Incident: Court IT System Common Platform Failure Risks Justice in England

Published Date: 2022-09-06

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident with the Common Platform system in the courts in England and Wales started going live in 2020 as per the article [132379]. 2. The article was published on 2022-09-06. 3. Therefore, the software failure incident with the Common Platform system likely occurred in 2020.
System 1. Common Platform system [132379]
Responsible Organization 1. The entity responsible for causing the software failure incident in the court IT system, Common Platform, is the HM Courts and Tribunal Service, as they were in charge of the system's implementation and rollout [132379].
Impacted Organization 1. Court cases in England and Wales were impacted by the software failure incident [132379].
Software Causes 1. Software faults in the Common Platform system causing key information about court cases to change or disappear, leading to incorrect case results and missing information [132379].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of proper engagement with concerns raised by staff members [132379] 2. Failure to address warnings about faults in the system [132379] 3. Inadequate response to reported issues by the court service [132379] 4. Disregard for repeated warnings about faults in the IT system [132379]
Impacts 1. Key information about court cases in England and Wales changed or disappeared, putting justice at risk [132379]. 2. Results of cases entered into the Common Platform system were altered, leading to potential threats to public safety as individuals might not have been disqualified from driving when they should have been [132379]. 3. Instances were reported where individuals were held in prison for longer than necessary due to faults related to the Common Platform system [132379]. 4. Court staff, including legal advisors and court associates, felt ignored as their warnings about faults in the system were not addressed, leading to a lack of trust in the system [132379]. 5. The PCS union representing court staff claimed that repeated warnings about faults were ignored, leading to a vote for strike action by legal advisors and court associates [132379].
Preventions 1. Conducting thorough testing and quality assurance before the full rollout of the Common Platform system could have potentially prevented the software failure incident [132379]. 2. Engaging with concerns raised by staff members and experts, such as IT expert Professor Alan Woodward, and pausing the rollout to address issues could have helped prevent the software failure incident [132379].
Fixes 1. Pausing the roll-out of the Common Platform system to address the reported faults and engage with concerns being raised by court staff [132379]. 2. Conducting a thorough investigation into the reported issues with the system to identify and rectify any bugs, faults, or errors causing key information to change or disappear [132379]. 3. Providing proper training and support to court staff on how to use the Common Platform system effectively to minimize errors and ensure accurate data entry [132379]. 4. Implementing robust quality assurance processes to prevent future incidents of key information disappearing or being inaccurately recorded in the system [132379].
References 1. Legal adviser (James) - provided firsthand experience of entering information into the Common Platform system and later discovering changes in results [132379] 2. PCS union - represents court staff and claims repeated warnings about faults in the Common Platform system have been ignored by the courts service [132379] 3. Professor Alan Woodward - an IT expert and visiting professor at the University of Surrey, who urged the court service to pause the roll-out of Common Platform and engage with the concerns being raised [132379] 4. HM Courts and Tribunal Service spokesperson - provided statements defending the Common Platform system and addressing concerns raised by staff and the comparison to the Post Office Horizon scandal [132379]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring unknown The article does not provide information about the software failure incident happening again at either the same organization or at multiple organizations. Therefore, the information to answer this question is 'unknown'.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the article. The Common Platform system, designed to replace outdated software in the criminal courts, has been reported to have significant issues causing key information about court cases to change or disappear. Legal advisers and court staff have raised concerns about the system being "fundamentally flawed" and have warned about faults being ignored by the courts service [132379]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is also highlighted in the article. Court staff reported instances where key information disappeared, including pleas entered and case results. There was a specific case mentioned where an individual was held in prison for days longer than they should have been due to a fault related to the Common Platform system. The PCS union representing court staff claimed that repeated warnings about faults were ignored, leading to concerns about the system's operation [132379].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to the Common Platform IT system in the courts in England and Wales is primarily attributed to issues originating from within the system itself. Court staff reported instances where key information about court cases, such as case results and pleas entered, changed or disappeared within the Common Platform system, leading to concerns about compromised justice and potential risks to individuals [132379]. The concerns raised by staff indicate that the faults and flaws are inherent to the system, as they described Common Platform as "fundamentally flawed" and highlighted how results entered correctly were later found to have changed without explanation [132379]. Additionally, the comparison made by a legal adviser to the Post Office Horizon scandal, where faults in the Horizon software led to serious consequences, further emphasizes the internal nature of the issues within the Common Platform system [132379]. The need for the court service to engage with the concerns raised and the decision to pause the roll-out of Common Platform to address issues further suggest that the failures are rooted within the system itself [132379]. (b) outside_system: There is no explicit mention in the articles of contributing factors originating from outside the Common Platform system that led to the software failure incident. The focus of the reports is on the internal issues within the system, such as data discrepancies, disappearing information, and faults affecting case outcomes [132379]. The concerns raised by court staff, the warnings about faults being ignored, and the decision to take strike action over the system all point towards issues within the system itself rather than external factors impacting the software failure incident [132379].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the court IT system, Common Platform, seems to be primarily attributed to non-human actions such as system faults and errors. Court staff reported instances where key information about court cases changed or disappeared within the system, leading to potential risks to justice. For example, a legal adviser correctly entered the results of a case only to later discover that the result had changed in the system without human intervention [132379]. (b) However, there are also indications of human actions contributing to the software failure incident. The court staff, including legal advisors and court associates, raised repeated warnings about faults in the Common Platform system, but these concerns were allegedly ignored by the courts service. This lack of response to human feedback and warnings led to dissatisfaction among the staff, with some even considering strike action over the system issues [132379].