| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident has happened again at Anker and its popular security and doorbell camera brand Eufy. This incident involves security flaws related to data handling and cloud storage, similar to previous incidents reported with other home security camera companies like Wyze, Ring, and Google [135243].
(b) The software failure incident has also happened at other organizations, including home security camera companies like Wyze, Ring, and Google, which have faced privacy infringements and security flaws in recent years. This incident with Eufy cameras sending data to cloud servers despite promises of local storage adds to the list of similar incidents across different companies in the industry [135243]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident related to the design phase is evident in the case of Eufy cameras. Despite the manufacturer's promise of "local storage for your eyes only," it was discovered that some Eufy cameras send data to Eufy's cloud servers, even when cloud storage is disabled. This design flaw allowed thumbnail images of videos, facial recognition data, and user identifier information to be sent to the cloud, contrary to the initial claims of local storage only [135243].
(b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is highlighted by the fact that unencrypted live streams from Eufy cameras could be viewed using the open-source media player VLC without the need for authentication. This indicates a failure in the operation or security measures of the system, allowing unauthorized access to live streams [135243]. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) The software failure incident related to Eufy cameras sending data to Eufy's cloud servers despite promises of "local storage for your eyes only" and not immediately removing data from the servers after deletion can be categorized as within_system failure. This is evident from the fact that the issue was exposed by security researcher Paul Moore, who provided evidence of the vulnerability within the system [135243]. Additionally, the response from Eufy mentioning revisions to push notifications and being more clear about the use of cloud for push notifications indicates that the failure originated from within the system and its design or implementation [135243]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in this case appears to be related to non-human actions. The failure was due to the Eufy cameras sending data to Eufy's cloud servers, including thumbnail images of videos, facial recognition, and user identifier information, despite the manufacturer's promise of "local storage for your eyes only" [135243]. This indicates that the failure was a result of the software design and functionality rather than direct human actions. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
hardware, software |
(a) The software failure incident related to hardware:
- The article reports on a software failure incident involving Eufy cameras, specifically the Eufy Doorbell Dual and the EufyCam 3, sending data to Eufy's cloud servers despite promises of "local storage for your eyes only" [135243].
- Security researcher Paul Moore exposed the vulnerability by showing that thumbnail images of videos, facial recognition data, and user identifier information were sent to the cloud [135243].
- Additionally, Moore claimed that unencrypted live streams could be viewed using the open-source media player VLC without authentication [135243].
(b) The software failure incident related to software:
- The software failure incident is primarily attributed to software issues, as the Eufy cameras were sending data to the cloud despite claims of local storage [135243].
- Eufy acknowledged the issue and mentioned revising the push notifications option language in the Eufy Security app to be clearer about the use of cloud for push notifications in their marketing materials [135243]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
non-malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in this case appears to be non-malicious. The incident involves a vulnerability in Eufy cameras where data, including thumbnail images of videos, facial recognition, and user identifier information, is sent to the cloud servers despite the manufacturer's promise of "local storage for your eyes only" [135243]. The security researcher, Paul Moore, exposed this vulnerability and provided evidence of the issue. Additionally, the incident involves potential security vulnerabilities and the unauthorized viewing of unencrypted live streams using VLC without authentication, indicating a flaw in the system rather than a deliberate malicious act. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The software failure incident related to poor decisions is evident in the case of the Eufy security cameras. Despite the manufacturer's promise of "local storage for your eyes only," it was revealed that some Eufy cameras were sending data to Eufy's cloud servers, even when cloud storage was disabled. This decision to send data to the cloud without clear communication to users about thumbnail-based notifications requiring cloud hosting can be considered a poor decision [135243]. Additionally, the failure to ensure the security and privacy of user data, as highlighted by security researcher Paul Moore's findings, further emphasizes the impact of poor decisions in the design and implementation of the Eufy security cameras. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, accidental |
(a) The software failure incident in the article can be attributed to development incompetence. Security researcher Paul Moore exposed a vulnerability in Eufy cameras where thumbnail images of videos, facial recognition data, and user identifier information were sent to the cloud despite the manufacturer's promise of "local storage for your eyes only" [135243]. Moore demonstrated that this claim of entirely local and private storage was false, indicating a lack of professional competence in ensuring data privacy and security by the development organization. Additionally, the article mentions that Eufy is revising the push notifications option language in their app and consumer-facing marketing materials to be more clear about the use of cloud for push notifications, suggesting a need for improved communication and transparency in development practices.
(b) The software failure incident can also be considered accidental. The article highlights that Eufy cameras were sending data to Eufy's cloud servers, including thumbnail images of videos, even when cloud storage was disabled. This indicates that the data transfer to the cloud was unintentional or accidental, leading to a breach of user privacy and security. The article mentions that Eufy is working on clarifying the use of cloud for push notifications in their marketing materials, suggesting that the unintended data transfer may have been a result of oversight or accidental implementation rather than a deliberate action. |
| Duration |
temporary |
The software failure incident reported in Article 135243 can be categorized as a temporary failure. The incident involved a security flaw in Eufy cameras where data, including thumbnail images and user identifier information, was being sent to Eufy's cloud servers despite promises of local storage. This issue was highlighted by security researcher Paul Moore, who provided evidence of the vulnerability. Eufy acknowledged the problem and mentioned revising the push notifications option language in their app to be clearer about the use of cloud for push notifications. This indicates that the failure was due to specific circumstances related to the cloud storage implementation and not a permanent issue affecting all aspects of the software [135243]. |
| Behaviour |
value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in the article does not involve a crash where the system loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The issue reported is related to privacy infringements and security flaws in Eufy cameras, specifically regarding data handling and potential vulnerabilities [135243].
(b) omission: The incident does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, it pertains to how data is handled by the Eufy cameras, including sending data to cloud servers despite promises of local storage and potential security vulnerabilities [135243].
(c) timing: The failure is not related to the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The focus is on the data handling practices and potential security vulnerabilities in Eufy cameras, such as sending data to the cloud even when cloud storage is disabled [135243].
(d) value: The software failure incident does involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. Specifically, the incident relates to the mishandling of data by Eufy cameras, including sending thumbnail images and user data to the cloud despite claims of local storage and potential security vulnerabilities [135243].
(e) byzantine: The incident does not involve the system behaving erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The main issue highlighted in the article is related to data handling practices and potential security vulnerabilities in Eufy cameras, as exposed by security researcher Paul Moore [135243].
(f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a privacy infringement and security flaw related to data handling practices in Eufy cameras. This includes sending data to cloud servers despite promises of local storage, potential security vulnerabilities, and the accessibility of unencrypted live streams without authentication [135243]. |