| Recurring |
one_organization, multiple_organization |
(a) The software failure incident at Suffolk County government involving a malicious cyberattack and data breach is a case of a similar incident happening again within the same organization. The incident involved hackers exploiting a flaw in an obscure but commonplace piece of software to gain access to the county's computer system [136396]. Additionally, the article mentions a previous incident in September 2021 where one of the IT supervisors at the county clerk's office was arrested for public corruption and grand larceny related to unlawful use of computer systems [136396].
(b) The article mentions that since 2017, more than 3,600 local, state, and tribal governments across the country have been targeted by ransomware hackers, indicating that similar incidents have occurred at multiple organizations [136396]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) |
design, operation |
(a) The software failure incident in Suffolk County was primarily due to a flaw in an obscure but commonplace piece of software that hackers exploited to penetrate the county clerk's office system [136396]. This flaw allowed the hackers to gain access to the system and eventually breach the wider county network. The incident highlighted the importance of system development and updates in addressing vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors.
(b) The operation of the Suffolk County systems also played a significant role in the software failure incident. The decentralized structure of the county, with no centralized cybersecurity protocol across departments, allowed the hackers to exploit the vulnerabilities in the clerk's system and move laterally to other systems in the county, encrypting files and holding them hostage [136396]. Additionally, the failure of the antivirus software to detect the hackers' presence until several months after the initial breach also points to operational shortcomings in monitoring and responding to security threats. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) |
within_system |
(a) within_system: The software failure incident in Suffolk County was primarily due to contributing factors that originated from within the system. The hackers exploited a flaw in an obscure but commonplace piece of software within the county clerk's office, allowing them to penetrate the system and eventually breach the wider county network [136396]. Additionally, the investigation revealed that the hackers spent months within the clerk's system, installing remote-management tools, creating rogue user accounts, collecting login credentials, and encrypting files within the system itself [136396]. The failure to implement necessary cybersecurity measures and updates within the county's decentralized structure also contributed to the incident [136396]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) |
non-human_actions, human_actions |
(a) The software failure incident in Suffolk County was primarily due to non-human actions, specifically a malicious cyberattack carried out by hackers who exploited a flaw in an obscure but commonplace piece of software [136396]. The hackers first penetrated the county clerk's office system in December 2021 and spent months exploring the system undetected, installing remote-management tools, creating rogue user accounts, collecting login credentials, and encrypting files in various county systems [136396].
(b) However, human actions also played a role in the software failure incident. The information technology director for the clerk's office was put on paid administrative leave for acting in an "incredibly nonchalant manner" regarding cybersecurity, despite attempts to raise awareness about the need for better cybersecurity protection [136396]. Additionally, the decentralized structure of Suffolk County's cybersecurity operations, with no centralized cybersecurity protocol across departments, contributed to the hackers' success in breaching the systems [136396]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) |
software |
(a) The software failure incident in Suffolk County was primarily due to contributing factors that originated in software. The malicious cyberattack that targeted the county government exploited a flaw in an obscure but commonplace piece of software, allowing hackers to gain access to the system [136396]. The hackers spent months exploring the system undetected, installing remote-management tools, creating rogue user accounts, collecting login credentials, and encrypting files in different departments within the county [136396].
(b) The incident did not have a significant hardware-related contributing factor mentioned in the articles. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) |
malicious |
(a) The software failure incident in Suffolk County was malicious in nature. The failure was caused by a malicious cyberattack carried out by hackers who exploited a flaw in an obscure but commonplace piece of software to gain access to the county's computer system [136396]. The hackers stole sensitive data, disabled email for all civil service workers, demanded a ransom of $2.5 million, and ultimately breached the wider county network. The incident involved the installation of remote-management tools, creation of rogue user accounts with administrative permissions, theft of passwords, encryption of files, and other malicious activities carried out by the hackers over several months [136396].
(b) The software failure incident was not non-malicious. There is no indication in the articles that the failure was caused by unintentional factors or errors. The incident was clearly attributed to a deliberate and malicious cyberattack orchestrated by hackers with the intent to harm the system and steal sensitive data [136396]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) |
poor_decisions |
(a) The intent of the software failure incident:
- The software failure incident in Suffolk County was partly due to poor decisions made regarding cybersecurity measures. The information technology director for the clerkâs office had raised concerns about the need for more robust cybersecurity protection, but his requests were rebuffed, and he was put on paid administrative leave [136396].
- The decentralized structure of Suffolk County's cybersecurity protocols, with no centralized cybersecurity protocol across departments, contributed to the failure. This decentralized approach allowed the hackers to exploit vulnerabilities and move laterally within the county's systems [136396]. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) |
development_incompetence, unknown |
(a) The software failure incident in Suffolk County was primarily due to development incompetence. The malicious cyberattack that targeted the county government exploited a flaw in an obscure but commonplace piece of software, allowing hackers to penetrate the system and steal sensitive data [136396]. Additionally, the county's decentralized structure and lack of centralized cybersecurity protocol across departments contributed to the vulnerability that was exploited by the hackers [136396].
(b) The accidental aspect of the software failure incident is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. |
| Duration |
temporary |
(a) The software failure incident in Suffolk County was not permanent as the county's system is largely back online, but several workarounds remain in place [136396]. The incident was a result of a cyberattack that began in December 2021 and was discovered in September 2022, lasting for several months before being mitigated. The county took itself offline in response to the attack and has been working on restoring its systems.
(b) The software failure incident in Suffolk County can be considered temporary as the county's system is largely back online, indicating that the failure was not permanent [136396]. The incident was a result of a cyberattack that began in December 2021 and was discovered in September 2022, lasting for several months before being mitigated. The county took itself offline in response to the attack and has been working on restoring its systems. |
| Behaviour |
crash, omission, value, other |
(a) crash: The software failure incident in Suffolk County involved a crash as the system lost its state and was not performing its intended functions. The incident led to the county government being offline for weeks, forcing officials to resort to pen and paper and fax machines of the 1990s [136396].
(b) omission: The software failure incident also involved omission, as the system omitted to perform its intended functions at instances. For example, the hackers were able to exploit a flaw in an obscure but commonplace piece of software in the county clerk's office, allowing them to gain access and move undetected through the system for months [136396].
(c) timing: The timing of the software failure incident was also a factor, as the system failed to detect the intrusion for a significant period. The antivirus software of the county only began pinging about the cyberattack eight months and 21 days after it had actually begun, leading to a delayed response from the county [136396].
(d) value: The software failure incident also involved a failure in value, as the system performed its intended functions incorrectly. For example, the hackers were able to steal sensitive data, disable email for all civil service workers, and encrypt files in various county systems, leading to a breach of data security and integrity [136396].
(e) byzantine: The software failure incident did not exhibit a byzantine behavior as described in the articles.
(f) other: The software failure incident also involved other behaviors not described in the options. For instance, the incident highlighted the lack of centralized cybersecurity protocol across departments in Suffolk County, leading to vulnerabilities that were exploited by the hackers. Additionally, the behavior of the IT director in the clerk's office, who was put on paid administrative leave, showcased a lack of proactive cybersecurity measures and response to warnings about vulnerabilities [136396]. |