Published Date: 2021-04-15
| Postmortem Analysis | |
|---|---|
| Timeline | 1. The software failure incident happened on January 6, as reported in Article 113177. |
| System | unknown |
| Responsible Organization | 1. The software failure incident was not caused by any specific entity mentioned in the articles [113177]. |
| Impacted Organization | 1. Capitol Police [113177] 2. Washington’s Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) [113177] |
| Software Causes | unknown |
| Non-software Causes | 1. Insufficient number of officers and shortages of less-lethal weapons and protective equipment [113177] 2. Communications breakdowns within the police response [113177] 3. Decision by the United States Capitol Police to pull their personnel back inside the building, leaving flanks weak [113177] 4. Rioters attacking police flanks on the south and north, gaining access to upper terrace and breaking a window on the west side of the building [113177] |
| Impacts | 1. Insufficient number of officers and shortages of less-lethal weapons and protective equipment hampered the police response, leading to officers being vastly outnumbered by the mob [113177]. 2. Communications breakdowns within the police response hindered coordination and decision-making during the incident [113177]. 3. The inability to coordinate a fallback position due to lack of response to requests for guidance led to challenges in maintaining control of the situation [113177]. 4. The software failure incident resulted in the loss of the police line, forcing a retreat and ultimately allowing the mob to flood towards the building's entrances [113177]. |
| Preventions | 1. Implementing a more robust and efficient communication system for coordinating and deploying officers in emergency situations could have prevented the software failure incident [113177]. 2. Ensuring that the software used for crowd estimation and analysis is accurate and reliable to provide real-time data to law enforcement officers could have helped in better decision-making and resource allocation during the incident [113177]. 3. Conducting regular testing and simulations of the software and communication systems to identify and address any potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities before they impact critical operations could have mitigated the software failure incident [113177]. |
| Fixes | 1. Improved communication systems and protocols to ensure seamless coordination between different law enforcement agencies involved in such incidents [113177]. 2. Implementation of better crowd-monitoring software to accurately estimate the number of individuals present in critical areas during emergencies [113177]. 3. Enhanced crowd-control strategies and tactics supported by technology to prevent situations where law enforcement officers are vastly outnumbered by rioters [113177]. | References | 1. Police radio communications [113177] 2. Video footage [113177] 3. Testimony and interviews with police supervisors [113177] 4. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University [113177] |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Recurring | unknown | <Article 113177> does not provide information about a software failure incident happening again at one_organization or multiple_organization. Therefore, the answer to this question is 'unknown'. |
| Phase (Design/Operation) | unknown | The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to the development phases, specifically design or operation. Therefore, it is unknown whether the incident was caused by factors introduced during system development, system updates, or procedures to operate or maintain the system (design), or by factors introduced during the operation or misuse of the system (operation). |
| Boundary (Internal/External) | within_system | The software failure incident described in the article is primarily related to failures of planning and preparation within the system [113177]. The article details how the police response at the Capitol on Jan. 6 was severely disadvantaged due to factors such as insufficient number of officers, shortages of less-lethal weapons and protective equipment, and communication breakdowns within the police response. These factors originated from within the system and contributed to the failure of effectively handling the situation. |
| Nature (Human/Non-human) | unknown | (a) The software failure incident in this case does not seem to be related to non-human actions. The incident described in the articles primarily focuses on failures of planning and preparation that left the police at the Capitol severely disadvantaged during the events of January 6. There is no indication of any software or technical system being the direct cause of the failure. The failures mentioned include insufficient number of officers, shortages of less-lethal weapons and protective equipment, and communication breakdowns within the police response [113177]. (b) The software failure incident does not appear to be directly related to human actions causing a technical failure. The failures discussed in the articles are more related to human factors such as planning, preparation, decision-making, and coordination among law enforcement agencies during the events at the Capitol on January 6. There is no explicit mention of human actions causing a software or technical failure in this context [113177]. |
| Dimension (Hardware/Software) | unknown | The articles do not mention any software or hardware failure incidents related to the Capitol police response on January 6, 2021. Therefore, it is unknown whether the incident was caused by hardware or software failures. |
| Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) | non-malicious | (a) The software failure incident described in the article is non-malicious. The failure was primarily attributed to failures of planning and preparation that left the police at the Capitol severely disadvantaged during the events of January 6. The article highlights how the insufficient number of officers, shortages of less-lethal weapons and protective equipment, and communication breakdowns within the police response contributed to the challenges faced by law enforcement during the incident [113177]. |
| Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) | unknown | The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to poor_decisions or accidental_decisions. |
| Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) | unknown | The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to development incompetence or accidental factors. |
| Duration | unknown | The articles do not mention any software failure incident related to either a permanent or temporary duration. Therefore, the information to answer this question is 'unknown'. |
| Behaviour | other | (a) crash: The software failure incident in the article does not directly involve a crash of the system where it loses state and does not perform any of its intended functions. The failure described is more related to the planning and preparation failures that left the police disadvantaged during the Capitol riot incident [113177]. (b) omission: The failure described in the article does not involve the system omitting to perform its intended functions at an instance(s). Instead, it focuses on the insufficient number of officers, shortages of equipment, and communication breakdowns that impacted the police response during the Capitol riot [113177]. (c) timing: The software failure incident does not involve the system performing its intended functions correctly but too late or too early. The focus of the incident is on the challenges faced by the police due to planning and preparation failures during the Capitol riot [113177]. (d) value: The failure described in the article does not involve the system performing its intended functions incorrectly. The issues highlighted are more related to the lack of resources, communication breakdowns, and challenges faced by the police during the Capitol riot [113177]. (e) byzantine: The software failure incident does not exhibit the characteristics of a byzantine failure where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. The focus is on the challenges faced by the police due to inadequate planning and preparation during the Capitol riot [113177]. (f) other: The behavior of the software failure incident in the article can be categorized as a failure due to inadequate planning and preparation, leading to the police being severely disadvantaged during the Capitol riot. The failure is more related to organizational and operational shortcomings rather than a specific software malfunction [113177]. |
| Layer | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Perception | None | None |
| Communication | None | None |
| Application | None | None |
| Category | Option | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence | harm, other | (a) death: People lost their lives due to the software failure - There is no mention of people losing their lives due to the software failure incident reported in the articles [113177]. (b) harm: People were physically harmed due to the software failure - The articles describe how police officers suffered injuries as the mob grew in size and became more violent during the incident at the Capitol [113177]. (c) basic: People's access to food or shelter was impacted because of the software failure - There is no mention of people's access to food or shelter being impacted due to the software failure incident reported in the articles [113177]. (d) property: People's material goods, money, or data was impacted due to the software failure - The articles do not mention people's material goods, money, or data being impacted due to the software failure incident reported [113177]. (e) delay: People had to postpone an activity due to the software failure - The articles do not mention people having to postpone an activity due to the software failure incident reported [113177]. (f) non-human: Non-human entities were impacted due to the software failure - The articles focus on the impact on police response and the events at the Capitol, with no specific mention of non-human entities being impacted due to the software failure incident [113177]. (g) no_consequence: There were no real observed consequences of the software failure - The software failure incident at the Capitol had significant consequences on the police response and the events that unfolded, as detailed in the articles [113177]. (h) theoretical_consequence: There were potential consequences discussed of the software failure that did not occur - The articles do not discuss potential consequences of the software failure that did not occur [113177]. (i) other: Was there consequence(s) of the software failure not described in the (a to h) options? What is the other consequence(s)? - The primary consequence of the software failure incident reported in the articles was the severe disadvantage faced by the police at the Capitol due to failures of planning and preparation, leading to injuries and challenges in managing the growing mob [113177]. |
| Domain | government | The software failure incident reported in the provided article [113177] is related to the government industry. The incident specifically involves the failures of planning and preparation that left police at the Capitol severely disadvantaged during the events of January 6. The article details how the Capitol Police and D.C. police faced challenges due to insufficient numbers of officers, shortages of equipment, and communication breakdowns, ultimately leading to the breach of the Capitol building by a violent mob. Therefore, the failed system in this incident was intended to support the government industry, specifically in the realm of politics, defense, justice, and public services. |
Article ID: 113177