Incident: Cyber Attack on Community Health Systems via Heartbleed Bug

Published Date: 2014-08-19

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident, where hackers exploited the Heartbleed bug to steal personal data from Community Health Systems Inc, happened in April 2014 [Article 29256]. 2. The cyber attack on Community Health Systems Inc, resulting in the theft of personal data belonging to 4.5 million patients, occurred in April and June [Article 29257].
System 1. OpenSSL encryption software - Specifically, the Heartbleed bug in OpenSSL encryption software [29256, 29257].
Responsible Organization 1. Hackers exploited the "Heartbleed" internet bug to break into the computer system of Community Health Systems Inc, resulting in the theft of personal data of about 4.5 million patients [Article 29256]. 2. The hacking group known as "APT 18," with potential links to the Chinese government, was identified as responsible for the cyber attack on Community Health Systems Inc [Article 29257].
Impacted Organization 1. Patients of hospital group Community Health Systems Inc [Article 29256, Article 29257] 2. Canada’s tax-collection agency [Article 29256]
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was the exploitation of the "Heartbleed" internet bug, allowing hackers to break into the computer system of Community Health Systems Inc [29256]. 2. The hackers used the Heartbleed bug in equipment made by Juniper Networks Inc to gain access to the system [29256].
Non-software Causes 1. The cyber attack on Community Health Systems Inc was attributed to hackers from China, specifically a group known as "APT 18" with potential links to the Chinese government [29256, 29257]. 2. The hackers exploited the "Heartbleed" internet bug to gain unauthorized access to the company's computer system [29256]. 3. Community Health Systems Inc used equipment made by Juniper Networks Inc for remote access to employees through a virtual private network (VPN), which was compromised by the hackers using stolen credentials [29256]. 4. The attack resulted in the theft of personal data, including patient names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, and social security numbers of individuals who were referred or received services from doctors affiliated with the company over the last five years [29256, 29257]. 5. The stolen data did not include medical or clinical information, credit card numbers, or intellectual property related to medical device development [29257]. 6. The cyber attack on Community Health Systems Inc was part of a larger trend of increased cyber attacks on healthcare providers over the past six months [29257].
Impacts 1. Personal data of about 4.5 million patients of hospital group Community Health Systems Inc was stolen, including patient names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, and social security numbers [Article 29256, Article 29257]. 2. The stolen data did not include medical or clinical information, credit card numbers, or any intellectual property such as data on medical device development [Article 29257]. 3. The attack resulted in the largest breach of patient information since 2009, affecting a significant number of individuals [Article 29257]. 4. The incident raised concerns about cybersecurity in the healthcare industry, with the FBI warning about vulnerabilities and lax protections in the sector [Article 29257]. 5. The attack was attributed to a hacking group known as "APT 18," which has links to the Chinese government and is known for targeting various industries, including healthcare [Article 29257].
Preventions 1. Patching the Heartbleed bug promptly after its discovery could have prevented the hackers from exploiting this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to the system [29256]. 2. Implementing stronger authentication measures, such as multi-factor authentication, could have made it more difficult for the hackers to use stolen credentials to log into the network posing as employees [29256]. 3. Enhancing network security measures, such as intrusion detection systems and regular security audits, could have helped in detecting and preventing unauthorized access to the system [29257]. 4. Increasing employee cybersecurity awareness and training to recognize phishing attempts and other social engineering tactics that could lead to credential theft could have reduced the risk of unauthorized access [29256]. 5. Regularly monitoring and analyzing network traffic for unusual patterns or activities could have helped in detecting the intrusion earlier and mitigating the impact of the cyber attack [29257].
Fixes 1. Patching the Heartbleed bug in the OpenSSL encryption software to prevent further exploitation by hackers [29256]. 2. Strengthening network security measures, such as implementing multi-factor authentication and regularly updating credentials to prevent unauthorized access [29256]. 3. Conducting thorough security audits and assessments of the network infrastructure to identify and address vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers [29256]. 4. Enhancing employee training on cybersecurity best practices to prevent social engineering attacks and unauthorized access to sensitive data [29256]. 5. Collaborating with cybersecurity firms like Mandiant to investigate and mitigate the impact of the cyber attack, as well as to enhance overall security posture [29257].
