Recurring |
unknown |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in Dominion Voting Systems' ballot-marking devices has not happened again within the same organization as per the provided articles [127593].
(b) The incident involving software vulnerabilities in Dominion Voting Systems' devices has not been reported to have occurred at multiple organizations or with their products and services in the articles provided [127593]. |
Phase (Design/Operation) |
design |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to the design phase. The vulnerabilities in certain ballot-marking devices made by Dominion Voting Systems were discovered during a security assessment conducted by a University of Michigan computer scientist at the behest of plaintiffs in a lawsuit against Georgia’s Secretary of State. The vulnerabilities could potentially allow a malicious actor to tamper with the devices by altering QR codes printed by the ballot-marking devices, leading to discrepancies between the codes and the votes recorded by the voters [127593].
(b) The software failure incident is not related to the operation phase but rather to vulnerabilities in the design of the Dominion ballot-marking devices. |
Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the Dominion Voting Systems' ballot-marking devices was primarily due to vulnerabilities within the system itself. The vulnerabilities in the Dominion ballot-marking devices, specifically the Democracy Suite ImageCast X, were discovered during a security assessment conducted by a University of Michigan computer scientist. The vulnerabilities could potentially allow a malicious actor to tamper with the devices by altering QR codes printed by the ballot-marking devices, leading to discrepancies between the recorded votes and the voter's choices [127593]. The CISA advisory highlighted these vulnerabilities and mentioned that states' standard election security procedures could detect and prevent exploitation of these vulnerabilities, making it unlikely that they could impact an election [127593].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident was also influenced by external factors, particularly the context surrounding Dominion Voting Systems and the ongoing controversy related to election fraud claims. The Dominion voting equipment, including the ballot-marking devices, has been the target of conspiracy theories and false claims of large-scale fraud in the 2020 election. The potential weaponization of news about the vulnerabilities by election deniers ahead of midterm elections indicates how external factors such as misinformation and political motivations can impact the perception and handling of software vulnerabilities [127593]. |
Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is primarily due to non-human actions, specifically software vulnerabilities in certain ballot-marking devices made by Dominion Voting Systems. These vulnerabilities were discovered during a security assessment conducted by a University of Michigan computer scientist, J. Alex Halderman, who had physical access to the Dominion ballot-marking devices. The vulnerabilities could potentially allow a malicious actor to tamper with the devices, although exploiting them would require physical access to the voting equipment or other extraordinary criteria [127593].
(b) Human actions also play a role in this incident as the vulnerabilities in the Dominion ballot-marking devices were discovered through a security assessment conducted by a computer scientist at the behest of plaintiffs in a lawsuit against Georgia’s Secretary of State. Additionally, the Mitre Corp. conducted a review of Georgia's election systems, which showed that existing procedural safeguards make it extremely unlikely for any bad actor to exploit vulnerabilities, indicating the importance of human actions in implementing and maintaining security protocols [127593]. |
Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The software vulnerabilities in certain ballot-marking devices made by Dominion Voting Systems were discovered during a security assessment conducted by a University of Michigan computer scientist who was given physical access to the devices over several weeks [127593].
- The vulnerabilities would require physical access to voting equipment or other extraordinary criteria to be exploited, which standard election security practices prevent [127593].
- Dominion has provided updates to the machines to address the vulnerability, indicating a hardware-related mitigation effort [127593].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The vulnerabilities in the Dominion ballot-marking devices were identified as software vulnerabilities that could potentially allow a malicious actor to tamper with the devices [127593].
- The vulnerabilities were related to the software flaws that could be used to alter QR codes printed by the ballot-marking devices, potentially leading to discrepancies between the recorded votes and the printed codes [127593].
