Incident: Tesla's Over-the-Air Software Updates for Safety Recalls.

Published Date: 2022-03-23

Postmortem Analysis
Timeline 1. The software failure incident involving Tesla's "full self-driving" software rolling through stop signs was reported in the article published on 2022-03-23 [125664]. Therefore, the software failure incident likely occurred around March 2022.
System 1. Tesla's "full self-driving" driver assist function rolling through stop signs 2. Some windshields not properly defrosting 3. Tesla's "Boombox" feature interfering with the pedestrian warning system [125664]
Responsible Organization 1. Tesla - Tesla was responsible for causing the software failure incident mentioned in the article by issuing recalls for issues related to its "full self-driving" driver assist function and other safety concerns [125664].
Impacted Organization 1. Tesla owners were impacted by the software failure incident as they had to deal with safety issues related to the "full self-driving" driver assist function and defrosting windshields [125664].
Software Causes 1. The failure incident was caused by Tesla's "full self-driving" driver assist function rolling through stop signs due to a software issue [125664]. 2. Another software cause of the failure incident was some windshields not properly defrosting due to a software issue [125664].
Non-software Causes unknown
Impacts 1. The software failure incident in Tesla vehicles led to safety issues such as the "full self-driving" driver assist function rolling through stop signs and some windshields not properly defrosting [125664]. 2. Tesla managed the recalls through over-the-air software updates, which were less burdensome for both the automaker and consumers compared to traditional recalls that require physical servicing [125664]. 3. The ease of implementing over-the-air recalls may lead to features being shipped with rough edges and inadequate testing, potentially turning consumers into beta testers and guinea pigs [125664]. 4. Tesla's "full self-driving" software recalls in October and February due to issues like unexpected activation of automatic emergency braking and rolling through stop signs highlighted the risks associated with software failures in vehicles [125664]. 5. The software failure incident in Tesla's Boombox feature, which interfered with the pedestrian warning system, required a recall and subsequent over-the-air software update to disable the function while the car is in motion [125664].
Preventions 1. Implementing more rigorous testing procedures before releasing software updates to ensure that features are thoroughly vetted and do not have rough edges [125664]. 2. Conducting comprehensive risk assessments to identify potential issues that could arise from software updates, such as unexpected activations or malfunctions [125664]. 3. Enhancing communication and collaboration between software development teams and safety experts to address potential safety concerns before releasing updates [125664].
Fixes 1. Over-the-air software updates can fix the software failure incident, as demonstrated by Tesla's approach to addressing safety recalls by pushing out updated software wirelessly [125664]. 2. Automakers like Mercedes-Benz and General Motors have also utilized over-the-air updates to address software flaws and issues in their vehicles [125664].
References 1. Tesla owners 2. Don Slavik, attorney focused on motor vehicle product liability 3. Sean Kane, founder of the research organization Safety Research & Strategies 4. John Bozzella, CEO of the Alliance for Automotive Innovation 5. Mercedes-Benz spokesperson Anne McGregor 6. General Motors spokesperson Chris Bonelli 7. Michael Brooks, chief counsel at the Center for Auto Safety 8. Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla [125664]

