| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the digital driver's licenses in New South Wales, Australia, has happened again within the same organization, ServiceNSW. The incident involved the ease with which fake identities could be forged using the digital driver's licenses, highlighting significant security flaws in the system [127908]. The incident showcases how the lack of adequate encryption, failure to validate data against the back-end database, and other design flaws allowed fraudsters to manipulate the digital driver's licenses with minimal effort, compromising the security and authenticity of the system.
(b) There is no specific information in the provided article about the software failure incident happening again at multiple organizations or with their products and services. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the flaws identified in the Digital Driver's License (DDL) system rolled out by the government of New South Wales in Australia. Security researchers found that the DDL system had design flaws such as inadequate encryption using a four-digit PIN, lack of validation of DDL data against the back-end database, failure to refresh data stored in the electronic credential, and the QR code transmitting limited information that can be easily manipulated by fraudsters [127908].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the ease with which fraudsters could exploit the flaws in the DDL system. The operation failure was due to the fact that the DDL data was never validated against the back-end database, allowing attackers to display falsified data on the Service NSW application without detection. Additionally, the pull-to-refresh function failed to update the data stored in the electronic credential, making it easier for fraudsters to manipulate the information [127908]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the digital driver's licenses in New South Wales, Australia, was primarily due to contributing factors that originated from within the system itself. Security researchers identified various design flaws within the Digital Driver's Licence (DDL) system that allowed forgeries to be created easily. These flaws included inadequate encryption using a four-digit PIN, lack of validation of DDL data against the back-end database, failure to refresh data stored in the electronic credential, limitations in the QR code transmission, and the ability for the app to back up and restore data, making it susceptible to manipulation [127908]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in the article was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically design flaws in the digital driver's license (DDL) system. These design flaws included inadequate encryption using a four-digit PIN, lack of validation of DDL data against the back-end database, failure of the pull-to-refresh function to update data, limited information transmitted by the QR code, and the ability to back up and restore data stored by the app [127908].
(b) However, human actions also played a role in the software failure incident as security researchers identified and exploited these design flaws to forge fake identities using the DDL system. The researcher demonstrated how a fraudster could manipulate the encrypted DDL data by brute-forcing the PIN, modifying the data, and presenting a fake ID as genuine [127908]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The software failure incident in the article is not directly attributed to hardware issues but rather to design flaws and lack of adequate encryption in the digital driver's license system [127908].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident in the article is primarily due to contributing factors that originate in software, such as lack of adequate encryption, failure to validate data against the back-end database, and flaws in the DDL verification scheme [127908]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is malicious. Security researchers have demonstrated that it is trivial for individuals to forge fake identities using the digital driver's licenses (DDLs) created by the government of New South Wales in Australia. The flaws in the DDL system allow fraudsters to easily change their date of birth and create fake IDs that pass inspection by the electronic verification system used by police and other venues [127908].
The incident involves intentional actions by individuals to exploit vulnerabilities in the system for fraudulent purposes, indicating a malicious intent to deceive and potentially harm the system's security and integrity. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was due to poor_decisions introduced by the design flaws in the Digital Driver's License (DDL) system implemented by the government of New South Wales. The flaws included inadequate encryption using a four-digit PIN, lack of validation of DDL data against the back-end database, failure of the pull-to-refresh function to update data, limited information transmitted by the QR code, and allowing data stored in the app to be easily backed up and restored [127908]. These poor decisions led to the vulnerability of the system, allowing forgeries and fraudulent activities to be carried out with minimal effort. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in this case can be attributed to development incompetence. Security researchers discovered significant flaws in the digital driver's licenses (DDLs) rolled out by the government of New South Wales in Australia. These flaws allowed forgeries of fake identities with minimal effort, undermining the promised security enhancements compared to traditional plastic driver's licenses. The flaws included inadequate encryption using a four-digit PIN, lack of validation against the back-end database, failure to refresh data properly, and the ability to easily back up and restore falsified data [127908]. These issues point to a lack of professional competence in designing and implementing secure software systems.
(b) The software failure incident can also be categorized as accidental, as the flaws in the DDL system were not intentional but rather resulted from oversight and inadequate security measures during the development process. The ease with which fraudsters could exploit the system to create fake IDs was not a deliberate design choice but a consequence of unintentional vulnerabilities in the software. The flaws were identified by security researchers who highlighted the weaknesses in the system, indicating that the failures were not intentional but rather a result of accidental oversights and shortcomings in the development process [127908]. |
| Duration |
permanent |
(a) The software failure incident in this case appears to be permanent. The security researchers have identified significant flaws in the design of the digital driver's licenses (DDLs) that make it trivial for fraudsters to forge fake identities using the system. These flaws include inadequate encryption, lack of validation against the back-end database, failure to refresh data properly, and the ability to easily back up and restore falsified data [127908]. The ease and effectiveness of the hack suggest that the vulnerabilities are inherent to the system and not easily mitigated, indicating a permanent failure. |
| Behaviour |
value |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. Instead, the incident involves a flaw in the design and implementation of the digital driver's license system that allows forgeries to be created easily [127908].
(b) omission: The failure is not due to the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). The flaw in the system allows fraudsters to modify and forge digital driver's licenses, indicating a failure in the security and validation mechanisms of the system [127908].
(c) timing: The failure is not related to the system performing its intended functions too late or too early. Instead, the issue lies in the system's vulnerability to manipulation and forgery, compromising the security and authenticity of the digital driver's licenses [127908].
(d) value: The software failure incident is primarily related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The flaw in the system allows individuals to generate fraudulent digital driver's licenses with minimal effort, undermining the security claims made by the government [127908].
(e) byzantine: The failure is not characterized by the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The primary issue is the ease with which fraudsters can manipulate and forge digital driver's licenses, indicating a fundamental flaw in the system's design and security measures [127908].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a failure due to a significant design flaw in the digital driver's license system. The lack of adequate encryption, failure to validate data against the backend database, shortcomings in the refresh mechanism, and the ability to back up and restore falsified data all contribute to the vulnerability of the system to fraudulent activities [127908]. |