two letters, resulting in a fatal dose to the patient [127019]. (b) omission: The software failure incident can also be categorized as an omission. The failure occurred when hospital staff members searched medication cabinets with three or fewer letters and then administered or nearly administered the wrong drug due to the system omitting to perform its intended function of providing accurate search results based on the input [127019]. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not align with the timing behavior as described. The issue was not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early. (d) value: The software failure incident can be categorized as a value failure. The system performed its intended function of displaying search results based on the input letters, but it did so incorrectly, leading to the selection of the wrong drug by the hospital staff members [127019]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not align with the byzantine behavior as described. The system did not exhibit inconsistent responses or interactions in this case. (f) other: The other behavior observed in this software failure incident is related to the need for a software update to enhance the search functionality of medication cabinets. The incident highlighted the importance of requiring nurses to type in at least five letters of a drug's name to prevent errors, indicating a need for system improvement to ensure patient safety [127019].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence death, harm (a) death: The consequence of the software failure incident reported in the articles was the death of a patient. In the incident involving nurse RaDonda Vaught, she administered a fatal dose of the wrong drug to a patient due to a software vulnerability that allowed for the selection of the wrong medication from the search results [127019].
Domain health The software failure incident reported in the news article is related to the **health** industry. The incident involved a nurse making a fatal medication error due to a software vulnerability in the hospital's computerized medication cabinet system [Article 127019]. The incident highlighted the importance of implementing safeguards in medication cabinets to prevent such errors in healthcare settings.

Sources

Back to List