| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the Emergency Alert System (EAS) encoder/decoder devices has happened before within the same organization. The vulnerabilities in the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net DASDEC EAS, which is a type of emergency alert system encoder and decoder, were confirmed by multiple researchers and have not been patched for several years, leading to a significant flaw [131024].
(b) The software failure incident related to the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the EAS encoder/decoder devices has also happened at multiple organizations. Federal officials have warned in the past that hackers could exploit the EAS to hijack it for malicious purposes, indicating a potential threat to various organizations utilizing the EAS for emergency alerts [131024]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the article is related to the design phase. The incident occurred due to vulnerabilities in the EAS encoder/decoder devices, specifically the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net DASDEC EAS, which is a type of emergency alert system encoder and decoder. These vulnerabilities, which have not been patched for several years, allowed hackers to exploit the system and issue fake alerts over radio and TV stations [131024].
(b) The software failure incident is also related to the operation phase. The incident was exacerbated by the lack of updating EAS devices to the most recent software versions and security patches, as well as the absence of firewall protection for the EAS devices. Additionally, the vulnerabilities in the system allowed unauthorized access, enabling the hacker to exploit the web server, send fake alerts, and potentially lock legitimate users out of the system [131024]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in this case is within the system. The vulnerability in the Emergency Alert System (EAS) encoder/decoder devices, specifically the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net DASDEC EAS, allowed hackers to exploit the system and issue fake alerts over radio and TV stations [131024]. The vulnerabilities in the software were not patched for several years, leading to a significant flaw that could be exploited by hackers [131024]. The failure originated from within the system itself, highlighting the importance of keeping software up to date with the latest versions and security patches to prevent such incidents. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
The software failure incident in this case was due to a software flaw in the Emergency Alert System (EAS) that allowed hackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the EAS encoder/decoder devices. The flaw, if not updated to the most recent software versions, could enable an actor to issue fake EAS alerts over radio and TV stations [131024].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
The vulnerabilities in the EAS encoder/decoder devices, which led to the software failure incident, were confirmed by security researcher Ken Pyle and other researchers. These vulnerabilities had not been patched for several years, indicating a lack of timely human intervention in addressing and fixing the software issues [131024]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The software flaw in the Emergency Alert System was due to vulnerabilities in the EAS encoder/decoder devices, specifically the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net DASDEC EAS, which is a type of emergency alert system encoder and decoder [131024].
- The vulnerabilities in the hardware devices had not been patched for several years, leading to a significant flaw that could be exploited by hackers [131024].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The software flaw in the Emergency Alert System was a result of vulnerabilities in the software versions of the EAS encoder/decoder devices [131024].
- The lack of software updates and security patches for the EAS devices contributed to the exploit that allowed hackers to issue fake alerts over radio and TV stations [131024]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The objective of the software failure incident was malicious, as hackers exploited a software flaw in the Emergency Alert System to issue fake warnings over radio and TV stations. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security warned that if the EAS encoder/decoder devices were not updated to the most recent software versions, actors could issue EAS alerts over the host infrastructure [131024]. The security researcher, Ken Pyle, successfully demonstrated this exploit and mentioned being able to obtain access to credentials, exploit the web server, send fake alerts, and lock legitimate users out, among other malicious actions [131024].
(b) The software failure incident was non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerabilities in the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net DASDEC EAS, which is a type of emergency alert system encoder and decoder, had not been patched for several years, leading to a huge flaw. The lack of patching and addressing these vulnerabilities over time contributed to the software failure incident, indicating a non-malicious oversight or neglect in maintaining the software [131024]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident related to poor_decisions:
- The software failure incident in this case was due to poor decisions related to the lack of updating EAS encoder/decoder devices to the most recent software versions, leaving vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers [131024].
- The vulnerabilities in the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net DASDEC EAS, which is a type of emergency alert system encoder and decoder, had not been patched for several years, leading to a significant flaw that could be exploited [131024].
(b) The intent of the software failure incident related to accidental_decisions:
- There is no specific mention in the articles about the software failure incident being related to accidental decisions. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in this case can be attributed to development incompetence. The incident involved a software flaw in the Emergency Alert System (EAS) that allowed hackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the EAS encoder/decoder devices. The vulnerabilities were not patched for several years, indicating a lack of proper software maintenance and updates by the development organization. The security researcher who demonstrated the exploit highlighted that multiple vulnerabilities and issues in the system had not been addressed, leading to a significant flaw [131024].
(b) Additionally, the incident can also be categorized as accidental, as the vulnerabilities in the Monroe Electronics R189 One-Net DASDEC EAS were not intentionally introduced but rather existed due to a lack of proper attention to security and software maintenance over the years. The researcher mentioned that the vulnerabilities had not been patched for several years, indicating an accidental oversight that snowballed into a significant flaw [131024]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is more likely to be temporary rather than permanent. This is evident from the fact that the failure was caused by specific contributing factors, namely vulnerabilities in the EAS encoder/decoder devices, which allowed hackers to exploit the system and issue fake alerts. The vulnerabilities were identified by security researchers like Ken Pyle, and the incident was demonstrated as a proof of concept at a conference. Additionally, the article mentions that the vulnerabilities have not been patched for several years, indicating that the failure was not permanent but rather a result of specific circumstances [131024]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article is not described as a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [131024].
(b) omission: The software failure incident in the article is related to a vulnerability in the Emergency Alert System that could allow an actor to issue fake alerts over radio and TV stations, indicating an omission in performing its intended functions correctly [131024].
(c) timing: The software failure incident in the article does not involve timing issues where the system performs its intended functions too late or too early [131024].
(d) value: The software failure incident in the article is related to a software flaw that allows unauthorized actors to issue fake alerts over the Emergency Alert System, leading to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [131024].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident in the article does not exhibit byzantine behavior with inconsistent responses and interactions [131024].
(f) other: The software failure incident in the article involves a security vulnerability in the Emergency Alert System that could be exploited by hackers to issue fake alerts, potentially leading to unauthorized access, exploitation of web servers, and sending of crafted messages [131024]. |