| Recurring |
one_organization |
(a) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in Zoom's automatic update feature has happened again within the same organization. Security researcher Patrick Wardle discovered multiple vulnerabilities in Zoom's automatic update feature, leading to potential total control of a victim's machine by an attacker. Zoom has released fixes for the vulnerabilities found by Wardle, but he also discovered an additional vulnerability that reopens the attack vector [131219].
(b) The software failure incident related to vulnerabilities in Zoom's automatic update feature has not been reported to have happened at other organizations or with their products and services in the provided articles. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to the design phase. The vulnerabilities found in Zoom's automatic update feature were a result of flaws in the validation checks for updates, specifically related to cryptographic signature checks and the mechanism for confirming new versions of the software [131219, 132593].
(b) Additionally, the software failure incident can also be linked to the operation phase. The vulnerabilities discovered by Patrick Wardle could be exploited by attackers who already had access to a target Mac, indicating that the failure could be exacerbated by the operation or misuse of the system [131219, 132593]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident described in the articles is primarily within the system. The vulnerabilities and flaws in Zoom's automatic update feature were identified by security researcher Patrick Wardle within the system itself. Wardle found issues in the cryptographic signature check, the validation checks for updates, and the installer, all of which were internal to Zoom's software [131219, 132593].
(b) outside_system: There is no indication in the articles that the software failure incident was caused by contributing factors originating from outside the system. The vulnerabilities and flaws identified by Wardle were all related to internal aspects of Zoom's software and update mechanisms [131219, 132593]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions:
- The software failure incident in the articles was primarily due to vulnerabilities found in Zoom's automatic update feature's validation checks for updates, which allowed for potential exploitation by attackers [131219, 132593].
- The vulnerabilities in the cryptographic signature check and the flaw in how the updater app received software to distribute were identified as contributing factors to the software failure incident [131219, 132593].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions:
- The vulnerabilities in Zoom's automatic update feature were identified and disclosed by Mac security researcher Patrick Wardle, indicating that the flaws were introduced by the design and implementation of the software [131219, 132593].
- Wardle highlighted the lack of deep auditing of the code and the quality of the code as factors contributing to the vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers [131219, 132593]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware:
- The articles do not mention any hardware-related issues contributing to the software failure incident. Therefore, it can be concluded that the incident did not occur due to hardware factors [131219, 132593].
(b) The software failure incident occurring due to software:
- The software failure incident in the articles is primarily attributed to software vulnerabilities found in Zoom's automatic update feature. These vulnerabilities allowed attackers to exploit the system and gain control of a victim's machine. The vulnerabilities were related to the validation checks for updates, cryptographic signature checks, and flaws in how the updater app received software to distribute [131219, 132593]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The vulnerabilities found in Zoom's automatic update feature by security researcher Patrick Wardle could be exploited by an attacker who already had access to a target Mac to gain total control of the victim's machine [131219, 132593]. Wardle discovered vulnerabilities in the cryptographic signature check and the update distribution process that could be exploited to bypass security checks and install malicious software [131219, 132593]. Additionally, Wardle found a way to inject malicious code into the Zoom update installer, allowing an attacker to gain root access to the victim's device [131219, 132593].
(b) The software failure incident is non-malicious in the sense that the vulnerabilities were not intentionally introduced by the software developers to harm the system. Instead, they were oversights or flaws in the implementation of the automatic update feature that could be exploited by malicious actors [131219, 132593]. The vulnerabilities were discovered through security research and were not part of a deliberate attack on the system [131219, 132593]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident was due to poor decisions made during the development and implementation of Zoom's automatic update feature. The vulnerabilities discovered by security researcher Patrick Wardle highlighted flaws in the validation checks for updates, indicating that the quality of the code was suspect and not audited deeply enough [131219, 132593]. These poor decisions in the design and implementation of the automatic update feature led to security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers to gain total control of a victim's machine.
(b) Additionally, the incident also involved accidental decisions or unintended consequences. For example, the cryptographic signature check implemented by Zoom could be bypassed by cleverly naming a malicious package to deceive the validation checks [131219, 132593]. This unintended consequence of the flawed signature check allowed attackers to circumvent security measures and potentially compromise the integrity of the software updates. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to development incompetence. The vulnerabilities found in Zoom's automatic update feature were a result of inadequate validation checks for updates, allowing for potential exploitation by attackers. The quality of the code was deemed suspect, and it appeared that the code was not audited deeply enough for security flaws [131219, 132593].
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental as the vulnerabilities in the automatic update feature were not intentionally introduced but rather due to oversight and lack of thorough validation checks during the development process [131219, 132593]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident described in the articles can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident involved vulnerabilities in Zoom's automatic update feature that allowed for potential exploitation by attackers. These vulnerabilities were identified by security researcher Patrick Wardle and subsequently patched by Zoom [Article 131219, Article 132593]. The vulnerabilities were specific to certain circumstances and factors within the software, rather than being a permanent failure affecting all circumstances. |
| Behaviour |
other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident described in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and fails to perform its intended functions. Instead, the vulnerabilities identified by the researcher could potentially lead to a compromise of the victim's machine without causing a system crash [131219, 132593].
(b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the vulnerabilities identified by the researcher relate to flaws in the validation checks for updates that could allow an attacker to gain control of a victim's machine [131219, 132593].
(c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but at the wrong time. The vulnerabilities identified in the automatic update feature of Zoom do not involve timing issues but rather security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an attacker [131219, 132593].
(d) value: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly in terms of the value provided to the user. The vulnerabilities identified by the researcher in Zoom's automatic update feature relate to security flaws that could potentially lead to a compromise of the victim's machine [131219, 132593].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The vulnerabilities identified in Zoom's automatic update feature are related to specific security weaknesses that could be exploited by an attacker to gain control of a victim's machine [131219, 132593].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident can be categorized as a security vulnerability that could potentially lead to a compromise of the victim's machine. The vulnerabilities identified by the researcher in Zoom's automatic update feature highlight weaknesses in the validation checks for updates, which could be exploited by an attacker to gain control of the system [131219, 132593]. |