Published Date: 2021-10-08
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident related to Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) technology occurred over the years since its debut more than two years ago [Article 120372]. 2. The incident can be estimated to have happened around mid to late 2019 based on the information that Joel M. Young paid $6,000 for F.S.D. in 2019 and assumed he would receive a system that could drive anywhere on its own by year’s end, which remains beyond the system’s abilities two years later. This suggests the incident occurred around late 2019 or early 2020. |
| System | 1. Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) system [Article 120372] |
| Responsible Organization | 1. Tesla - The software failure incident in this case relates to complaints from customers regarding the Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) option not operating as advertised, leading to lawsuits and scrutiny from regulators and lawmakers [120372]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Tesla customers who purchased the Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) option [120372] 2. California Department of Motor Vehicles reviewing Tesla's use of the term Full Self-Driving [120372] 3. Senators Richard Blumenthal and Edward J. Markey calling on the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the marketing and advertising of Autopilot and F.S.D. [120372] |
| Software Causes | 1. The failure incident was caused by the Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) software not living up to its advertised capabilities, leading to customer complaints and lawsuits [Article 120372]. |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Overpromising and underdelivering on the capabilities of the Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) package, leading to customer dissatisfaction and legal action [120372]. 2. Concerns raised by experts and regulators regarding Tesla's marketing and advertising of its driver-assistance technologies, Autopilot and F.S.D. [120372]. 3. Tesla's decision to rely solely on cameras for autonomous driving, removing radar sensors from its new cars, despite industry standards and recommendations for additional sensors like lidar and radar for better understanding and predicting surroundings [120372]. |
| Impacts | 1. Customers who purchased Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) option complained that it did not operate as advertised, leading to dissatisfaction and legal action [Article 120372]. 2. The failure of the F.S.D. system to deliver on its promises resulted in customers questioning whether they had paid for a non-existent feature, leading to potential reputational damage for Tesla [Article 120372]. 3. The limitations and notable flaws of the F.S.D. system, such as stress and potential danger in lane-changing and occasional failures in summoning the car from a parking space, impacted the overall user experience and trust in Tesla's autonomous driving technology [Article 120372]. |
| Preventions | 1. Clear and accurate communication: The software failure incident related to Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) feature could potentially have been prevented through clearer and more accurate communication to customers about the capabilities and limitations of the technology [120372]. 2. Transparent marketing and advertising: Ensuring transparency in marketing and advertising of autonomous driving features like Autopilot and F.S.D. could have helped set realistic expectations for customers and prevent dissatisfaction and legal issues [120372]. 3. Thorough testing and validation: Conducting extensive testing and validation of the software before marketing and selling it to customers could have identified limitations and shortcomings early on, potentially preventing customer complaints and legal actions [120372]. |
| Fixes | 1. Implementing additional sensors like radar and lidar alongside cameras to improve the understanding of the car's surroundings and enhance safety [Article 120372]. 2. Gradually improving the software that analyzes and responds to what the cameras see to enhance autonomous driving capabilities [Article 120372]. 3. Ensuring that the technology can drive in any situation on its own before marketing it as full self-driving to avoid misleading customers [Article 120372]. | References | 1. Tesla owners who have purchased the Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) package, such as Joel M. Young and the two brothers in Southern California [Article 120372]. 2. Public advocacy website PlainSite, which revealed information obtained through a public records request [Article 120372]. 3. Senators Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts, who sent a letter to the chair of the Federal Trade Commission regarding the investigation of Autopilot and F.S.D. marketing and advertising [Article 120372]. 4. Bryant Walker Smith, an associate professor specializing in autonomous vehicles at the University of South Carolina [Article 120372]. 5. Jason K. Levine, executive director of the Center for Auto Safety [Article 120372]. 6. Other automakers like General Motors and Toyota, who offer driver-assistance technologies similar to Autopilot and F.S.D. but do not market them as self-driving systems [Article 120372]. 7. Companies like Argo, Cruise, and Waymo, which have been developing and testing autonomous vehicles for years [Article 120372]. 8. Chris Urmson, the chief executive of the autonomous vehicle company Aurora [Article 120372]. 9. Jake Fisher, senior director of Consumer Reports’ Auto Test Center [Article 120372]. 10. Schuyler Cullen, a computer vision specialist who oversaw autonomous driving efforts at Samsung [Article 120372]. 