Published Date: 2022-10-20
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident at Medibank occurred on 13 October [Article 133693]. 2. The incident began on 13 October [Article 133680]. 3. The hack of Medibank's customer database was reported on 26 October [Article 134009]. |
| System | 1. User credentials system failed, leading to unauthorized access to Medibank's systems [Article 133693, Article 133680] 2. Multi-factor authentication system may have been compromised or bypassed [Article 133680] 3. Customer database system was breached, exposing personal information of millions of customers [Article 134009] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Hackers gained unauthorized access to Medibank's systems by stealing credentials, leading to the data breach incident [133693, 133680, 134009]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Medibank Private [133693, 133680, 134009] 2. ahm (Medibank's budget provider) [133693, 133680, 134009] 3. International students with Medibank [133693, 133680, 134009] |
| Software Causes | 1. The Medibank hack occurred due to the theft of credentials of someone with high-level access within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum, leading to unauthorized access to customer data [Article 133680]. 2. The attack involved the exploitation of compromised or fake user credentials to gain access to Medibank's systems, allowing the hacker to extract sensitive customer information [Article 133693]. 3. It is believed that the attacker infiltrated Medibank's network by establishing backdoors after purchasing stolen high-level credentials, enabling the extraction of customer data using a bespoke tool [Article 133680]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. The Medibank hack began with the theft of credentials of someone with high-level access within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum [Article 133680]. 2. The attacker gained access using fake or compromised user credentials [Article 133693]. |
| Impacts | 1. Personal information of millions of current and former customers, including health claims, was exposed in the Medibank hack, affecting a total of 9.7 million customers, including 5.1 million Medibank customers, 2.8 million ahm customers, and 1.8 million international customers [Article 134009]. 2. The hacker obtained sensitive information such as names, addresses, dates of birth, Medicare numbers, phone numbers, and medical claims data, including diagnoses, procedures, and location of medical services, potentially leading to identity theft or extortion attempts [Article 133693]. 3. The breach led to the exposure of personal identification information, including names, addresses, dates of birth, gender, email addresses, Medicare card numbers, and health claims made with Medibank, raising concerns about potential identity theft [Article 134009]. 4. Medibank customers, particularly international students, were at risk of having their private health information used against them, highlighting the serious implications of the breach [Article 133693]. 5. The breach resulted in the exposure of sensitive medical information, including claims associated with alcohol and drug use, mental health, and terminating pregnancies, which were posted on the dark web after Medibank refused to pay the ransom [Article 134009]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing strong multi-factor authentication measures to prevent unauthorized access to high-level credentials within the organization [Article 133680]. 2. Regularly reviewing and updating security protocols and settings to detect and prevent backdoors from being established within the network [Article 133680]. 3. Enhancing employee training on cybersecurity awareness to prevent falling victim to credential theft and phishing attacks [Article 133680]. 4. Conducting thorough security audits and assessments to identify vulnerabilities and potential points of entry for hackers [Article 133680]. 5. Utilizing advanced intrusion detection systems to monitor and detect suspicious activities within the network in real-time [Article 133680]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing stronger authentication measures, such as multi-factor authentication, to prevent unauthorized access to high-level credentials within the organization [Article 133680]. 2. Conducting thorough security assessments and audits to identify and address vulnerabilities in the network and internal applications to prevent future breaches [Article 133680]. 3. Enhancing data protection measures, including encryption of sensitive information like Medicare numbers and health claims data, to mitigate the risk of data exposure [Article 134009]. 4. Providing specialized training to employees on cybersecurity best practices to prevent social engineering attacks and unauthorized access to sensitive data [Article 133680]. 5. Collaborating with government agencies and law enforcement to investigate and prosecute cybercriminals responsible for the breach, potentially with international cooperation in cases involving hackers located in other countries [Article 134009]. |
| References | 1. Medibank Private 2. Australian Signals Directorate 3. Australian federal police 4. Clare O’Neil, cybersecurity minister 5. David Koczkar, Medibank’s chief executive 6. Fergus Hanson, director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Centre 7. Albanese government 8. Equifax 9. IDCARE 10. Reece Kershaw, Commissioner of the Australian federal police |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | one_organization, multiple_organization | (a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization: The software failure incident has happened again at Medibank Private. Just weeks after the Optus data breach, Medibank experienced a major cybersecurity incident involving a data breach [133693]. This incident involved hackers gaining access to customer data, including intimate medical records, through compromised user credentials. The breach led to the exposure of sensitive information such as names, addresses, dates of birth, Medicare numbers, phone numbers, and medical claims data [133693]. (b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization: The articles mention other data breaches that occurred around the same time as the Medibank incident. For example, there was a data breach at the online wine retailer Vinomofo, where the records of 700,000 users were sold on a Russian-language cybercriminal forum [133693]. Additionally, the Optus data breach, which occurred just weeks before the Medibank incident, involved one-third of Australians having their information held to ransom [133693]. These incidents indicate a broader trend of cybersecurity challenges affecting multiple organizations. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The software failure incident at Medibank was primarily due to factors related to system development and updates. The incident began with the theft of high-level credentials within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum [Article 133680]. The attack is believed to have started when someone with high-level access had their credentials stolen, leading to the infiltration of Medibank's network and the establishment of backdoors for data extraction [Article 133680]. The attacker conducted a thorough examination of Medibank's network and internal applications, deploying a bespoke tool to withdraw customer information from the database [Article 133680]. (b) The software failure incident at Medibank was also influenced by factors related to system operation and potential misuse. The attack occurred after someone gained access using fake or compromised user credentials [Article 133693]. The hacker was able to obtain sensitive customer information, including names, addresses, dates of birth, Medicare numbers, phone numbers, and medical claims data, indicating a breach in the operational security of the system [Article 133693]. Additionally, the incident highlighted the need for organizations to enhance their data protection measures and for individuals to review security settings on social media platforms and be cautious about sharing personal information [Article 133693]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system, outside_system | (a) within_system: - The software failure incident at Medibank was primarily due to factors originating from within the system. The incident began with the theft of high-level credentials of an individual within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum [Article 133680]. - The attack involved the infiltration of Medibank's network and the establishment of backdoors within the system by hackers [Article 133680]. - The hacker deployed a bespoke tool to withdraw customer information from Medibank's customer database, indicating an internal system breach [Article 133680]. (b) outside_system: - The software failure incident at Medibank also had contributing factors originating from outside the system. The attack began with the theft of credentials that were sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum, indicating an external source of the breach [Article 133680]. - The hackers were located in Russia and were believed to be associated with known hacker groups, suggesting an external origin of the attack [Article 134009]. - The Australian federal police and the Australian Signals Directorate were involved in investigating the incident, indicating the involvement of external agencies due to the severity of the breach [Article 133680]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - The Medibank hack began with the theft of credentials of someone with high-level access within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum [Article 133680]. - The attack is believed to have started when a person with high-level access within Medibank's systems had their credentials stolen by a hacker, who then put them up for sale on a cybercrime forum acting as a credential broker [Article 133680]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - Medibank is understood to still be investigating how someone gained access using fake or compromised user credentials [Article 133693]. - The attack is believed to have begun when a person with high-level access within Medibank's systems had their credentials stolen by a hacker [Article 133680]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | hardware, software | (a) The software failure incident occurring due to hardware: - The Medibank hack began with the theft of credentials of someone with high-level access within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum [Article 133680]. - The attack is believed to have started when a person with high-level access within Medibank's systems had their credentials stolen by a hacker, who then put them up for sale on a cybercrime forum acting as a credential broker [Article 133680]. - The attacker reportedly established two backdoors in Medibank's network, including one for redundancy in case of discovery [Article 133680]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to software: - Medibank is understood to still be investigating how the attack occurred, but it is thought that someone gained access using fake or compromised user credentials [Article 133693]. - The attacker conducted a thorough examination of Medibank's network and internal applications, not just customer data, and deployed a bespoke tool to withdraw customer information from the database [Article 133680]. - The hackers began posting some of the records on the dark web after Medibank refused to pay the ransom, indicating a software-related breach [Article 134009]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | malicious | (a) The software failure incident at Medibank was malicious in nature. The incident involved a major cybersecurity breach where hackers gained unauthorized access to Medibank's systems and stole sensitive customer data, including names, addresses, dates of birth, Medicare numbers, phone numbers, and medical claims data [133693]. The attack began with the theft of high-level credentials within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum. The hackers infiltrated Medibank's network, established backdoors, and extracted customer information from the database [133680]. The hackers demanded ransom from Medibank and threatened to release the information of high-profile Australians if their demands were not met [133693]. (b) The software failure incident at Medibank was non-malicious in the sense that the failure was not caused by unintentional errors or faults in the system. Instead, it was a deliberate cyberattack orchestrated by hackers with the intent to steal sensitive data and potentially use it for malicious purposes [133693, 133680]. The incident involved a breach of customer data, including personal information and health claims, affecting millions of current and former customers of Medibank and its subsidiary ahm [134009]. The attack was preventable, and there were concerns raised about the security measures in place to protect customer data [133680]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | poor_decisions | (a) poor_decisions: The software failure incident at Medibank was primarily due to poor decisions made in terms of cybersecurity measures and handling of sensitive customer data. The incident began with the theft of high-level credentials within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum [Article 133680]. Additionally, the hackers were able to access and steal sensitive customer data, including names, addresses, dates of birth, Medicare numbers, phone numbers, and medical claims data, indicating a lack of robust security measures in place [Article 133693]. (b) accidental_decisions: There is no specific information in the articles to suggest that the software failure incident at Medibank was caused by accidental decisions or unintended mistakes. The incident appears to be primarily attributed to poor decisions related to cybersecurity practices and handling of customer data. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence | (a) development_incompetence: - The Medibank hack began with the theft of credentials of someone with high-level access within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum [Article 133680]. - The attack is believed to have begun when a person with high-level access within Medibank’s systems had their credentials stolen by a hacker, who then put them up for sale on a Russian-language cybercrime forum acting as a credential broker [Article 133680]. - The attack was preventable, and there are questions about whether Medibank could have done better in handling the situation [Article 133680]. (b) accidental: - The Medibank hack was not accidental but was a deliberate cyberattack orchestrated by hackers who infiltrated the company's network and stole sensitive customer data [Article 133680]. - The hackers conducted a thorough examination of Medibank’s network and internal applications, deployed a bespoke tool to withdraw customer information, and put it into a zip file to extract from the company’s network [Article 133680]. - The attack involved deliberate actions such as stealing credentials, establishing backdoors, and extracting customer information, indicating a deliberate and targeted cyberattack rather than an accidental incident [Article 133680]. |
| Duration | temporary | The software failure incident at Medibank was temporary. The incident began on 13 October when Medibank took offline the data and policy systems of its budget provider, ahm, and its international student division after a "cyber incident" [133693]. The company later restored systems and mentioned they were still responding to the incident. The situation escalated when hackers contacted Medibank to negotiate over the future of 200 gigabytes of customer data they claimed to have stolen [133693]. The attack involved the theft of credentials of someone with high-level access within the organization, which were then sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum [133680]. The attack was believed to have started when a person with high-level access had their credentials stolen, leading to the infiltration of Medibank's network and establishment of backdoors [133680]. The incident resulted in the exposure of personal information of millions of current and former customers [134009]. |
| Behaviour | omission, other | (a) crash: Failure due to system losing state and not performing any of its intended functions - The Medibank software failure incident did not involve a crash as the system was still operational despite the breach. The incident was related to a cybersecurity breach where hackers gained unauthorized access to customer data ([133693], [133680], [134009]). (b) omission: Failure due to system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s) - The software failure incident at Medibank involved the omission of proper security measures leading to the breach. The incident occurred due to the theft of credentials and subsequent unauthorized access to customer data ([133680], [134009]). (c) timing: Failure due to system performing its intended functions correctly, but too late or too early - The timing of the software failure incident at Medibank was not related to the system performing its functions too late or too early. The incident was primarily focused on the unauthorized access and exposure of customer data ([133693], [133680], [134009]). (d) value: Failure due to system performing its intended functions incorrectly - The software failure incident at Medibank did not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The breach was a result of security vulnerabilities and unauthorized access to sensitive customer information ([133693], [133680], [134009]). (e) byzantine: Failure due to system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions - The software failure incident at Medibank did not exhibit a byzantine behavior where the system provided inconsistent responses or interactions. The incident was primarily focused on the unauthorized access and exposure of customer data ([133693], [133680], [134009]). (f) other: Failure due to system behaving in a way not described in the (a to e) options; What is the other behaviour? - The other behavior in this case would be a security breach leading to unauthorized access to sensitive customer data. The incident involved the theft of credentials, establishment of backdoors, and extraction of customer information from the database by hackers ([133680], [134009]). |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | property, other | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident at Medibank in the provided articles [133693, 133680, 134009]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - There is no mention of physical harm to individuals resulting from the software failure incident at Medibank in the provided articles [133693, 133680, 134009]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure incident at Medibank in the provided articles [133693, 133680, 134009]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident at Medibank resulted in the exposure of personal information, including health claims, of millions of current and former customers [134009]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - There is no mention of people having to postpone activities due to the software failure incident at Medibank in the provided articles [133693, 133680, 134009]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The software failure incident at Medibank primarily impacted customer data and systems, with no mention of non-human entities being impacted [133693, 133680, 134009]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident at Medibank had significant consequences, including the exposure of personal information of millions of customers [134009]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles do not discuss potential consequences that did not occur as a result of the software failure incident at Medibank [133693, 133680, 134009]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The primary consequence of the software failure incident at Medibank was the exposure of sensitive personal information, including health claims, of millions of customers, leading to concerns about identity theft and potential misuse of the compromised data [134009]. |
| Domain | health | (a) The failed system was related to the health industry, specifically the health insurance sector. The software failure incident occurred at Medibank, one of Australia's biggest health insurance providers, leading to a major cybersecurity breach compromising sensitive customer data, including medical records [133693, 133680, 134009]. |
Article ID: 133693
Article ID: 133680
Article ID: 134009