Software Taxonomy of Faults

Category Option Rationale
Recurring one_organization, multiple_organization (a) In the article, it is mentioned that Tesla had to recall its "full self-driving" software twice due to issues. In October, the automatic emergency braking function was activating unexpectedly, and in February, the software was programmed to slowly roll through stop signs in some cases. This indicates that Tesla experienced software failure incidents with its "full self-driving" software multiple times [125664]. (b) The article also discusses how Mercedes-Benz and General Motors have issued over-the-air updates in the past and are considering using them more in the future. Mercedes-Benz addressed a recall through an over-the-air update to fix a flaw in its system, while General Motors issued an over-the-air software update to limit speeds of the Chevrolet Corvette. This shows that other automakers have also experienced software-related issues and have utilized over-the-air updates to address them [125664].
Phase (Design/Operation) design, operation (a) The software failure incident related to the design phase can be seen in the article where Tesla had to issue recalls for its "full self-driving" driver assist function rolling through stop signs and some windshields not properly defrosting. These issues were fixed through over-the-air software updates, indicating that there were contributing factors introduced during the system development or updates that led to these failures [125664]. (b) The software failure incident related to the operation phase is evident in the article discussing how the ease of implementing over-the-air recalls may encourage automakers to ship features that are rough around the edges and may not have received adequate testing. This can lead to failures due to the operation or misuse of the system, as seen in cases where Tesla had to recall its "full self-driving" software multiple times due to unexpected activations and issues like rolling through stop signs [125664].
Boundary (Internal/External) within_system (a) within_system: The software failure incident related to Tesla's recalls and software updates can be categorized as within_system. Tesla issued recalls for safety issues such as its "full self-driving" driver assist function rolling through stop signs and windshields not properly defrosting. These issues were addressed through over-the-air software updates, indicating that the failures originated from within the system itself [125664].
Nature (Human/Non-human) non-human_actions, human_actions (a) The software failure incident occurring due to non-human actions: - Tesla's "full self-driving" driver assist function rolling through stop signs was a safety issue that was fixed through an over-the-air software update, without requiring human intervention [125664]. - The over-the-air software updates provided by Tesla and other automakers are aimed at addressing safety issues and flaws in the software that could potentially lead to accidents or malfunctions, without the need for human involvement in the fixing process [125664]. (b) The software failure incident occurring due to human actions: - Experts raised concerns that the ease of correcting a car's software through over-the-air updates may lead automakers to ship features that are not thoroughly tested or may be rough around the edges, potentially putting consumers at risk [125664]. - There were instances where Tesla had to recall its "full self-driving" software due to issues like the automatic emergency braking function activating unexpectedly and the software being programmed to slowly roll through stop signs, highlighting potential risks introduced by human decisions in software development and deployment [125664].
Dimension (Hardware/Software) hardware, software (a) The article mentions instances where automakers like Mercedes-Benz, General Motors, and Ford issued over-the-air software updates to address hardware-related issues. For example, Mercedes-Benz addressed a flaw in its system that could prevent people from calling emergency services through some vehicles [125664]. General Motors issued an over-the-air software update to limit speeds of the Chevrolet Corvette when the hood isn't completely closed to prevent accidents [125664]. Ford also updated software on its Focus sedan to prevent engine stalls [125664]. (b) The article discusses software failures that led to recalls and updates. For instance, Tesla had recalls related to its "full self-driving" software, such as unexpected activation of automatic emergency braking and rolling through stop signs [125664]. Additionally, Tesla's Boombox feature was recalled as it interfered with the pedestrian warning system, showcasing a software-related issue [125664]. The article also highlights the potential downside of software fixes, where automakers may prioritize short-term software solutions that could lead to underlying issues in the future [125664].
Objective (Malicious/Non-malicious) non-malicious (a) The articles do not provide information about a malicious software failure incident. [125664] (b) The articles discuss non-malicious software failure incidents related to safety recalls in the automotive industry. Tesla issued recalls for issues such as its "full self-driving" driver assist function rolling through stop signs and windshields not properly defrosting. These issues were addressed through over-the-air software updates to fix the safety concerns without requiring physical visits to service centers, making the process less burdensome for both the automaker and consumers. Other automakers like Mercedes-Benz and General Motors have also utilized over-the-air updates to address recalls and improve safety features in their vehicles. However, there are concerns that the ease of implementing over-the-air updates may lead to shipping features that are not thoroughly tested, potentially introducing new issues. [125664]
Intent (Poor/Accidental Decisions) poor_decisions, accidental_decisions The articles provide information about software failure incidents related to both poor decisions and accidental decisions: (a) poor_decisions: The articles mention instances where the ease of implementing over-the-air recalls through software updates may encourage automakers to ship features that are rough around the edges and may not have received adequate testing. This can lead to situations where humans are essentially used as beta testers and guinea pigs, which is not an ideal scenario [Article 125664]. (b) accidental_decisions: The articles also highlight cases where software failures were due to unintended consequences or mistakes. For example, Tesla had to recall its "full self-driving" software because the automatic emergency braking function was activating unexpectedly, increasing the risk of rear-end collisions. Additionally, the "full self-driving" software was programmed to slowly roll through stop signs in some cases, which was not the intended behavior [Article 125664].
Capability (Incompetence/Accidental) accidental (a) The articles do not provide information about a software failure incident related to development incompetence. (b) The articles mention a software failure incident related to accidental factors. For example, Tesla had to recall its "full self-driving" software in February because it was programmed to slowly roll through stop signs in some cases, which could be considered an accidental issue [125664].
Duration permanent, temporary The articles discuss software failure incidents that can be categorized as both permanent and temporary: (a) Permanent: The articles mention instances where software failures led to safety issues in Tesla vehicles, such as the "full self-driving" function rolling through stop signs and windshields not properly defrosting. These issues were addressed through over-the-air software updates, indicating that the software failures were permanent until the updates were applied [125664]. (b) Temporary: On the other hand, the articles also highlight temporary software failures that were addressed through over-the-air software updates, such as the unexpected emergency braking issue and the issue with the Chevrolet Corvette's hood not being completely closed. These temporary failures were rectified through software updates, suggesting that the failures were due to specific circumstances that could be resolved through updates [125664].
Behaviour omission, value, other (a) crash: The articles do not mention any specific incidents of software crashes where the system lost state and did not perform any of its intended functions. (b) omission: The articles discuss instances where Tesla's "full self-driving" software was recalled due to issues such as rolling through stop signs and some windshields not properly defrosting. These issues can be categorized as omissions where the system omitted to perform its intended functions at instances [125664]. (c) timing: There is no specific mention of software failures related to timing issues where the system performed its intended functions correctly but at the wrong time. (d) value: The articles highlight software failures where Tesla's "full self-driving" software was programmed to slowly roll through stop signs and the Boombox feature interfering with the pedestrian warning system. These incidents can be categorized as failures due to the system performing its intended functions incorrectly [125664]. (e) byzantine: The articles do not provide information on software failures related to byzantine behavior, where the system behaves erroneously with inconsistent responses and interactions. (f) other: The articles mention concerns raised by experts about automakers potentially shipping features that are rough around the edges and may not have received adequate testing. This can be considered as another behavior of software failure where the system behaves in a way that raises questions about its reliability and safety [125664].

