Incident: Tesla Model Y NFC Relay Attack Exploiting Software Flaw

Published Date: 2022-09-13

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident, which is a security vulnerability in Tesla's software update allowing thieves to unlock and start a Tesla Model Y, happened after a software update in 2021 [133310]. Therefore, the incident occurred in 2021.
System The system that failed in the software failure incident described in Article 133310 is: 1. Tesla's software update released in 2021 that eliminated the need for owners to place the Key Card on the center console to change the vehicle’s gears, leading to a vulnerability exploited by the relay attack [133310].
Responsible Organization 1. Thieves who exploited the flaw in Tesla's software update [133310] 2. IOActive security consulting firm who identified and detailed the attack [133310]
Impacted Organization 1. Tesla owners were impacted by the software failure incident as their vehicles were vulnerable to being stolen due to the flaw in the software update released by Tesla in 2021 [133310].
Software Causes 1. The software cause of the failure incident was a flaw in a software update released by Tesla in 2021 that eliminated the need for owners to place the Key Card on the center console to change the vehicle’s gears [133310].
Non-software Causes 1. Lack of physical proximity authentication requirement for starting the engine, allowing thieves to exploit the NFC protocol used by Tesla Key Cards [133310].
Impacts 1. The software failure incident allowed thieves to unlock a Tesla Model Y and start the engine in just a matter of seconds by exploiting a flaw in a software update released by Tesla in 2021 [133310]. 2. The stolen Tesla cannot be turned off by the thief once they drive off, as they are no longer near the original key card. However, they could potentially add a new card at some point [133310]. 3. Prior to the software update, Tesla owners were required to physically place their Key Card on the center console to start the engine and shift gears. The software update eliminated this requirement, making it easier for thieves to exploit the flaw [133310]. 4. The security consultants from IOActive detailed how the attack was carried out by reverse-engineering the NFC protocol Tesla uses between the NFC card and the vehicle, creating custom firmware modifications, and using a Proxmark device to relay NFC communications over Bluetooth/Wi-Fi [133310]. 5. Tesla was made aware of this security issue in other Tesla models as well, indicating a potential widespread vulnerability in the software [133310].
Preventions 1. Implementing a more secure authentication method such as multi-factor authentication (MFA) could have prevented the software failure incident by adding an extra layer of security beyond just the Key Card [133310]. 2. Enhancing the timing precision in the system while waiting for a crypto response could have made it much harder to exploit the vulnerability over Bluetooth/Wi-Fi, thus preventing the attack [133310].
Fixes 1. Implementing a more precise timing mechanism while waiting for a crypto response could make it much harder to exploit the vulnerability over Bluetooth/Wi-Fi [133310].
References 1. Security consultant firm IOActive [133310] 2. The Verge [133310]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization The software failure incident related to a security vulnerability allowing thieves to unlock and start a Tesla Model Y has happened again at multiple organizations. The article mentions that the security consulting firm IOActive contacted Tesla about the issue, indicating that similar security vulnerabilities may exist in other Tesla models as well, not just limited to the Model Y [133310]. This suggests that the software flaw that allows for relay attacks on Tesla vehicles could potentially affect other Tesla models, indicating a broader vulnerability across Tesla's products.
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident in the article is related to the design phase. The incident is a result of a flaw in a software update that Tesla released in 2021, which eliminated the need for owners to physically place the Key Card on the center console to start the engine and shift gears. This design change introduced a vulnerability that allowed thieves to exploit the system by using a relay attack to unlock and start the Tesla Model Y [133310]. (b) The software failure incident is also related to the operation phase. The attack carried out by the thieves involves specific operations such as one individual capturing data from the Key Card using a smartphone while the other waits by the target vehicle with a device to pick up the data from their accomplice. The operation of the attack relies on the proximity of devices and communication between the Key Card and the NFC reader on the Model Y's door, highlighting an operational vulnerability that was exploited by the attackers [133310].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: - The software failure incident, in this case, is within the system as it is a flaw in a software update released by Tesla in 2021 that eliminated the need for owners to place the Key Card on the center console to change the vehicle’s gears [133310]. - The attack carried out by the thieves exploits a flaw in the NFC protocol Tesla uses between the NFC card and the vehicle, which was reverse-engineered by the security consultants from IOActive [133310]. - The software failure incident is related to the communication between the Key Card and the NFC reader on the Model Y’s door, which is an internal system process [133310]. (b) outside_system: - The software failure incident is not due to contributing factors originating from outside the system but rather from within the system itself, specifically related to the flaw in the software update released by Tesla [133310]. - The attack by the thieves does not involve external factors but rather takes advantage of vulnerabilities within the Tesla system, such as the NFC communication protocol and the lack of a requirement to physically place the Key Card on the center console [133310].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident in the Tesla Model Y's security system was due to non-human actions. The flaw in the software update released by Tesla in 2021 allowed for a relay attack that exploited the NFC protocol used between the Key Card and the vehicle's NFC reader. This flaw enabled thieves to unlock the car and start the engine without the need for human participation in the attack [133310]. (b) However, human actions were also involved in the software failure incident. The attack required one individual to be near the Tesla owner with their smartphone to capture data from the Key Card, while the other individual waited by the target vehicle with a device designed to pick up data from their accomplice. Additionally, the security consultants from IOActive detailed how the attack was carried out, indicating human involvement in executing the exploit [133310].