| Recurring |
unknown |
<Article 128194> The article discusses a software failure incident related to a human error in the Juno cryptocurrency blockchain. The incident involved a developer inadvertently copying and pasting the wrong wallet address, leading to $36 million in crypto being sent to an inaccessible address. This incident highlights the challenge of reversing transactions on a blockchain due to its immutable nature. The incident also points out that none of the network validators caught the mistake, emphasizing the importance of validators in verifying transactions on a blockchain. The article mentions that blockchain developers have found ways to reverse transactions in the past, such as the case when Ethereum developers had to "hard fork" their blockchain to recover stolen funds in 2016. In the case of Juno, the incident is expected to be resolved through a governance model where token holders can vote to alter blockchain transactions and a software update will be implemented to recover the funds [128194].
Regarding the software failure incident happening again at one_organization or multiple_organization, the article does not provide specific information about similar incidents happening before within the same organization (one_organization) or at other organizations (multiple_organization). Therefore, the information to determine if similar incidents have occurred again at one_organization or multiple_organization is unknown based on the provided article. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in the Juno cryptocurrency case was primarily due to a design-related issue. A developer inadvertently copy and pasted the wrong wallet address, leading to $36 million in crypto being sent to an inaccessible address. This mistake occurred during the transfer process, which was a result of human error in copying and pasting the incorrect information provided by another developer [128194].
(b) The software failure incident in the Juno cryptocurrency case did not involve operation-related factors such as misuse of the system. The failure was primarily attributed to a design flaw in the transfer process, where the wrong wallet address was copied and pasted, resulting in the funds being sent to an inaccessible address [128194]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to the Juno cryptocurrency sending $36 million in crypto to an inaccessible address was primarily within the system. The incident occurred due to human error where a developer inadvertently copy and pasted the wrong wallet address, leading to the funds being sent to an inaccessible address [128194]. Additionally, the lack of validation by any of the 125 network validators also contributed to the failure within the system, as none of them caught the mistake during the transaction process [128194]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the Juno cryptocurrency case was primarily due to non-human actions. Specifically, the incident occurred because a developer inadvertently copy and pasted the wrong wallet address, leading to $36 million in crypto being sent to an inaccessible address. This mistake was not intentional but rather a result of copying and pasting the hash number instead of the correct wallet address [128194].
(b) However, human actions also played a role in the failure incident. The human error of copying and pasting the wrong address was a critical factor in the incident. Additionally, the developer responsible for the transfer failed to verify the accuracy of the address before initiating the transaction. Furthermore, the lack of validation by any of the 125 network validators also contributed to the failure, indicating a potential oversight in human actions [128194]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in the Juno cryptocurrency case was not directly attributed to hardware issues. The incident occurred due to human error where a developer mistakenly copy and pasted the wrong wallet address, leading to $36 million in crypto being sent to an inaccessible address [128194].
(b) The software failure incident in the Juno cryptocurrency case was primarily attributed to a software error. The mistake occurred when a developer inadvertently copied and pasted a hash number instead of the correct wallet address, resulting in the transfer of funds to an inaccessible address. Additionally, the lack of validation by the network validators also contributed to the failure, as none of the 125 validators caught the mistake during the transaction process [128194]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious, non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in the Juno cryptocurrency involved a malicious aspect where around 3 million Juno tokens, worth $36 million, were to be seized from an investor deemed to have acquired the tokens via malicious means. This decision was made through a community vote [128194].
(b) The software failure incident also had a non-malicious aspect where the failure occurred due to human error. A developer inadvertently copy and pasted the wrong wallet address, leading to $36 million in crypto being sent to an inaccessible address. The mistake was attributed to the developer accidentally copying and pasting a hash number instead of the correct wallet address [128194]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
The software failure incident involving the Juno cryptocurrency was primarily due to poor decisions made by a developer who inadvertently copy and pasted the wrong wallet address during a transfer of $36 million in crypto. This mistake led to the funds being sent to an inaccessible address, causing a significant issue for the project [128194]. Additionally, the fact that none of the network validators caught the mistake also points to a lapse in oversight and validation processes, highlighting further poor decisions in the incident.
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
The software failure incident can also be attributed to accidental decisions made by the developer responsible for the transfer. The mistake of copying and pasting the hash number instead of the correct wallet address was unintentional, leading to the erroneous transfer of funds. This accidental decision resulted in the $36 million crypto being sent to an inaccessible address, showcasing the impact of unintended errors in software operations [128194]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the Juno cryptocurrency occurred due to development incompetence. A developer inadvertently copy and pasted the wrong wallet address, leading to $36 million in crypto being sent to an inaccessible address. This mistake was attributed to the developer's error in copying and pasting the hash number instead of the correct wallet address, despite being provided with the correct information by Andrea Di Michele, one of Juno's founding developers [128194].
(b) The software failure incident in the Juno cryptocurrency also involved accidental factors. The incorrect transfer of $36 million in crypto was a result of the developer accidentally copying and pasting the hash number instead of the correct wallet address. This accidental error led to the funds being sent to an inaccessible address, highlighting the impact of human error in software transactions [128194]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the article is more aligned with a temporary failure rather than a permanent one. The incident occurred due to a specific human error where a developer inadvertently copy and pasted the wrong wallet address, leading to $36 million in crypto being sent to an inaccessible address [128194]. This specific circumstance of human error contributed to the failure, and the article suggests that the issue can be resolved with a software update and a majority vote from token holders to alter blockchain transactions. This indicates that the failure is not permanent but can be rectified through specific actions within a certain timeframe. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value |
(a) crash: The incident described in the article does not involve a system crash where the system loses state and stops performing its intended functions.
(b) omission: The software failure incident in the article can be categorized as an omission. The failure occurred when a developer inadvertently copy and pasted the wrong wallet address, leading to $36 million in crypto being sent to an inaccessible address [128194].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to timing issues where the system performs its intended functions but at the wrong time.
(d) value: The software failure incident is related to a value issue where the system performed its intended function (sending funds) but did so incorrectly by sending the funds to the wrong address due to human error [128194].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a value-related failure due to the incorrect performance of the system's intended function of transferring funds [128194]. |