Incident: Counter-terrorism IT System Failure Impacts Manchester Arena Bombing Investigation

Published Date: 2022-04-12

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident with the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) happened in 2014 [126700].
System 1. National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) - The key intelligence database used by police to investigate extremists was not fit for purpose and had serious flaws [126700].
Responsible Organization 1. The National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) system introduced in 2014 was responsible for causing the software failure incident [126700].
Impacted Organization 1. Police forces across the UK 2. Counter Terrorism Policing 3. Metropolitan Police 4. Families of victims of the Manchester Arena bombing 5. National security efforts in the UK [Cited from Article 126700]
Software Causes 1. Inconsistent results and data discrepancies during searches conducted on the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) [126700] 2. Data being accidentally overwritten with no way to monitor alterations [126700] 3. Ability to edit intelligence files without the ability to undo the changes [126700]
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of proper training and testing procedures before the deployment of the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) system [126700]. 2. Roll-out of the NCIA system to police forces before all faults had been corrected [126700]. 3. Failure to act on highly relevant intelligence received in the months before the attack [126700]. 4. Inadequate information sharing and coordination between different agencies such as MI5 and counter-terrorism police [126700].
Impacts 1. The National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) used by police to investigate extremists was "not fit for purpose" and had serious flaws, including being clunky, clumsy, producing inconsistent results, allowing data to be destroyed, and lacking monitoring capabilities [126700]. 2. The faulty NCIA system was rolled out to police forces before the issues were corrected, potentially contributing to the failure to prevent the Manchester Arena bombing in 2017, which resulted in the deaths of 22 people [126700]. 3. The software failure incident led to concerns that the flaws in the NCIA system could have played a part in the failure to stop the attack, causing emotional distress to individuals like former detective constable Tony Thorne who had raised concerns about the system [126700]. 4. The public inquiry into the Manchester Arena bombing revealed that there were "multiple opportunities to uncover and prevent the outrage" but failures in intelligence handling, including the shortcomings of the NCIA system, may have contributed to the attack not being prevented [126700].
Preventions 1. Conducting thorough testing and validation of the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) before its rollout to ensure it was fit for purpose and free of critical flaws [126700]. 2. Implementing proper monitoring and auditing mechanisms within the NCIA system to prevent unauthorized access, data alteration, and accidental data destruction [126700]. 3. Addressing and rectifying identified issues and concerns raised by individuals like Tony Thorne regarding the functionality and reliability of the NCIA system before its deployment to police forces [126700]. 4. Ensuring that intelligence handling processes are robust, efficient, and interconnected to prevent gaps in information sharing and analysis, which could potentially lead to failures in preventing terror attacks [126700].
Fixes 1. Conduct a thorough review and overhaul of the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) system to address the serious flaws and inconsistencies reported by former officer Tony Thorne [126700]. 2. Implement robust testing procedures to ensure that the intelligence software produces consistent and accurate results, especially when multiple users are conducting identical searches [126700]. 3. Enhance data security measures within the NCIA system to prevent accidental data destruction or unauthorized alterations, such as implementing strict access controls and audit trails [126700]. 4. Prioritize the correction of identified faults and deficiencies in the NCIA system before widespread deployment to ensure that the software is indeed fit for purpose and does not pose risks to national security [126700].
References 1. Former counter-terrorism officer Tony Thorne [126700] 2. Counter Terrorism Policing [126700] 3. Government spokesperson [126700] 4. Lawyers for families of victims [126700] 5. Father of Saffie Roussos, Andrew Roussos [126700] 6. MI5 [126700]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization (a) The software failure incident related to the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) used by police to investigate extremists was reported to have serious flaws and was not fit for purpose when introduced in 2014 [126700]. Former counter-terrorism officer Tony Thorne raised concerns about faults in the intelligence software, including issues such as producing inconsistent results, allowing data to be destroyed, and lacking monitoring capabilities. Thorne mentioned that the NCIA system was rolled out too quickly and put to use before faults had been corrected, indicating a failure within the organization responsible for its development and implementation. (b) The article does not provide specific information about similar incidents happening at other organizations or with their products and services.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the case of the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) used by police for counter-terrorism purposes. Former detective constable Tony Thorne highlighted serious flaws in the intelligence software, mentioning that during the pilot project in 2013, users conducting identical searches yielded different results, indicating inconsistencies in the system's design [126700]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is demonstrated by the fact that the NCIA system allowed data to be destroyed as users could accidentally overwrite it, with no way of monitoring if any information had been altered. This flaw in the operation of the system was identified during testing, where Mr. Thorne accessed an intelligence file, edited it, and found that it couldn't be unedited, indicating operational issues with data integrity and security [126700].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) used by police to investigate extremists was primarily due to contributing factors that originated from within the system itself. Former counter-terrorism officer Tony Thorne highlighted serious flaws within the NCIA, such as being "clunky," "clumsy," producing inconsistent results, allowing data to be destroyed or altered easily, and lacking proper monitoring capabilities [126700]. These issues were intrinsic to the design and functionality of the NCIA, indicating that the failure was primarily within the system itself.