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The incident reported in Article 133310 involves a security vulnerability in Tesla's Model Y that allows thieves to unlock and start the vehicle using a relay attack. This vulnerability is related to the hardware components of the Tesla Model Y, specifically the Key Card and the NFC reader on the vehicle's door. Thieves exploit the hardware components by using devices like the Proxmark RDV4.0 to intercept and relay NFC communications over Bluetooth/Wi-Fi, enabling them to unlock and start the car without physical access to the original Key Card [133310]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - The software failure incident in Article 133310 is primarily attributed to a flaw in a software update released by Tesla in 2021. This software update eliminated the need for Tesla owners to physically place the Key Card on the center console to start the engine and shift gears. Thieves were able to exploit this software flaw by reverse-engineering the NFC protocol used by Tesla and creating custom firmware modifications to carry out the relay attack. The software vulnerability allowed attackers to manipulate the communication between the Key Card and the NFC reader on the vehicle, facilitating unauthorized access and control of the car [133310].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) malicious (a) The software failure incident described in the articles is malicious in nature. The incident involves a sophisticated relay attack on Tesla Model Y vehicles, where thieves exploit a flaw in a software update released by Tesla in 2021. The attack involves capturing data from the Key Card of a Tesla owner using NFC technology and relaying it to start the engine and unlock the vehicle without the need for the physical Key Card [133310]. The attackers intentionally exploit vulnerabilities in the software to steal the vehicles, indicating malicious intent to harm the system.
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions (a) The software failure incident related to the Tesla Model Y relay attack can be attributed to poor decisions made by Tesla in releasing a software update in 2021. This update eliminated the need for owners to physically place the Key Card on the center console to start the engine and shift gears, creating a vulnerability that allowed thieves to exploit the NFC protocol used by Tesla for keyless entry and ignition [133310]. (b) The incident also involved accidental decisions or unintended consequences, as the flaw in the software update enabled thieves to easily steal a Tesla Model Y by exploiting the NFC communication between the Key Card and the vehicle's NFC reader. The attackers were able to intercept and relay the necessary data to unlock the car and start the engine, showcasing how unintended decisions or design flaws can lead to security vulnerabilities [133310].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to development incompetence. The flaw in the software update released by Tesla in 2021, which eliminated the need for owners to physically place the Key Card on the center console to start the engine and shift gears, was exploited by thieves using a sophisticated relay attack. The attack involved reverse-engineering the NFC protocol used by Tesla and creating custom firmware modifications to relay NFC communications over Bluetooth/Wi-Fi, allowing thieves to unlock and start a Tesla Model Y without physical access to the Key Card [133310]. (b) The software failure incident can also be categorized as accidental, as the flaw in the software update that enabled the relay attack was not intentionally designed to be exploited by thieves. It was a vulnerability introduced unintentionally during the development process, which was later identified and exploited by individuals with malicious intent [133310].
Duration temporary The software failure incident described in the article is more of a temporary nature rather than permanent. The incident involves a flaw in a software update released by Tesla in 2021 that allows thieves to exploit the system and steal a Tesla Model Y by using a relay attack technique. The flaw in the software update enables the thieves to bypass the requirement of placing the Key Card on the center console to start the engine and shift gears, making it easier for them to steal the vehicle [133310]. This temporary failure is due to specific circumstances introduced by the software update, allowing unauthorized individuals to manipulate the system and steal the vehicle.
Behaviour other (a) crash: The software failure incident in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The incident is more related to a security vulnerability that allows thieves to exploit a flaw in Tesla's software to steal vehicles [133310]. (b) omission: The software failure incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, it involves a flaw in the software update that allows thieves to bypass the security measures and start the stolen Tesla vehicle [133310]. (c) timing: The software failure incident is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. It is more about a security vulnerability that allows thieves to manipulate the system to start the engine of a stolen Tesla vehicle [133310]. (d) value: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Instead, it is about a flaw in the software update that enables thieves to exploit the system and start the engine of a stolen Tesla vehicle [133310]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit the characteristics of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The incident is more about a security vulnerability that allows coordinated attacks to steal Tesla vehicles [133310]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a security vulnerability that enables a relay attack on Tesla vehicles, bypassing the need for the Key Card to start the engine. This flaw in the software update allows thieves to exploit the system and steal the vehicles [133310].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception None None
Communication None None
Application None None

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence property, non-human, theoretical_consequence (a) unknown (b) unknown (c) unknown (d) Property: The software failure incident allowed thieves to unlock a Tesla Model Y and start the engine, resulting in the theft of the vehicle [133310]. (e) unknown (f) Non-human: The software failure incident impacted the security of Tesla vehicles, specifically the Model Y, due to a flaw in a software update that allowed for unauthorized access and theft [133310]. (g) unknown (h) Theoretical_consequence: The article discusses potential consequences of the software failure, such as the ability for thieves to steal Tesla vehicles by exploiting the flaw in the software update. Tesla claims that the security issue is mitigated with the "PIN to Drive" feature, but this feature is optional and may not be utilized by all Tesla owners [133310]. (i) unknown
Domain transportation (a) The failed system in this incident is related to the transportation industry, specifically affecting Tesla vehicles like the Model Y. The software flaw identified by the security consultant firm IOActive allows thieves to unlock a Tesla Model Y and start the engine in just a matter of seconds by exploiting a vulnerability in the software update released by Tesla in 2021 [Article 133310].

Sources

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