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) software (a) The articles do not provide information about the software failure incident occurring due to hardware issues. (b) The software failure incident reported in the articles is related to issues originating in the software itself. The Common Platform IT system, designed to replace outdated software in the criminal courts, has been causing key information about court cases to change or disappear, putting justice at risk. Court staff have reported instances where results of cases were altered in the system, leading to potential threats to public safety. The system has been described as "fundamentally flawed" and warnings about faults have been ignored, prompting concerns and even strike actions by court staff [132379].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) non-malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the article does not seem to be malicious, as there is no indication that the issues with the Common Platform IT system were introduced with the intent to harm the system. The problems reported by court staff appear to be related to technical faults and flaws in the system, leading to incorrect information being entered or disappearing, which ultimately puts justice at risk [132379]. (b) The software failure incident is non-malicious, stemming from technical issues and flaws in the Common Platform IT system rather than any intentional harm. Staff have raised concerns about the system being "fundamentally flawed" and have reported instances where key information about court cases has changed or disappeared, leading to potential risks to justice [132379].
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the Common Platform IT system in the courts of England and Wales seems to involve poor decisions contributing to the failure. Court staff have raised concerns about the system causing key information about court cases to change or disappear, putting justice at risk. Despite warnings about alleged faults and describing the system as "fundamentally flawed," these concerns have been ignored by the courts service [132379]. Additionally, the comparison made by a legal adviser to the Post Office Horizon scandal, where faults in the software led to serious consequences, suggests that poor decisions in handling the rollout and management of the Common Platform system may have contributed to the software failure incident [132379].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) development_incompetence (a) The software failure incident in the article seems to be related to development incompetence. Court staff have raised concerns about the Common Platform IT system in the courts, describing it as "fundamentally flawed" and warning about alleged faults being ignored by the courts service [132379]. Legal advisers and court associates in the magistrates' court have even voted to take strike action over the system due to the faults [132379]. The situation is likened to the Post Office IT scandal, where faults in the Horizon software led to serious consequences [132379]. (b) The software failure incident does not seem to be related to accidental factors but rather to issues stemming from development incompetence and flaws in the system design and implementation.
Duration permanent, temporary The software failure incident related to the Court IT system in England and Wales, known as Common Platform, can be categorized as both temporary and permanent based on the information provided in the article. Temporary: The article mentions instances where key information about court cases, such as pleas entered and case results, disappeared due to the Common Platform system [132379]. Additionally, there was a case highlighted where an individual was held in prison for days longer than they should have been due to a Common Platform-related fault, indicating temporary disruptions caused by the software failure incident. Permanent: On the other hand, the concerns raised by court staff about the Common Platform system being "fundamentally flawed" and changing or misrepresenting key information about court cases suggest a more permanent issue with the software [132379]. The comparison made by a legal adviser to the Post Office Horizon scandal, where faults in the software led to criminal convictions, also indicates a potentially permanent impact of the software failure incident on the justice system. Therefore, the software failure incident related to the Court IT system in England and Wales can be seen as both temporary and permanent, with temporary disruptions occurring due to specific circumstances and permanent flaws affecting the system's overall functionality.
Behaviour omission, value, other (a) crash: The software failure incident described in the article is not specifically related to a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. (b) omission: The software failure incident involves instances where key information about court cases, such as pleas entered and case results, disappeared from the system, leading to potential issues like individuals being held in prison for longer than necessary [132379]. (c) timing: The article does not mention any specific instances where the software performed its intended functions but at the wrong time. (d) value: The failure of the software incident is related to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, such as changing or not reflecting the actual results of court cases entered into the system, potentially compromising justice [132379]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit behaviors of inconsistency or erratic responses typically associated with a byzantine failure. (f) other: The other behavior exhibited by the software failure incident is the system causing key information about court cases to change or disappear, putting justice at risk and potentially leading to serious consequences like individuals not being properly disqualified from driving, posing a threat to others [132379].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence theoretical_consequence (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? The articles do not mention any direct consequences such as death, physical harm, impact on basic needs, property loss, or harm to non-human entities due to the software failure incident. The reported consequences mainly revolve around the potential risk to justice and the functioning of the court system, with concerns raised about compromised case information, incorrect results, and individuals being held in prison longer than necessary due to faults in the Common Platform system. The focus is on the impact on the legal processes and the potential threat to justice rather than direct physical or material consequences.
Domain government (a) The failed system, Common Platform, was intended to support the justice system in England and Wales by providing a centralized platform for judges, lawyers, the CPS, and courts to access case information in one place [132379]. The system was meant to modernize the court system by replacing outdated software in the criminal courts [132379]. (l) The industry related to the failed system is the government sector, specifically the justice system in England and Wales [132379]. The software failure incident impacted the handling of court cases, with reports of key information changing or disappearing, potentially putting justice at risk [132379]. The system, Common Platform, was being used in 136 courts in England and Wales, with the aim of eventually being adopted by all courts in the region [132379].

Sources

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