- The CISA advisory highlighted the existence of vulnerabilities in the election technology but emphasized that the vulnerabilities being present did not indicate exploitation or impact on election results, pointing to the software-related risks [127593]. |
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident related to the vulnerabilities in Dominion Voting Systems' ballot-marking devices was not due to malicious intent. The vulnerabilities were discovered during a security assessment conducted by a University of Michigan computer scientist at the behest of plaintiffs in a lawsuit against Georgia’s Secretary of State. The vulnerabilities could potentially allow a malicious actor to tamper with the devices, but the analysis from the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency stated that the vulnerabilities have never been exploited in an election and would require physical access to the voting equipment or other extraordinary criteria [127593].
(b) The software failure incident was non-malicious in nature as there was no evidence of the vulnerabilities being exploited in any elections. The vulnerabilities were identified through a security assessment, and the CISA advisory emphasized that the existence of a vulnerability in election technology is not evidence that the vulnerability has been exploited or that the results of an election have been impacted. The vulnerabilities were addressed through updates provided by Dominion Voting Systems to mitigate the risks [127593]. |
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
unknown |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
The software failure incident related to the vulnerabilities in Dominion Voting Systems' ballot-marking devices was not due to poor decisions but rather due to the discovery of software vulnerabilities in the devices. The vulnerabilities were identified during a security assessment conducted by a University of Michigan computer scientist at the behest of plaintiffs in a lawsuit against Georgia’s Secretary of State [127593]. The vulnerabilities were not exploited in any elections, and federal cybersecurity officials emphasized that standard election security practices would prevent exploitation of these vulnerabilities [127593].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
The software failure incident was not due to accidental decisions but rather due to the discovery of software vulnerabilities in Dominion Voting Systems' ballot-marking devices. The vulnerabilities were identified during a security assessment conducted by a University of Michigan computer scientist at the behest of plaintiffs in a lawsuit against Georgia’s Secretary of State [127593]. The vulnerabilities were not exploited in any elections, and federal cybersecurity officials emphasized that standard election security practices would prevent exploitation of these vulnerabilities [127593]. |
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article [127593].
(b) The software failure incident related to accidental factors is highlighted in the article. The vulnerabilities in certain ballot-marking devices made by Dominion Voting Systems were discovered during a controversial Georgia court case. These vulnerabilities could potentially allow a malicious actor to tamper with the devices, although exploiting them would require physical access to the voting equipment or other extraordinary criteria. The vulnerabilities have not been exploited in any election, and federal cybersecurity officials are working closely with election officials to address these vulnerabilities and ensure the security and resilience of US election infrastructure [127593]. |
Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles is more aligned with a temporary failure. The vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems' ballot-marking devices were discovered during a court case in Georgia, and while they could theoretically allow tampering with the devices, exploiting them would require physical access to the voting equipment or other extraordinary criteria. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) emphasized that these vulnerabilities have not been exploited in any elections and that standard election security practices would prevent such exploitation [127593]. Additionally, the vulnerabilities were addressed through updates provided by Dominion, and existing procedural safeguards were highlighted as making it extremely unlikely for any bad actor to exploit the vulnerabilities [127593]. |
Behaviour |
omission, other |
(a) crash: The articles do not mention any instance of a system crash where the software completely loses its state and fails to perform any of its intended functions.
(b) omission: The software vulnerability incident related to Dominion Voting Systems' ballot-marking devices could potentially lead to the omission of performing its intended functions correctly. The vulnerabilities discovered could allow a malicious actor to tamper with the devices, altering QR codes printed by the ballot-marking devices so that they do not match the vote recorded by the voter [Article 127593].
(c) timing: There is no indication in the articles that the software failure incident was related to timing issues where the system performed its intended functions but at incorrect times.
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly in terms of the value it provides.
(e) byzantine: The software vulnerability incident does not exhibit behaviors of inconsistency or erratic responses that would classify it as a byzantine failure.
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in this case is related to potential vulnerabilities in the Dominion Voting Systems' ballot-marking devices that could allow for tampering with the devices, potentially leading to discrepancies between the QR codes printed and the actual votes recorded by voters [Article 127593]. |