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically flaws in the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) system. The former counter-terrorism officer highlighted serious flaws in the intelligence software, such as producing inconsistent results, allowing data to be destroyed, and lacking monitoring capabilities [126700]. (b) However, human actions also played a role in the software failure incident. The former detective constable, Tony Thorne, raised concerns about the faults in the NCIA system to his bosses in 2014 but felt that the system was rolled out too quickly and put to use before the faults had been corrected. He expressed his worries that the faults he had warned about could have played a part in the failure to stop the Manchester Arena bombing [126700].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) system, which was the software involved in the failure incident, had serious flaws such as allowing data to be destroyed as users could accidentally overwrite it, and there was no way of monitoring if any information had been altered [126700]. - Former detective constable Tony Thorne mentioned that during a pilot project in 2013, users sitting side-by-side at computer terminals were watched while they conducted identical searches. When these searches yielded different results, it raised concerns about the system [126700]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The NCIA system was described as "clunky", "clumsy", and producing inconsistent results by former officer Tony Thorne [126700]. - Tony Thorne highlighted that the system allowed data to be destroyed, could not be unedited once edited, and was not fit for purpose from the very start [126700].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) non-malicious (a) The software failure incident related to the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) used by police to investigate extremists was non-malicious. The former counter-terrorism officer Tony Thorne highlighted serious flaws in the NCIA system, such as being "clunky", "clumsy", producing inconsistent results, allowing data to be destroyed accidentally, and lacking monitoring capabilities [126700]. These issues were not introduced with malicious intent but rather stemmed from design and implementation shortcomings in the software.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The intent of the software failure incident was poor_decisions. Former counter-terrorism officer Tony Thorne highlighted that the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) used by police to investigate extremists was "not fit for purpose" when introduced in 2014 due to serious flaws [126700]. Thorne mentioned that the system allowed data to be destroyed as users could accidentally overwrite it, and there was no way of monitoring if any information had been altered. He also emphasized that the NCIA was rolled out too quickly and put to use before faults had been corrected, indicating poor decision-making in the deployment of the software.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence, accidental (a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the case of the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) used by police for investigating extremists. Former counter-terrorism officer Tony Thorne highlighted serious flaws in the intelligence software, including issues such as inconsistent results, data destruction, inability to monitor alterations, and the system allowing users to edit intelligence files without the ability to undo the changes [126700]. (b) The software failure incident also involved accidental factors, as users of the NCIA system could accidentally overwrite data, leading to potential loss of information. This accidental aspect of the failure was highlighted by the ability of users to edit intelligence files without a mechanism to reverse those changes, as mentioned by former detective constable Tony Thorne during his testing of the system [126700].
Duration permanent, temporary (a) The software failure incident related to the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) used by police to investigate extremists was more of a permanent failure. Former counter-terrorism officer Tony Thorne highlighted serious flaws in the NCIA system when it was introduced in 2014, mentioning issues such as data inconsistencies, the ability to accidentally overwrite data, and the lack of monitoring for alterations [126700]. These fundamental flaws in the system design and functionality indicated that the software was not fit for its intended purpose from the start. Additionally, delays in the system rollout and the deployment of the system before correcting faults further emphasized the permanent nature of the failure. (b) The software failure incident could also be considered temporary to some extent as Counter Terrorism Policing mentioned that "substantial improvements" were made following a significant review after terror attacks in 2017, including at the Manchester Arena [126700]. This suggests that while the initial implementation of the NCIA system was flawed and led to significant issues, efforts were made to address and improve the system over time. The temporary nature of the failure can be seen in the fact that improvements were implemented to enhance counter-terrorism work in the years following the initial deployment of the system.
Behaviour crash, omission, other (a) crash: The software failure incident related to the National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA) involved a crash behavior where the system lost state and did not perform its intended functions. Former detective constable Tony Thorne mentioned that during a pilot project in 2013, users sitting side-by-side at computer terminals were watched while they conducted identical searches. However, the searches yielded different results, indicating a crash in the system. Thorne also highlighted that the system allowed data to be destroyed as users could accidentally overwrite it, and there was no way of monitoring if any information had been altered, further indicating a crash behavior [126700]. (b) omission: The software failure incident also involved an omission behavior where the system omitted to perform its intended functions at instances. Tony Thorne mentioned that during the pilot project, the system allowed data to be destroyed as users could accidentally overwrite it, indicating an omission in the system's functionality [126700]. (c) timing: There is no specific information in the provided article indicating a timing-related failure. (d) value: The software failure incident did not involve a failure due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not involve a failure due to the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The other behavior observed in the software failure incident was related to the system being described as "clunky," "clumsy," and producing inconsistent results. This behavior could be categorized as a general usability issue affecting the overall performance and user experience of the system [126700].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence death, harm, theoretical_consequence (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure The consequence of the software failure incident mentioned in the articles is the loss of lives due to the Manchester Arena bombing on 22 May 2017, where 22 people were killed [126700]. The father of the youngest victim criticized the counter-terrorism police and MI5 for not acting on relevant intelligence that could have potentially prevented the attack, indicating that lives were lost as a result of the failure to prevent the bombing.
Domain government The failed system, National Common Intelligence Application (NCIA), was intended to support the government sector, specifically the counter-terrorism efforts within the police forces across the UK [126700]. The system was designed to allow police forces to share secret intelligence seamlessly in order to investigate extremists and prevent terror attacks. The NCIA system was a key intelligence database used by police for counter-terrorism purposes, highlighting its direct relevance to the government sector and national security.

Sources

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