| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in electronic voting machines from Dominion Voting Systems has happened again within the same organization. The vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems’ equipment were highlighted in a report by University of Michigan computer scientist J. Alex Halderman, who has long argued against using digital technology for voting due to security concerns [127755].
b) While the specific incident mentioned in the article pertains to Dominion Voting Systems, the expert involved, J. Alex Halderman, expressed concerns about systemic problems in the development, testing, and certification of election equipment from various vendors. Halderman suggested that if other vendors' equipment were subjected to similar testing, serious problems could likely be found as well [127755]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the vulnerabilities identified in the Dominion Voting Systems' equipment. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) detailed nine vulnerabilities in the machines, including the potential spread of malicious code from the election management system to machines throughout a jurisdiction, allowing for the alteration of recorded votes or identification of voters' secret ballots [127755].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by concerns about possible meddling by election insiders, such as the case of Mesa County Clerk Tina Peters in Colorado. Peters, who had access to the voting machines, appeared at an election symposium and was later barred from overseeing the upcoming election in her county. This situation underscores the risks associated with individuals with operational access potentially compromising the system [127755]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the electronic voting machines from Dominion Voting Systems was primarily due to software vulnerabilities within the system itself. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) detailed nine vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems' equipment that could be exploited by attackers, such as spreading malicious code, forging technician cards, and altering recorded votes [127755]. These vulnerabilities were identified by a computer scientist, J. Alex Halderman, who highlighted the risks associated with using digital technology for voting and emphasized the importance of implementing multiple safeguards to prevent exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Additionally, the incident involved concerns about the security of the voting machines and the potential for exploitation by hostile actors, including nation-states or election insiders [127755].
(b) outside_system: While the software failure incident primarily stemmed from vulnerabilities within the Dominion Voting Systems' equipment, there were external factors contributing to the overall context of the incident. For example, there were concerns about possible meddling by election insiders, as highlighted by the indictment of Mesa County Clerk Tina Peters in Colorado, who had access to the voting machines and appeared at events related to election conspiracy theories [127755]. Additionally, the incident occurred within the broader context of misinformation and disinformation surrounding elections, with CISA trying to balance the need for action by election officials without causing public alarm [127755]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is primarily related to non-human actions, specifically software vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems' equipment that leave them susceptible to hacking if unaddressed. The vulnerabilities were identified through testing by a computer scientist, J. Alex Halderman, and were not introduced by human actions but rather existed within the software itself [127755].
(b) However, human actions can also play a role in exploiting these vulnerabilities. For example, attackers could exploit the vulnerabilities by spreading malicious code from the election management system to machines throughout a jurisdiction, either through physical access or by remotely infecting other systems connected to the internet. Additionally, attackers could forge cards used in the machines by technicians to gain access and alter the software, potentially impacting election results [127755]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The software vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems' equipment could potentially allow malicious code to be spread from the election management system to machines throughout a jurisdiction, which could be exploited by someone with physical access or by someone who is able to remotely infect other systems connected to the internet [127755].
- One of the vulnerabilities identified could allow an attacker to forge cards used in the machines by technicians, giving the attacker access to a machine that would allow the software to be changed [127755].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The vulnerabilities identified in the Dominion Voting Systems' equipment were primarily due to software vulnerabilities that could be exploited by sophisticated attackers, such as hostile nation states or election insiders, leading to serious consequences like altering recorded votes or identifying voters' secret ballots [127755].
- The advisory issued by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) highlighted nine software vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems' equipment and recommended protective measures to prevent or detect their exploitation [127755]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious, non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to the vulnerabilities in Dominion Voting Systems' electronic voting machines can be categorized as potentially malicious. The vulnerabilities identified in the machines could allow for malicious code to be spread, forged cards to be used by attackers, and ballots to be altered or votes to be identified inconsistently with voters' intent [127755]. These vulnerabilities could be exploited by sophisticated attackers, hostile nation states, or election insiders, leading to serious consequences if not addressed. Additionally, concerns about possible meddling by election insiders were raised in the context of the incident, further indicating a potential for malicious exploitation [127755].
(b) The software failure incident can also be viewed as non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerabilities were not necessarily introduced with the intent to harm the system. The vulnerabilities were identified through testing by a computer scientist and expert witness, J. Alex Halderman, who has long argued that using digital technology for voting is inherently risky due to the vulnerabilities of computers [127755]. The incident highlights the importance of multiple safeguards and proper security measures in place to prevent exploitation, indicating that the vulnerabilities may have been a result of oversight or inadequate security practices rather than intentional harm. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
- The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in Dominion Voting Systems' electronic voting machines was not due to poor decisions but rather due to inherent vulnerabilities in the digital technology used for recording votes [127755].
- The vulnerabilities in the voting machines were identified through testing by a computer scientist and expert witness, J. Alex Halderman, who has long argued that using digital technology for voting is dangerous due to the inherent vulnerability of computers to hacking [127755].
- The vulnerabilities were not a result of poor decisions but rather a consequence of using digital technology that can be exploited by sophisticated attackers, hostile nation states, or election insiders [127755].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
- The software failure incident was not due to accidental decisions but rather due to the vulnerabilities inherent in the Dominion Voting Systems' electronic voting machines [127755].
- The vulnerabilities identified in the machines were not accidental but were deliberate weaknesses that could be exploited by attackers with physical or remote access to the systems [127755].
- The vulnerabilities were not introduced accidentally but were a result of the design and implementation of the voting machines, which could allow for malicious code to be spread and for ballots to be altered or votes to be manipulated [127755]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the vulnerabilities found in the Dominion Voting Systems' equipment. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) identified nine vulnerabilities in the voting machines, including the potential spread of malicious code, the ability to forge technician cards, and the risk of altering recorded votes [127755]. These vulnerabilities were highlighted by University of Michigan computer scientist J. Alex Halderman, who emphasized the dangers of using digital technology for voting and the need for multiple safeguards that were not uniformly followed. The incident underscores systemic problems in the development, testing, and certification of election equipment, indicating a lack of professional competence in ensuring the security of voting systems.
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is not explicitly mentioned in the articles. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles seems to be more of a permanent nature. The vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems' equipment identified by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) are inherent to the software and could potentially be exploited by sophisticated attackers or election insiders [127755]. These vulnerabilities, if not addressed, could have serious consequences and pose a risk to election integrity. Additionally, the concerns raised by experts like J. Alex Halderman about the security of digital voting technology and the need for multiple safeguards indicate that the software vulnerabilities are not temporary issues but rather fundamental flaws in the system [127755]. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article is not described as a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [127755].
(b) omission: The software failure incident in the article is not described as an omission where the system omits to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) [127755].
(c) timing: The software failure incident in the article is not described as a timing issue where the system performs its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early [127755].
(d) value: The software failure incident in the article is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, which could be categorized as a failure due to the system providing incorrect value [127755].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident in the article is not described as a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions [127755].
(f) other: The software failure incident in the article involves vulnerabilities in electronic voting machines that could potentially be exploited by sophisticated attackers, election insiders, or hostile nation states, leading to serious consequences such as altering recorded votes or identifying voters' secret ballots. This behavior could be categorized as a failure due to potential malicious exploitation of the system [127755]. |