11. Amnon Shashua, chief executive of Mobileye, a company that supplies driver-assistance technology to major carmakers [Article 120372]. |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | multiple_organization | (a) In the provided articles, there is no specific mention of a similar software failure incident happening again within the same organization (Tesla) or with its products and services. The focus is primarily on the complaints and legal actions related to Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) feature not meeting customer expectations and the limitations of Tesla's autonomous driving technology. (b) The articles do mention that there have been complaints and legal actions from customers regarding Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) feature not living up to its promises. Additionally, there are references to concerns raised by Senators Richard Blumenthal and Edward J. Markey about investigating the marketing and advertising of Autopilot and F.S.D. by Tesla. These instances indicate that similar issues related to driver-assistance technology and autonomous driving systems have been raised by customers and regulators beyond just Tesla, suggesting a broader industry concern [120372]. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | design, operation | (a) The article mentions complaints among customers regarding Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) option not operating as advertised, despite customers paying significant amounts for the package [120372]. This failure can be attributed to the design phase, where contributing factors introduced during system development and updates have led to the system not meeting the promised capabilities. (b) The article also highlights concerns about people potentially being killed by misuse or glitches in Tesla's driver-assistance technology, including Autopilot and F.S.D. [120372]. This indicates a failure related to the operation phase, where contributing factors introduced by the operation or misuse of the system have led to safety concerns and potential incidents. |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) feature can be categorized as within_system. This is evident from the complaints among customers that the F.S.D. feature does not operate as advertised, with customers feeling they have paid for something that does not exist [Article 120372]. The limitations of the F.S.D. technology, such as the inability to drive anywhere on its own as initially promised, point to a failure within the system in meeting the expectations set by Tesla [Article 120372]. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | non-human_actions, human_actions | (a) The articles discuss a software failure incident related to non-human actions, specifically focusing on the limitations and failures of Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) technology. The F.S.D. feature, which is supposed to enable full self-driving capabilities, has been criticized for not living up to its promises and not being able to drive anywhere on its own as initially expected [120372]. (b) The articles also touch upon the aspect of human actions contributing to the software failure incident. Customers, such as Joel M. Young and two brothers in Southern California, have filed lawsuits against Tesla, accusing the company of fraud and breach of contract for not delivering what was promised with the F.S.D. feature. Additionally, Senators Richard Blumenthal and Edward J. Markey have called on the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the marketing and advertising of Tesla's Autopilot and F.S.D., indicating potential human actions leading to the failure incident [120372]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | software | (a) The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident occurring due to contributing factors originating in hardware. (b) The software failure incident related to the Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) feature offered by Tesla can be attributed to contributing factors originating in software. Customers have complained that the F.S.D. feature did not operate as advertised, with limitations and functionalities not meeting expectations set by Tesla [120372]. The limitations of the software, such as the inability to drive anywhere on its own as initially promised, have led to dissatisfaction among customers and legal actions against Tesla for fraud and breach of contract [120372]. Additionally, experts have pointed out the notable limits of the F.S.D. feature, indicating software-related challenges in achieving full autonomy and reliable self-driving capabilities solely through cameras without additional sensors like lidar and radar [120372]. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | non-malicious | (a) In the provided articles, there is no indication of a malicious software failure incident where the failure was due to contributing factors introduced by humans with the intent to harm the system. (b) The articles do discuss a non-malicious software failure incident related to Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) feature. Customers have complained that the F.S.D. feature does not operate as advertised, with limitations and functionality not meeting expectations. Customers have raised concerns about not receiving what was promised, leading to lawsuits and investigations into Tesla's marketing and advertising of the Autopilot and F.S.D. features [120372]. This non-malicious failure is attributed to limitations in the technology and the company's approach to driving automation. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | unknown | The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to poor_decisions or accidental_decisions. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | development_incompetence | (a) The article discusses a software failure incident related to development incompetence in the context of Tesla's Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) feature. Customers who paid for the F.S.D. package, expecting a system that could drive anywhere on its own, were disappointed as the technology did not live up to its promises even after two years [Article 120372]. This failure can be attributed to the lack of professional competence in developing a fully autonomous driving system that could meet customer expectations. (b) The article also hints at a software failure incident related to accidental factors. Tesla's approach to self-driving technology, relying solely on cameras and removing radar sensors, has raised concerns among experts about the safety and reliability of such a system. The decision to remove radar sensors may have been driven by cost considerations or a belief in the sufficiency of cameras alone, but it introduces risks related to crash rates and the ability to offer autonomous driving technology on a wide scale without driver oversight [Article 120372]. This accidental factor of underestimating the importance of additional sensors could lead to software failures in the autonomous driving system. |