References 1. Security expert David Kennedy, chief executive of TrustedSec LLC [Article 29256] 2. Community Health Systems Inc [Article 29256, Article 29257] 3. Juniper Networks Inc [Article 29256] 4. FireEye Inc's Mandiant forensics unit [Article 29256, Article 29257] 5. Charles Carmakal, managing director with FireEye Inc's Mandiant forensics unit [Article 29257] 6. CrowdStrike [Article 29257] 7. Dmitri Alperovitch, Chief Technology Officer at CrowdStrike [Article 29257] 8. FBI [Article 29257] 9. Department of Homeland Security [Article 29257]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring unknown (a) The software failure incident related to the cyber attack on Community Health Systems Inc was a significant breach that involved the exploitation of the "Heartbleed" internet bug. This incident was the first known large-scale cyber attack using the Heartbleed flaw [29256]. The attack resulted in the theft of personal data of about 4.5 million patients, including sensitive information such as patient names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, and social security numbers [29256]. The hackers gained access to the system by exploiting the vulnerability in equipment made by Juniper Networks Inc, which was used by Community Health Systems for remote access through a virtual private network (VPN) [29256]. (b) The software failure incident involving the cyber attack on Community Health Systems Inc is not explicitly mentioned to have happened at other organizations in the articles provided. The focus is primarily on the specific breach that occurred at Community Health Systems Inc and the details surrounding that incident.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident in the articles can be attributed to the design phase. The incident occurred due to the exploitation of the "Heartbleed" internet bug, which was a vulnerability in the OpenSSL encryption software widely used to secure websites and technology products [29256]. The hackers were able to breach the system by exploiting this flaw in the equipment made by Juniper Networks Inc, which was used by Community Health Systems to provide remote access to employees through a virtual private network (VPN) [29256]. (b) The software failure incident can also be linked to the operation phase. The hackers gained access to the system by using stolen credentials to log into the network posing as employees [29256]. This indicates a failure in the operation of the system, as the hackers were able to misuse the system by impersonating legitimate users and accessing sensitive data.
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system, outside_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident involving the theft of personal data of about 4.5 million patients of Community Health Systems Inc was due to contributing factors that originated from within the system. The hackers exploited the "Heartbleed" internet bug to break into the company's computer system, gaining access to the system by using the Heartbleed bug in equipment made by Juniper Networks Inc [29256]. The hackers used stolen credentials to log into the network posing as employees, indicating an internal vulnerability that allowed unauthorized access to sensitive data within the system [29256]. (b) outside_system: The software failure incident was also influenced by contributing factors that originated from outside the system. The cyber attack was attributed to a hacking group known as "APT 18," which was believed to have links to the Chinese government [29257]. This external threat actor targeted Community Health Systems Inc, indicating that the attack originated externally from the system. Additionally, the attack was part of a larger trend of increased cyber attacks on healthcare providers, highlighting the external risks faced by organizations in the healthcare industry [29257].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in this case was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically the exploitation of the "Heartbleed" internet bug by hackers to break into the computer system of Community Health Systems Inc [29256]. The hackers took advantage of the vulnerability in the OpenSSL encryption software, which is a non-human factor that made the systems vulnerable to data theft without leaving a trace. (b) However, human actions also played a role in this software failure incident. The hackers used stolen credentials to log into the network posing as employees, indicating that human actions (such as credential theft) were involved in gaining unauthorized access to the system [29256]. Additionally, the cybersecurity firm Mandiant forensics unit, which led the investigation into the breach, mentioned that the hacking group "APT 18" had fairly advanced techniques for breaking into organizations, indicating human involvement in planning and executing the cyber attack [29257].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident related to hardware: - The software failure incident involving the theft of personal data from Community Health Systems Inc was attributed to hackers exploiting the "Heartbleed" internet bug, which was present in equipment made by Juniper Networks Inc [29256]. - The hackers gained access to the system by using the Heartbleed bug in Juniper's equipment, which was used by the hospital operator to provide remote access to employees through a virtual private network (VPN) [29256]. - The hackers used stolen credentials to log into the network posing as employees, indicating a breach in the hardware-based security measures [29256]. (b) The software failure incident related to software: - The software failure incident was primarily due to the exploitation of the Heartbleed bug in the OpenSSL encryption software, which is widely used to secure websites and technology products [29256]. - The vulnerability in the OpenSSL encryption software made systems vulnerable to data theft by hackers, allowing them to attack without leaving a trace [29256]. - The incident involved the theft of patient information, including names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, and social security numbers, highlighting a breach in the software security measures [29256].