IoT System Layer

Layer Option Rationale
Perception sensor, processing_unit, embedded_software (a) sensor: The article mentions a safety recall by Tesla related to an unexpected emergency braking issue that was fixed through an over-the-air software update, indicating a sensor-related failure [125664]. (b) actuator: There is no specific mention of a failure related to an actuator in the articles provided. (c) processing_unit: The article discusses Tesla's recalls related to its "full self-driving" software, which had issues such as activating emergency braking unexpectedly and rolling through stop signs, indicating failures related to the processing unit [125664]. (d) network_communication: The articles do not provide information about a failure related to network communication. (e) embedded_software: The article mentions Tesla's recalls related to its software, including the "full self-driving" software and the Boombox feature, indicating failures related to embedded software [125664].
Communication unknown The articles do not provide specific information about a software failure incident related to the communication layer of the cyber physical system that failed.
Application FALSE The software failure incident related to the application layer of the cyber physical system that failed is not explicitly mentioned in the provided article. Therefore, it is unknown whether the failure was specifically related to the application layer as defined.

Other Details

Category Option Rationale
Consequence non-human (a) death: There is no mention of any deaths resulting from the software failure incident in the provided article [Article 125664]. (b) harm: The article does not mention any physical harm caused to individuals due to the software failure incident [Article 125664]. (c) basic: The incident did not impact people's access to food or shelter [Article 125664]. (d) property: The software failure incident did not result in any direct impact on people's material goods, money, or data [Article 125664]. (e) delay: There is no mention of any activities being postponed due to the software failure incident [Article 125664]. (f) non-human: The software failure incident primarily affected vehicles and their software systems, which are non-human entities [Article 125664]. (g) no_consequence: The article does not mention any observed real consequences resulting from the software failure incident [Article 125664]. (h) theoretical_consequence: The article discusses potential consequences of software failures, such as the risk of rough features being shipped without adequate testing, but does not mention any specific theoretical consequences that actually occurred [Article 125664]. (i) other: The article does not describe any other specific consequences of the software failure incident beyond those mentioned in the options (a) to (h) [Article 125664].
Domain transportation (a) The failed system was related to the transportation industry. The software failure incident discussed in the articles pertains to Tesla's vehicle recalls due to safety issues, such as the "full self-driving" driver assist function rolling through stop signs and windshields not properly defrosting. Tesla addressed these safety recalls with over-the-air software updates, which is a growing trend in the auto industry [Article 125664]. The transportation industry heavily relies on software in modern vehicles, especially electric vehicles, making software updates crucial for ensuring safety and functionality.

Sources

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