| Duration | unknown | The articles do not provide information about a specific software failure incident being either permanent or temporary. |
| Behaviour | crash, omission, value, other | (a) crash: The article mentions concerns about people being killed by misuse or glitches in Tesla's driver-assistance technology, indicating potential crashes as a result of the system not performing its intended functions [Article 120372]. (b) omission: Customers have complained that the Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) option they purchased from Tesla does not operate as advertised. For example, the system was expected to be able to drive anywhere on its own by a certain time, but it remains beyond the system's abilities even after two years [Article 120372]. (c) timing: The article discusses how Tesla's approach to self-driving cars differs from other companies that are more conservative in their automation strategies. Tesla believes that cameras alone will be sufficient to guide autonomous cars, aiming to gradually improve the software to achieve full autonomy. However, the limitations of the technology and the slow progress suggest that the system may be performing its intended functions, but too late in achieving full autonomy [Article 120372]. (d) value: The article mentions limitations of the Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) system, such as automatically changing lanes being stressful and summoning the car from a parking space working only occasionally. These limitations indicate that the system may be performing its intended functions incorrectly in certain scenarios [Article 120372]. (e) byzantine: The article does not specifically mention the system behaving with inconsistent responses and interactions, so there is no direct evidence of a byzantine behavior in this context. (f) other: The "other" behavior observed in this case could be related to the overreliance of customers on Tesla's driver-assistance technology, leading them to believe their cars can do more on their own than they actually can. This overreliance can result in potential safety issues and misunderstandings about the capabilities of the system [Article 120372]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | no_consequence, theoretical_consequence | (a) death: The articles do not mention any instances of people losing their lives due to the software failure incident reported on Tesla's driver-assistance technology [Article 120372]. (b) harm: The articles do not mention any instances of people being physically harmed due to the software failure incident reported on Tesla's driver-assistance technology [Article 120372]. (c) basic: The articles do not mention any impact on people's access to food or shelter due to the software failure incident reported on Tesla's driver-assistance technology [Article 120372]. (d) property: The articles do not mention any impact on people's material goods, money, or data due to the software failure incident reported on Tesla's driver-assistance technology [Article 120372]. (e) delay: The articles do not mention any instances of people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure incident reported on Tesla's driver-assistance technology [Article 120372]. (f) non-human: The articles discuss the limitations and challenges of Tesla's driver-assistance technology, particularly in terms of autonomous driving capabilities and the reliance on cameras over additional sensors like lidar and radar. The focus is on the technology's ability to understand and predict surroundings accurately rather than any direct impact on non-human entities [Article 120372]. (g) no_consequence: The articles do not mention any real observed consequences of the software failure incident reported on Tesla's driver-assistance technology [Article 120372]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The articles discuss potential consequences of Tesla's driver-assistance technology, such as overreliance on the system by customers and the discrepancy between marketing claims and actual capabilities. There are concerns raised by experts about the safety and reliability of autonomous driving solely based on cameras without additional sensors like lidar and radar [Article 120372]. (i) other: The articles do not mention any other specific consequences of the software failure incident reported on Tesla's driver-assistance technology beyond those discussed in the options (a) to (h) [Article 120372]. |
| Domain | transportation, utilities, other | (a) The failed system in question is related to the transportation industry. The article discusses Tesla's driver-assistance technology, particularly the Full Self-Driving (F.S.D.) package, which is intended to enhance Tesla's Autopilot system [Article 120372]. The article highlights customer complaints about the F.S.D. not living up to its name and not being able to deliver full self-driving capabilities as promised. Additionally, there are legal actions taken by customers against Tesla for fraud and breach of contract related to the F.S.D. feature. (g) The failed system also has implications for the utilities industry. The article mentions concerns raised by experts and regulators regarding Tesla's use of the term Full Self-Driving and the limitations of the technology. There are discussions about the safety and reliability of Tesla's autonomous driving technology, which are crucial aspects in the utilities sector, especially in terms of power and safety services [Article 120372]. (m) The failed system can be categorized under the "other" industry as it pertains to autonomous vehicles and self-driving technology. The article contrasts Tesla's approach to self-driving technology with that of other companies like Argo, Cruise, and Waymo, which are developing autonomous vehicles for ride-hailing services. It discusses the differences in strategies and technologies used by various companies in the autonomous vehicle space, highlighting the unique position of Tesla in the industry [Article 120372]. |
Article ID: 120372