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident in the articles is malicious. Hackers exploited the "Heartbleed" internet bug to break into the computer system of Community Health Systems Inc, stealing personal data of about 4.5 million patients [29256]. The hacking group, known as "APT 18," which may have links to the Chinese government, targeted the healthcare industry and stole patient information including names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, and social security numbers [29257]. The attack was sophisticated, with the hackers using stolen credentials to log into the network posing as employees and accessing a database to steal the data [29256]. (b) There is no information in the articles indicating that the software failure incident was non-malicious.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions The software failure incident reported in the news articles is related to a cyber attack on Community Health Systems Inc, where hackers stole the personal data of about 4.5 million patients by exploiting the "Heartbleed" internet bug [29256, 29257]. This incident can be categorized under both options: (a) poor_decisions: The incident involved poor decisions related to cybersecurity practices, such as the exploitation of the Heartbleed bug, which is a major vulnerability in OpenSSL encryption software widely used to secure websites and technology products [29256]. (b) accidental_decisions: The incident also involved accidental decisions or unintended consequences, as the hackers were able to gain access to the system by exploiting a flaw in the equipment made by Juniper Networks Inc, which was not intended by the company [29256]. Therefore, the software failure incident can be attributed to both poor decisions and accidental decisions made by the company and the software vendors involved.
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The software failure incident in the articles was not due to development incompetence. The incident was a result of a cyber attack by hackers exploiting the "Heartbleed" internet bug to steal personal data from Community Health Systems Inc [29256, 29257]. (b) The software failure incident was accidental in the sense that the hackers exploited a vulnerability (Heartbleed bug) in the system to gain unauthorized access and steal data. It was not a failure caused by accidental factors introduced during development or system maintenance [29256, 29257].
Duration temporary The software failure incident reported in the articles was temporary. The incident was a cyber attack where hackers exploited the "Heartbleed" internet bug to gain unauthorized access to Community Health Systems Inc's computer system [29256]. The attack resulted in the theft of personal data of about 4.5 million patients, including social security numbers and other records [29256]. The incident was investigated by security experts and forensic units, such as FireEye Inc's Mandiant, to identify the source of the attack and take remediation steps [29256, 29257]. The company stated that it had removed the malicious software used by the attackers from its systems and completed other remediation steps [29257].
Behaviour other (a) crash: The software failure incident in the articles does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident is related to a cyber attack where hackers exploited the Heartbleed bug to gain unauthorized access to Community Health Systems' computer system [29256, 29257]. (b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, the incident is about hackers stealing personal data, including patient names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, and social security numbers, from Community Health Systems [29256, 29257]. (c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The incident is focused on the cyber attack and data breach that occurred due to the exploitation of the Heartbleed bug by hackers [29256, 29257]. (d) value: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The incident is about the theft of personal data, such as social security numbers and other records, from Community Health Systems' database by hackers [29256, 29257]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit the behavior of the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident is primarily about a cyber attack orchestrated by hackers who exploited the Heartbleed bug to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data [29256, 29257]. (f) other: The software failure incident does not fall under the categories of crash, omission, timing, value, or byzantine behaviors. The incident involves a security breach caused by hackers exploiting a known vulnerability in the system's encryption software, leading to the theft of personal data from Community Health Systems [29256, 29257].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, theoretical_consequence (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure The software failure incident involving the hack on Community Health Systems resulted in the theft of personal data, including patient names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, and social security numbers of about 4.5 million patients [29256, 29257]. This data breach led to the compromise of sensitive information, which could potentially be used for identity theft or other malicious purposes.
Domain health (a) The failed system was related to the healthcare industry, specifically affecting Community Health Systems Inc, a hospital group [29256, 29257]. (j) The incident involved the theft of personal data of about 4.5 million patients, including patient names, addresses, birth dates, phone numbers, and social security numbers [29256, 29257]. (l) The attack on Community Health Systems Inc was reported to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, indicating the involvement of government agencies in responding to the incident [29257].

Sources

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