| Recurring |
multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident having happened again at one_organization:
The article does not mention any specific information about a similar incident happening again within the same organization (Optus) or with its products and services. Therefore, it is unknown if a similar incident has occurred before at Optus [134014].
(b) The software failure incident having happened again at multiple_organization:
The article mentions that the home affairs minister, Clare O’Neil, highlighted that existing cybersecurity laws were "absolutely useless" when the Optus breach occurred. This implies that similar incidents or vulnerabilities might exist in other organizations as well, indicating a broader issue beyond just Optus [134014]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident at Optus, leading to a massive data breach where at least 150,000 passport and 50,000 Medicare numbers were stolen, was primarily attributed to security system and process vulnerabilities. Optus commissioned Deloitte to conduct an independent external review focusing on security systems and processes to understand how the breach occurred and prevent similar incidents in the future [Article 134014].
(b) The operation phase also played a role in the software failure incident at Optus. For example, the breach exposed the personal information of 10 million customers due to vulnerabilities in the system's operation and handling of sensitive data. The government services minister expressed concerns about Optus not proactively providing information on the exposed Medicare card numbers, indicating operational issues in responding to the breach effectively [Article 134014]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system, outside_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident at Optus, involving a massive data breach where at least 150,000 passport and 50,000 Medicare numbers were stolen, was primarily due to factors originating from within the system. Optus commissioned Deloitte to conduct an independent external review focusing on security systems and processes to understand how the breach occurred and prevent it from happening again. The review will help inform Optus' response to the incident and assist in rebuilding trust with customers [134014]. Additionally, Optus was working with technical professionals within the federal government and the Australian Signals Directorate to understand the breach and ensure other telecommunications providers do not have similar vulnerabilities [134014].
(b) outside_system: The software failure incident at Optus, specifically the data breach, also involved contributing factors originating from outside the system. For instance, the breach led to a ransom demand from an alleged attacker on a data breach forum, where records of 10,200 customers were posted online. The user later deleted the post, dropped the demands, and apologized for leaking the data. This external factor of a ransom demand from an attacker impacted the incident [134014]. Additionally, the government services minister mentioned that Optus had not provided Services Australia with information on which customers were exposed, despite the government's request, indicating external challenges in handling the aftermath of the breach [134014]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident at Optus was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a massive data breach where at least 150,000 passport and 50,000 Medicare numbers were stolen. The breach was a result of vulnerabilities in the security systems and processes, leading to the exposure of sensitive customer information [134014].
(b) Human actions also played a role in the incident. The government services minister, Bill Shorten, expressed concern about Optus not taking enough initiative to inform Services Australia about the customers whose Medicare card numbers were exposed despite the government's request. Additionally, the home affairs minister, Clare O'Neil, highlighted the inadequacy of existing cybersecurity laws during the breach and emphasized the need to review emergency powers for future incidents [134014]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article does not specifically mention any hardware-related contributing factors to the software failure incident reported by Optus [134014].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident at Optus was primarily due to a massive data breach where sensitive customer information, including passport and Medicare numbers, was stolen [134014].
- The breach led to the exposure of ID numbers, including driver's license numbers, Medicare card numbers, and other personal information of customers [134014].
- The breach resulted in the posting of records of 10,200 customers online as part of a ransom demand from an alleged attacker on a data breach forum [134014].
- The incident highlighted the need for a forensic assessment of the breach to understand how it occurred and prevent similar incidents in the future [134014]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious, non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case is malicious. The incident involved a massive data breach at Optus where at least 150,000 passport numbers and 50,000 Medicare numbers were stolen by an alleged attacker who posted the data online as part of a ransom demand [134014].
(b) Additionally, the incident involved a non-malicious aspect where Optus identified that 2.1 million customers had one form of ID number exposed in the breach, with 900,000 of those being ID numbers from expired documents. This exposure of sensitive data was not intentional but resulted from a security vulnerability in the system [134014]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions, accidental_decisions |
The intent of the software failure incident related to the Optus data breach appears to involve both poor decisions and accidental decisions:
(a) poor_decisions: The incident involved poor decisions such as the exposure of sensitive customer data due to vulnerabilities in Optus' security systems and processes. The breach resulted in the theft of at least 150,000 passport numbers and 50,000 Medicare numbers [134014].
(b) accidental_decisions: There were accidental decisions or mistakes made during the incident, as highlighted by the exposure of 2.1 million customers' ID numbers, including 900,000 from expired documents. Additionally, the breach led to the exposure of 36,900 Medicare card numbers [134014]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident related to development incompetence is evident in the article as it mentions the need for an independent external review by Deloitte to assess the security systems and processes at Optus following the massive data breach. The review was commissioned to understand how the breach occurred and to prevent similar incidents in the future, indicating a potential lack of professional competence in ensuring robust security measures [134014].
(b) The accidental nature of the software failure incident is highlighted in the article when it mentions that the breach resulted in the exposure of personal information, including passport and Medicare numbers, of a large number of customers. The incident was described as a breach that occurred due to vulnerabilities, and it led to the exposure of sensitive data accidentally, rather than as a deliberate act [134014]. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident reported in Article 134014 is related to a massive data breach at Optus, where sensitive customer information was stolen. This incident can be categorized as a temporary software failure due to contributing factors introduced by certain circumstances, such as vulnerabilities in the security systems and processes of Optus that allowed the breach to occur. The breach was not a permanent failure as it was caused by specific factors that led to the unauthorized access and theft of customer data [134014]. |
| Behaviour |
omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The incident involving Optus was not specifically described as a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions [134014].
(b) omission: The software failure incident at Optus resulted in the omission of performing its intended functions, specifically related to the security systems and processes that led to the massive data breach [134014].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident at Optus was not explicitly mentioned as a factor in the articles provided.
(d) value: The software failure incident at Optus resulted in the system performing its intended functions incorrectly, leading to the exposure and theft of sensitive customer data such as passport and Medicare numbers [134014].
(e) byzantine: The behavior of the software failure incident at Optus did not exhibit characteristics of a byzantine failure, which involves inconsistent responses and interactions [134014].
(f) other: The software failure incident at Optus could also be categorized as a security breach, where unauthorized access to sensitive data occurred due to vulnerabilities in the system's security measures [134014]. |